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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to analyze the major factors which led to landmarks 
in the evolution of social security in Greece during the turbulent period between 
1920 and 1990. The development of hundreds of different social insurance 
schemes and the lack of reliable information makes a full history almost 
impossible. The landmarks are chosen both for their impact on population 
coverage as well as for the principles they established. The first ever state social 
insurance was introduced in 1922 followed by the Social Insurance Organization 
(IKA) in 1934 - the compulsory scheme for white and blue collar workers in the 
urban areas; in the post war period there were desperate efforts to establish social 
assistance to help the casualties of the Second World War and the successive civil 
war. An attempt to reorganize IKA failed in 1951. Agricultural social insurance 
was established in 1961. Finally the repressive social insurance reform of 1990 
attempted to correct the social policies of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
Seventy years after the early state social insurance policies, the nature of 
the Greek social security system is unique - a mosaic of almost four hundred social 
insurance funds - reproducing huge inequalities, inconsistencies and inefficiencies. 
Moreover, the "system" reached a financial deadlock in the late 1980s, threatening 
the country itself with bankruptcy.
The faulty development of the social security system reflects the 
irresponsibility, indecisiveness and opportunism of Greek politics, not met in 
other European countries. What is shown is that the social security model in 
Greece is embarrassingly characterized as an accumulation of political bribes in 
favour of particular socio-professional groups. Rational decisions have never been 
taken. In fact, social policy is meant and used as a form of social politics.
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PREFACE
The development of social security in Greece is an illuminating example 
of a rigorous attempt to establish the young Greek state after its liberation from 
the Turks. The legacy of 400 years under Turkish occupation and Ottoman rule 
was catastrophic. Greece never had the opportunity to assimilate the 
Renaissance, the revival of art and letters from the 14th to the 16th century, even 
though - ironically - this was built upon the classical models of Ancient Greece. 
The Industrial Revolution occurred in this most fragile region of Europe only in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Following their political leaders faithfully, Greeks - not 
rarely - found themselves fighting one another, ever deepening the gap in national 
progress compared to other European countries. The Greeks have lacked an 
innate collective spirit, solidarity and long-run thinking.
This thesis is a critical analysis of the factors which led to the landmarks 
in the evolution of social security in Greece during the turbulent period between 
1920 and 1990: the introduction of a wider state social insurance policy in 1922 
(Chapter I); the establishment of compulsory social insurance for white and blue 
collar workers after long discussions in the 1932 -1937 period (Chapters II and 
III); the urgent social assistance policies in the aftermath of the Second World 
War and the successive civil war between 1944 and 1960 (Chapter IV); the 1950s’ 
attempts to reorganize the social security system (chapter V);the establishment of 
the agricultural insurance scheme in 1961 and its impact (Chapters VI and VII); 
the crisis of the Greek Welfare State (Chapter VIII); the 1990 wide intervention 
and its reflections (Chapters IX and X). The existence of almost 400 social 
insurance funds in Greece makes a full history of social security almost 
impossible. The writer’s premise is that the tough historical legacy determined the
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introduction and implementation of social policies. The national disasters of the 
20th century and the prevailing upheaval prevented sensible decisions.
However, the careful study of the socio-political environment has 
inescapably led the writer to question whether the impact of the arduous 
conditions is a sufficient explanation. Was this the only reason for the formation 
of a social policy which lacked determination, planning and coordination, and was 
overrun by political opportunism, irresponsibility and dilettantism? A broad 
exploration of the impact of the social measures shows that a considerable part of 
the legislation remained inactive as a result of lack of political will.
"Social security lacks a base in education at any level and is relatively 
neglected as a subject of university research" (I.L.O., 1984).Not much research 
work has yet been done in this field in Greece as well. The very few books written 
dealing with social security in Greece - mentioned in the Greek Bibliography - are 
referring to limited periods and issues, mainly for the period of the 1930s, and 
most of their contents is devoted to theoretical aspects of social insurance. The 
reason is clear. Historical research is laborious and sometimes desperate, since 
the statistics available - especially before 1950 - are disconnected and 
controversial. The bulk of public records for the period before 1950 have been 
destroyed during the World War II and the civil war which followed. In this 
respect, the main sources used have been Parliamentary Records - during periods 
when the essential social legislation passed - and press articles reflecting the 
picture of each period, coming from newspapers supporting both the government 
and the opposition.
Research work has been carried out on the premises of the main social 
insurance organizations, using both their records and the experience and 
knowledge of several employees. Valuable descriptions were given by Mr. J. 
Zarras, already in his eighties in five interviews in the spring of 1987. He was one 
of the instigators of the crucial social insurance reform of 1932, holding the 
position of Secretary of the Special Preparatory Committee of the 1932 Bill.
13
Moreover, for decades he was the "Expert", the writer of articles on social 
insurance issues for the newspaper "Kathimerini". The author has been fortunate 
to have had for the last twelve years, the consecutive cooperation of Professor M. 
Raphael - the first and only Professor of Social Administration in Greece. He has 
contributed immensely to the instigation and enrichment of all stages of this 
thesis.
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THE INTRODUCTION OF STATE SOCIAL 
INSURANCE POLICY IN GREECE, 1920 -1922
A theoretical framework: Bismarck versus Beveridge
"To bring about an improvement in conditions of life and work 
throughout the world, the International Labour Office emphasizes the promotion 
among member States of social security measures to guarantee income 
maintenance for all in need of such protection, comprehensive medical care, and 
child welfare and maternity protection... In the long term social security has much 
more far reaching objectives than the mere fight against poverty. Social security 
must aim at the maintenance of the level and quality of life and at the 
strengthening of the individual feeling of security" (1).
This thesis, setting out the causes and effects and attempting an 
evaluation of the development of social security in most of the twentieth century 
in Greece, aims to point out the faults for those who are likely to influence social 
security policies and programmes of the country. "Social security has grown to a 
vast size in a fog of public ignorance about it. Misunderstandings are widespread 
and give rise to the exploitation of public prejudices" (2). Social insurance and 
assimilated schemes are defined as systems of social security, based both on flat 
rate and on earnings - related benefits coming from contributions and subsidies.
The policy of social security affects economic, financial and legal policies 
and is in turn affected by repercussions from these sectors. A purpose-oriented 
approach to the social security policies in Greece however, cannot avoid 
discussing the prevailing Bismarck and Beveridge models, allowing later on in this 
thesis a gradual extraction of such elements as are linked with the established 
policies.
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Bismarck, as German Chancellor, introduced in 1881 a new approach to 
social policy. The general idea was that the curing of social ills is not to be found 
in the repression of social democratic excesses exclusively, but also in the 
furtherance of workers’ well-being (3). It should be emphasized that the labour 
movement at that time did not demand legislation on social security. Bismarck’s 
basic idea was tying workers to the State by providing welfare benefits. He 
considered social policy primarily as a means to an end and he was quite open- 
minded in principle as how it should be implemented (4).
In brief, Bismarck’s principles were, firstly, that benefits as a proportion 
of earnings intended to give an element of protection of living standards while at 
work - if this meant that the low paid fell below the poverty line, so be it; secondly, 
those who paid contributions got the benefits but those who did not, might not get 
them. In other words, social insurance, according to Bismarck, had nothing to do 
with poverty.
If the German social security system had been exactly as Bismarck 
wanted it when starting to pacify workers, it would have been characterized by: 
the principle of state welfare and provision; a centralized state-controlled office; 
and financing by taxes and employers’ contributions (5). This pure Bismarck’s 
model would actually come somewhat closer to the Beveridge Plan. But, it was 
only parliamentary resistance in the Reichstag - the German Parliament - which 
modified the initial concept towards a system based on insurance principles, the 
decentralized self-government of the institutions; and the legal claim to benefits 
founded on contributions made by the claimant (6).
The German example showed not only that the principles of a 
contributory, compulsory insurance for wide sections of the population could 
become a reality, but also that its positive effects, from the workers’ point of view, 
led to internal peace without weakening the productive resources of the economy. 
The classical principles of Bismarck’s social insurance and the established socio­
political legacy, have survived the political and economic tides of German history
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(7).
While Bismarck’s idea was to pacify the German workers by welfare 
benefits, Beveridge’s idea sixty years later was to use universal benefits to remove 
the poverty caused by certain contingencies, such as unemployment, injury, 
sickness, widowhood, retirement and large families (8). In the middle of the 
Second World War, during the period when Britain was left alone to fight Hitler’s 
Germany, the Beveridge Report was published. It was seen by many throughout 
the world as the dawning of a new age to replace the pre-war horrors of mass 
unemployment, inability to afford health care and poverty in sickness, widowhood 
and old-age (9). The Report designed policies which would overcome the battle 
against the "five giants on the road to reconstruction" - Want, Disease, Ignorance, 
Squalor and Idleness.
Beveridge expanded the group over which risks are pooled to the whole 
community, a universalism which marked his approach out of the narrower 
industrial groups sharing risks in the Bismarckian model (10). The wartime spirit 
of social solidarity is one reason to explain the "euphoric reception" of the 
Beveridge Report in late 1942, and the sea-change in public opinion in favour of 
his proposed reforms (11). The Report, balancing both collectivism and 
individualism inherent in any social policy, formulated an ideology of collectivist 
social insurance which promoted the full realization of the reconciliation between 
community and society that insurance makes possible (12).
Beveridge helped change the prevailing concept that social insurance was 
not a matter of interest to the citizen, but to the economic producer as a number 
of particular classes or economic groups. He drastically reinforced the solidaristic 
potential of social insurance. A minimum level of material well-being, basic 
protection against the vicissitudes of mortality and the inequalities of the market, 
was now, like the vote, to be every citizen’s birthright (13) .The universalization of 
risk-sharing and the recognition that all citizens would be equivalently dependent 
on the State’s aid were to establish a social security system where stigma would be
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removed. Sir William’s strategy of inducing the insurance principle was to twist 
social security benefits from a state charity accompanied by stigma, to a right of 
citizenship earned by the contributor.
The vital concept of social citizenship as inaugurated by Beveridge and 
reinforced by Marshall and Titmuss, raised the potential contradiction between 
citizenship and contributor-ship. If all cannot be contributors can they be citizens 
(14)? Civil and political rights are generally accepted as unconditional, but social 
rights are not. Beveridge expanded the circle of full community membership at 
the same time as he enlarged the nature of citizenship. He claimed that the 
concept of social citizenship presented the citizen as a contributory participant, 
drawing the key relationship of social rights with market principles.
It is crucial to distinguish at the end of the day, between Beveridge’s 
vision and the rhetoric with which it was expressed, and the practical details of his 
proposals (15). Certainly, after the Second World War, a considerable number of 
countries introduced social insurance measures much closer to the progressive 
Beveridgian model than to the traditional Bismarckian one. The model of non­
means-tested flat rate insurance benefits has definitely not become the 
international pattern. The most durable innovation of the Beveridge Report is its 
concern with a national minimum, envisaged by the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty of the European Community (16).
The alleviation of poverty was the centre of the Beveridge Report and 
nothing else. Contributions were only used to give a minimum flat rate benefit; 
coverage was to be stretched as far as an insurance scheme could be credibly 
stretched e.g. housewives; family allowances would be provided for all; health care 
- not really based on insurance - would be provided for all.
Our present social security system still bears the mark of the traditional 
Bismarckian reflex and the important legacy of Beveridge (17). Both appear to 
be the founders and instigators of contemporary social policies, covering their own 
side of the same rolling coin. Irrespective of the winning side, the value of the coin
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will be always the same. Bismarck is not versus Beveridge.
The foundation of labour protection policies
After the Greek Revolution of 1821, the liberation from Turks of almost 
half of the areas where hellenism survived despite the 400 years of Ottoman rule, 
was achieved. Until 1922, national effort was directed towards the liberation of 
those Greeks still under Turkish occupation and little attention was given to social 
policy.
Before 1860, the State was to some extent concerned with poor relief, 
public health and the insurance coverage of specific occupational groups. 
Pensions were only granted to limited groups or individuals after direct 
application to the King who was the one to decide by a royal ordinance, allocating 
money from the Treasury. Destitution was the first social policy issue which 
attracted state attention in 1833 (18); not all the poor but only the indigent 
holding a certificate of work incapability, were entitled to protection. This 
coverage was organized at the level of local government and the cost of relief 
provided was undertaken by the local community. Bearing in mind that at this 
time almost all the Greeks were poor and that no resources were available, in the 
absence of information, we reach the assumption that state poor relief had a very 
marginal role. As we know, the extended family was the leading agency in social 
protection.
In May 1834, a Central Medical Committee was appointed (19),aiming to 
scrutinize the existing medical problems and was authorized to cope with all 
medical problems. By that time public health - and it must have been very 
substandard - was provided by district physicians. State services were 
concentrated in preventive measures against contagious diseases and attention 
was paid in the establishment of basic medical legislation.
In the social insurance field, the State was primarily involved with the 
protection of government employees and workers engaged in dangerous
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occupations. According to European practice the early provisions were pensions. 
The first ever, occasionally provided, benefits were given to officers and soldiers 
of the army, to the war disabled and to the judiciary. The level of benefit 
depended mainly on the status of the recipient.
The first organized social insurance attempts are met in 1834 when 
legislation concerning invalid municipal primary school teachers was introduced 
(20). At the same time, the intention of the King "... to create a special fund for 
invalid seamen" was expressed in public, becoming legislation which led to the 
establishment of the scheme two years later (21). Both experiments failed to 
succeed since they were not implemented, mainly due to the turbulent political 
environment, as well as the lack of pressure coming from the unorganized 
occupational groups involved (22).
It seems that 1861 was the turning point for the start of social insurance 
in Greece. It was then that at last the invalid seamen’s pension fund (23) was 
established and a relevant pension fund for miners (24) introducing the constant 
state concern with these two occupational groups. Moreover it was in 1861 when, 
following the relevant French legislation of 1853, the public servants’ pension 
fund (25) was created, including primary and secondary school teachers, judges 
and army and navy officers and soldiers (26). These funds provided pensions for 
invalidity, old-age and death, protecting either the employees or their widows and 
orphans.
The history of the public servants’ insurance coverage - including always a 
special section for the armed forces - finds its origins in the 1830s. Until 1861 
pensions depended on royal ordinances including only the "loyal" government 
servants. The first bill concerned with a pension scheme for public servants was 
dropped in 1856 due to political instability. The second bill of 1861 became the 
XNB’ Act of 3 August 1861 introducing the scheme which would provide earnings 
- related pensions for: old-age, at the age of sixty following twenty-five years of 
service or simply after twenty-five years of service; invalidity, for any reason after
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a three months waiting period and ten years of service unless invalidity was due to 
employment; death, for widows and orphans of an old-age pensioner or in any 
case when death was due to employment.
The public servants scheme of 1861 included teachers and judges and was 
to be financed by an annual state contribution by an employees’ contribution of 5 
per cent of annual salary, by the first monthly salary of new-comers in service, by 
special fines, etc. Some opposition was expressed for the employees’ contribution 
and political promises for pension increases and contributory conditions decreases 
were given (27). Notably, it was clearly confessed that up to then public servants 
were appointed "by virtue of favouritism, ... sympathies, obligations and 
acquaintances..." ( 28). In 1866, the qualifying period for an old-age pension 
decreased from twenty-five to twenty years of service and in 1877, when the 
scheme was incorporated with Treasury funds, pensions decreased by 10 per cent 
and contributions increased to 7.5 per cent retroactively.
The factors which led to this kind of development were, in summary, the 
need for measures protecting military officers and soldiers as well as the main 
arduous occupations, the establishment of parliamentary procedures which 
introduced practices such as lobbying and political bribes, the pressure exercised 
by many public servants having participated in the Revolution but now of retiring 
age, and the influence of European social insurance legislation (29).
Consequently several pension funds were gradually established such as 
for civil employees of the military forces (1867), for the employees of the National 
Bank (1867) and the Bank of Athens (1906), for the employees in the railways of 
Athens-Piraeus-Peloponnesus (1907), of Thessaly (1908), of south-western 
Greece (1908), of Larissa (1913), etc. (30).
In the meantime, in 1905, following a period of huge deficits of the public 
servants’ scheme, an insurance law increased again the contributory conditions: 25 
years of service for old-age pension not payable before the age of sixty, 
contribution rate of 9 per cent of salary. This reform provoked huge reactions
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among public servants. In response, the progressive Venizelos Government 
introduced several reforms in 1911, aiming to provide greater security of tenure to 
public servants. A measure prohibiting their dismissal in any case, except of fraud 
or abolishment of the respective position, was established! The justification of this 
"double-edged knife" treatment, which became in 1952 a constitutional right 
called "the public servants’ permanence", rested on the grounds of political 
interventions in the public sector, which provoked huge purges of public servants 
following changes of governments. Venizelos also introduced public examinations 
for those wishing to enter the public service.
In 1914, two primitive but critical uniform insurance attempts should be 
mentioned. Firstly, Law No 551 of 1914 called "The Workmen’s Compensation 
Act" provided lump sum compensation for work injuries. Secondly, Law No 281 of 
1914 introduced the option of the establishment of mutual aid funds. Both laws 
failed to be implemented on a large scale, either due to employers’ disinterest or 
due to employees’ reluctance to participate. In addition, the Treaty of Peace in 
Versailles (1919) which included social policies on the principle of social justice 
led to debates on social insurance in Greece. In the same year the foundation of 
the International Labour Office (I.L.O.) led to an international campaign for the 
expansion of protective labour measures through the international labour 
conferences and the respective conventions.
After 1914, the socio-political scene in Greece was dominated by the 
First World War and the Balkan Wars and again, little attention was given to 
social policy measures in the field of workers’ protection. The consequences of 
the war led to pressing needs and priority was given to war pensions, to measures 
for the orphans of soldiers, to the resettlement of Greek refugees from Turkey 
and Eastern Europe and of those suffering from the Bulgarian cruelty. In 1916 the 
Venizelos Government, temporarily seated in Thessaloniki, introduced the Social 
Assistance Department but this was abolished a year later when the Ministry of 
Social Welfare was established. The new Ministry was mainly concerned with the
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support of soldiers and their families, war victims and war refugees.
During World War I, most European socialist movements opposed the 
war and many socialists rejected participation in it. Consequently, the Greek 
labour movement was motivated against the Venizelos’ policies before the end of 
the war. The Government attempted to manipulate the situation by trying to 
divide the trade unionists (31). These conditions constrained labour demands and 
weakened trade unionism. In 1918 there were 367 unions in the country with less 
than a hundred thousand members divided by ideological conflicts and lacking any 
form of association and unity.
The need for a labour confederation enforced a Jewish unionist from 
Thessaloniki, Abraham Benaroyas, to undertake the arduous task of trying to 
federate all the existing unions. Benaroyas organised a "Pan-Hellenic Labour 
Conference" which in October 1918 introduced the General Confederation of 
Greek Labour (G.C.G.L.) and with it the principle of class conflict. A year later 
the G.C.G.L. appealed to the Government, demanding a decrease of working 
hours, wage rises and social insurance, warning that if these demands were refused 
they would organise a national general strike.
During a Parliamentary debate Venizelos - having to his credit important 
reforms established in the early 1910s such as the expropriation of land and 
property, the introduction of compulsory but free primary education, of minimum 
wages for women and children, of the official recognition of trade unions, etc. - 
advocated the socialist principles but attacked the "Bolshevik political thought" of 
Benaroyas. On the other hand, Venizelos emphasized that social insurance for 
workers was a central issue for his Government but was delayed only due to 
financial and administrative problems.
In 1920 the Minister of National Economy stated again that the 
Government should establish a social insurance scheme ".... not only because it is 
bound to do so according to international conventions ratified by our country; 
moreover such measures are in line with our national objectives... (the
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establishment of social insurance) will control class conflict by improving the 
standard of living of working people". However, there is no clear evidence that the 
Liberals had prepared a social insurance legal framework before their election 
defeat of November 1920.
The disaster of Asia Minor
The Sevre jconvention of 1920, after the end of the First World War, 
annexed to Greece West and East Thrace and the islands Imvros and Tenedos. 
Moreover, an extended area around Smyrna in Asia Minor was to be under Greek 
Administration. The Venizelos’ triumph appeared unique, but the national price 
was very high. His personal dispute with Prince Constantine, which started in 
1912, became a national schism, dominating the social and political life of the 
country in the inter-war period. Hate, persecution and cruel terrorism were 
exercised by both sides. The political regime was the dominating issue, the choice 
between monarchy and democracy.
In the 1920 general elections the focus was on foreign policy. The 
monarchists were in favour of "a small but dignified Greece", of peace and 
demobilization. The Liberals were campaigning for "the Great Greece of the two 
continents and the five seas". Venizelos maintained his power among the workers 
and the liberal middle class of the urban areas, but lost his popularity among the 
agricultural classes which cost him the loss of the elections.
The conservative Populist party, which won the elections undertook the 
task of elaborating a general social insurance scheme. Venizelos went into self- 
imposed exile. The Populists’ leader, Dimitris Gounaris, had been the first to 
mention social insurance in 1902. Some weeks before the elections the death of 
King Alexander led to a problem of succession. The elected monarchist 
government carried out a plebiscite which led to the re-establishment of his 
father, the exiled King Constantine, causing the allies - who predicted political 
and financial repercussions - serious anxiety. Constantine’s restoration provoked
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most of all, the deepening of the national schism concerning the issue of 
monarchy versus republic, Constantinists versus Venizelists.
The new Government faced significant problems in the implementation 
of the Sevre Convention’s conditions. The situation in Asia Minor was 
dangerously fragile because the Greek Administration had to confront a hostile 
Turkish majority. The monarchists, attracted by the idea of a Great Greece, 
reconsidered their ideas of prolonging the extensive foreign policy of Venizelos. 
In the meantime, the allies distrust of the monarchist administration and the 
displacement of their interests, reoriented their policy and support. Greeks were 
left on their own to confront the aggressiveness of the new Turkish nationalists 
under the inspired revolutionary leadership of Kemal Ataturk. Simultaneously, 
the clearance of Venizelos’ supporters from the army, resulted in a decline in its 
morale and efficiency.
The first two decades of the century saw several hundred thousand 
Greeks abandon their homes in Western Turkey, where Greek Communities had 
thrived for two and a half millenniums. But the final exodus was precipitated by 
Greek determination to annex part of Turkey, which it had helped defeat during 
the 1914-1918 war.
Greece’s invasion, already launched from 1919, was repelled by a 
reinvigorated Turkish army under Ankara’s leader Ataturk. First Greek 
inhabitants and then the retreating army fell back on the port of Smyrna, now 
Izmir. When the Turks arrived carrying with them memories of earlier Greek 
atrocities, they sacked the refugee-swollen city. Two hundred thousand people 
lined the quay, waiting for rescue or massacre. Looting and rape were pandemic, 
and thousands of Greeks were slaughtered. An American observer, Charles 
Howland, wrote that "the scene would have warmed the heart of Tamerlane on 
one of his black days".
A "Dunkirk-like evacuation" followed with American and British 
destroyers alongside leaky fishing boats ferrying the refugees. Further evacuations
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on the Aegean coast and from Black Sea ports followed. Upwards of 900.000 fled 
to Greece in that first wave, under horrifying conditions. Henry Morgenthau, a 
League of Nations official, reported that "typhoid and smallpox swept through the 
ships. Lice infested everyone.... Men and women went insane. Some leapt 
overboard to end their miseries in the sea. Those who survived were landed 
without shelter upon the open beach, loaded with filth, racked by fever, without 
blankets or even warm clothing, without food and without money". This was the 
bitter end of the Greek presence in Asia Minor after 2.500 years of expansion and 
civilization, it was the death of the dream of a Greek Empire, the so called "Great 
Idea".
A few weeks before the Smyrna catastrophe, the conservative Populist 
Government brought to Parliament the first ever compulsory social insurance Bill. 
The introduction of the law was based on Bismarck’s basic principles. "... By 
relieving workers during the difficult periods the State improves their physical and 
mental standards, and prevents sympathy to communist and revolutionary ideas" 
(32) .The Bill was passed by Parliament thus opening the era of the general 
development of this field in Greece. It became Law No 2868 of 1922 concerning 
"the compulsory insurance of workers and employees in urban areas" and 
constituted a landmark in the evolution of social protection in Greece. This law 
attempted above all to establish this new institution in the conscience of the mass 
of the working population.
The Law was passed while the country was engaged in a painful war and 
as it did not introduce immediate liabilities, it did not consequently provoke 
counter reactions. John Rallis, the Minister of National Economy, said in 
Parliament that the introduction of social insurance was considered by the 
Government to be a significant contribution to the prosperity of working people, 
and to the improvement and development of their lives. The Minister
concluded:.... "by alleviating the difficulties of working people, we contribute to
their material and moral exaltation, keeping them from communist and subversive
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influences; we strongly believe that the State is obliged to undertake that care, for 
the progress and prosperity of society" (33).
The First Social Insurance Bill of 1922
The new legislation was very brief and contained the following provisions:
a. Every dependent working person should be insured, i.e. employees in industry,
handicraft, commercial enterprises, building and transportation. In addition, 
those employed in home industries and handicrafts were allowed to be 
included in the scheme.
b. The risks covered were death, old-age and disability. The respective pensions
provided were for any kind of work-accidents and work incapacity, old-age 
pensions, mental or physical disability pensions. The dependants - mainly 
widows and children - would be entitled to death pensions; death pensions 
could be further transferred to under age sisters and brothers or disabled 
ones, to dependant parents or grandparents. Males under 15 and females 
under 20 years were considered as under age. Disability was to be 
determined by the funds’ Board of Directors after the submission of a 
medical report.
c. Contributions were to be defined by a forthcoming decree.
d. The following ways of organization were anticipated: funds for single
companies, funds of Industrial Associations, funds of mining companies and 
state funds for the remaining uninsured workers and private employees, 
aiming to cover gradually the uninsured working people.
e. The funds, the "insurance agencies" according to the legislation, would be under
the State control of the Ministry of National Economy. Each fund was 
allowed to introduce its own constitution to be approved by the Minister, on 
the recommendations of a "Supervising Board of Working Insurance". 
Constitutions should define the contributory conditions and provisions, the 
financial resources of the fund, the composition and duties of the Board of
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Directors, the administration and financial procedures, and the 
representatives of the fund (34).
f. The "insurance agencies" were established as independent organizations
administered by employees (2/3) and employers (1/3) representatives.
g. The administrative body of each fund was defined to be the Board of Directors,
members of which would be the employers’ and employees’ representatives 
(35).
h. Pensions would be provided on a monthly basis paid in advance. In the case of 5
years lapse of time, debts to pensioners who might fail to collect their 
pension would be withdrawn (36). Pensions’ transfer or attachment were 
allowed for up to a third in the case of allowances due to woman from their 
ex-husband after legal separation (37).
i. A three member Control Committee (two insured persons and a state
representative), were to submit a report on the accounts to the Ministry 
(38).
j. Special decrees providing the detailed arrangements would be issued in order to 
facilitate the implementation of the law. 
k. Employers not accepting compliance with the law would pay a penalty of two 
thousand drachmas.
As article 12 of the 2868 Law anticipated, a royal decree was in fact 
prepared, said to be concerned mainly with administrative issues and was passed 
by Parliament on 19 November 1923. The coverage of industrial accidents was 
abolished but the announcement of another forthcoming special royal decree was 
anticipated aiming at the establishment of a health insurance scheme which would 
provide for hospital fees. Death pensions were restricted only for widows and 
orphans. According to vague administrative regulations, contributions were finally 
defined as the variable percentage of 3 to 7 per cent for each insurance sector 
depended on the level of pay . Companies with more than 70 employees operating 
for at least 3 years were required to run their individual own insurance fund.
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Similar companies were allowed to establish joint funds. The decree provided a six 
months period for the organization of these funds and a low penalty for each 
month of delay. The Minister was authorized to prepare and issue in the future 
special decrees by which insurance legislation would be applicable to companies 
employing less than 70 employees.
Reflections
It is clear that the law No 2868 of 1922 as amended by the Royal Decree 
of November 1923, was the first major step in the introduction of compulsory 
social insurance in Greece and in the adoption of this field as an essential part of 
state policy. Until then, as we have seen, only a minority of organized 
occupational groups of the working population, mainly seamen, miners and public 
servants, were covered by special social insurance pension schemes.
The law was characterized as "very brief, inefficient, .. (and) 
nebulous",...(but) consisting a boost in the motivation of social insurance (39). The 
1922-3 legislation envisaged almost all feasible ways of organization. Notably, 
companies with more than 70 employees were bound to organize their own 
company funds. Most of these mini-funds proved non-viable both in terms of 
organization and finance while collaboration between them was hard to establish. 
In addition, each single fund was allowed to determine arbitrarily its provision, 
eligibility regulations, contributions level and calculations. In this respect the law 
strengthened the existing variations in provisions. The lack of coordination and 
state control as well as of political continuity contributed significantly to the 
establishment of huge discretion among the several social insurance funds and 
their insured working people.
The law, introduced in such a turbulent socio-political period and having 
no immediate effect, was nearly ignored by public opinion and the employers’ 
lobbies. It also failed actually to introduce health insurance - anticipated by the 
1923 decree - though the need of such provision was an urgent national priority.
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At that time, very few employees enjoyed health insurance coverage; health 
services were provided mainly by public hospitals, by local authorities and by 
voluntary activities (40). Sickness coverage was among the issues discussed during 
the debates for the preparation of the new legislation (41) but rumours persisted 
that the final exclusion of health insurance was due to the pressure exercised by 
doctors. This was a crucial original gap, stretched by the low level of public health 
provisions in Greece during this period.
In terms of finance, the law provided special indirect taxation on luxury 
consumption goods, but refused to introduce a state contribution. The main 
financial problems arose due to the low number of contributors, though the law 
included both manual and non-manual employees. A census of 1920 (42) 
indicated that the working people employed in companies with more than 26 
people amounted to just around one quarter of the total registered number of 
industrial employees. According to I.L.O. information (43) in 1925 only 17.000 
working people were insured in comparison with 10.000 people in 1922. These 
figures undoubtedly indicate the poor practical impact of the law.
Another strategic deficiency of the law was the inadequate provision of 
measures against failure to implement the regulations introduced. The fines for 
those employers refusing to follow the new insurance legislation were extremely 
low and in any case much less costly than establishing a fund, while no specific 
supervising measures were taken. In this respect, employers especially in the rural 
areas - almost ignored the law (44). This explicitly demonstrates the weak support 
for its introduction and the lack of organized pressures for its implementation.
After a dramatic upheaval following the Asia Minor Disaster, Venizelos’ 
Liberal party won the December 1923 elections, while the royalists largely 
boycotted the vote. The Director of the Labour Directorate, A. Zakkas, 
appointed by the new Liberal Government, immediately recognized the 
weaknesses of the 1922-3 insurance legislation. In a letter sent to the I.L.O. (45), 
he announced "amendments to be brought to Parliament" aiming to improve the
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2868 law’s regulations. In fact, these promises were not fulfilled.
Some months earlier, in April 1923, a special royal decree was issued by 
the Government of Colonel Gonatas, a militaiy junta, which decreased once again 
the qualifying period for public servants’ old-age eamings-related pension to 
twenty years of service, irrespective of sex. This adjustment provided pension 
increases respective to the years of service and the last year’s earnings granted 
pensions at the age of 60, after just ten years of service (46). In addition, it 
enlarged considerably the transferability conditions of death pensions not only to 
widows and orphans, but to parents and unmarried sisters and daughters for life
(47). Strikingly, the 1923 decree provided invalidity pensions to doctors, either 
private or contracted in public service, on the condition that invalidity occurred 
during service for infectious or contagious diseases or during service provided in 
war areas (48). Death pensions for doctors’ families were respectively granted. In 
general, the scheme provided invalidity pensions but in case invalidity did not 
occur during service, a ten years working period was required (49).
In brief, the insurance regulations defined by Law No 2868 as well as 
their implementation can be seen only as a first but vital step towards a national 
compulsory social insurance scheme aiming at income maintenance according to 
Bismarck’s anti-revolutionary strategy. The scheme was to provide eamings- 
related pensions and failed to include health insurance. The legislators put the 
initiative for the organization and the implementation of social insurance in the 
hands of employers; in other words they asked the wolves to look after the sheep.
This law of "strategic" importance, inaugurated the era of state 
intervention in the field and is consequently considered as the milestone of social 
insurance in Greece. However, this law proved to be the milestone for the 
dispersion of the field as well as the start of absurd wider social insurance policies; 
it founded the roots for the State’s concept of unrestricted creation of 
fragmentary small pension funds lacking any actuarial estimates and ignoring 
essential social insurance principles. This was simply a falsification of the orthodox
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Bismarckian model.
Finally, during this turbulent period, the insurance privileges of the 
already matured public servants scheme were confirmed. Since 1861, when their 
scheme was introduced, almost 250 acts and decrees had been set forth, 
establishing, abolishing and re-establishing remarkable pieces of social insurance 
legislation. In this respect, the State pursued the strategy of unequal distribution 
of resources in the social insurance arena, reinforcing respective demands coming 
from other powerful socio-professional groups.
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II
TEN YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT, 1922 -1932
The turbulent socio-political environment
The decade 1922 - 1932 marks a very interesting and fertile period for 
social security developments in Greece. The 1922 Asia Minor Disaster provoked 
numerous counter-effects in the socio-political life of the country as well as a 
prolonged painful recession. The compulsory exchange of population between 
Turkey and Greece increased the existing 5.5 million population of Greece by less 
than 1.5 million refugees allocated to the rural and urban areas. The 1928 census 
gave the following underestimated figures - overall population 6.200.000 from 
2.600.000 in 1907; refugees from Turkey 1.104.216; from Russia 58.526; from 
Bulgaria 49.027.
The urgent need for resettlement caused an exacerbation of social 
problems and the State was compelled to act in order to alleviate the housing and 
health care problems, the employment and unemployment disorder, problems of 
urban and rural restoration and of social adaptation. During this period according 
to legislation of 1917, the State distributed two million acres of land to refugees 
and to the poorer farmers, in spite of the landowners’ reaction, thus alleviating 
the problems of the new-comers to the rural areas. An international "Committee 
for the Refugees Restoration" (EAP) was established which between 1923 and 
1930 allocated, in addition, houses to almost 150.000 refugee families. Moreover, 
EAP created in 1925 dispensaries for the free medical treatment of refugees in 
Macedonia and Thrace, the two regions of Northern Greece, the most organized 
and reliable health services of this period. Furthermore, according to press 
releases, public assistance played a significant supportive role, complemented by 
the Church and Private Voluntary Organizations.
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The successful resettlement of the refugees in the rural areas was not 
achieved for those entering the big cities. Wealthy businessmen from Asia Minor’s 
lucrative cities were forced to become blue collar workers since they had not been 
able to bring with them most of their belongings. Some successfully exercised their 
talent and contributed significantly to the development of trade and industry. 
However, the bulk of urban refugees were conscripted to the bottom of the labour 
market, causing a fall in wages and unemployment, while the cost of living kept 
steadily increasing. In Athens, where the population was doubled between 1920 
and 1928, the refugees were established in the suburbs, living in most cases in 
misery and facing problems of public health and social rehabilitation. In fact, 
Greece responded rather well to the overwhelming pressures exercised by the 
arrival of the refugees. Their influence on the social, political and economic life 
was remarkably positive, when the acute problems of the first years were 
resolved.
On the political scene, the refugees vote played a decisive role in the 
abolishment of the monarchy in the 1924 plebiscite when 70 per cent of the people 
voted against a monarchy and in favour of a republic (1). The reason for the 
refugees’ votes was that they blamed the royalists for the disastrous foreign 
policies which led to their misery, keeping their support for the Venizelos side. 
This political reform facilitated more progressive policies in the field of social 
protection and especially in social insurance.
The implications of Law No 2868 of 1922 prevailed in the social 
insurance developments during the period between 1922 and 1925. The law 
reinforced the further carve up of social insurance; tiny organizations and mini­
funds were established covering even one single enterprise, lacking any actuarial 
basis or any rational proportional economic or mathematic calculation. Moreover, 
the State introduced "selective" financing in some of them by "social resources", 
revenues coming from indirect taxes, allocated according to political criteria.
The climate seemed to change in 1925 when A. Papanastasiou, the leader
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of the "Sociologists", the Greek Fabians, became for a very short period Prime- 
Minister. He had been advocating the implementation of broader social welfare 
policies since 1909, and encouraging multinational cooperation (2).
After 1925, new funds for certain occupational groups of self-employed 
were introduced, covering the main insurance sectors and some unemployment. 
Funds for lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, dentists, notaries, stockbrokers, artisans, 
custom officers, small traders, high-level technicians, commerce employees, etc. 
were established. The realization that social insurance was the major institution in 
the protection of working people and their families, resulted in the fiourishment 
of pension schemes, of the most powerful professional classes and social insurance 
obtained a wider character. It should be noted that according to the 1928 census 
more than one-third of the working population were self-employed.
In 1926, a "very serious insurance organization" was established, the 
tobacco workers’ insurance fund, the first ever, according to the existing data, 
including organized health and unemployment insurance (3). It covered sickness, 
maternity, disability, death and unemployment risks of one of the largest, 
occupational groups, which developed early its occupational consciousness. This 
fund, significantly subsidized by the State, was established in Thessalonika; its 
instigator was Christos Agallopoulos, an expert who became a legend for social 
security in Greece. The scheme applied the system of free choice of doctor after 
pressures from local doctors’ associations; this system was later abolished due to 
cash benefits’ large abuses in Kavala (4). Agallopoulos organized the institution 
on "scientific and healthy regulations" reaching within three years an important 
level of coverage for the morale, the health and the economic situation of insured 
tobacco workers. They achieved a higher standard of living and improved 
industrial relations, although their organization was one of the first to experience 
the communist influence. "It consisted of one of the most perfect laboratories, 
having as its mission the application of the Social Insurance institution" claimed J. 
Zarras, a social security expert (5).
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After a year, in 1927, following international developments and 
agreements (6), the Greek Republic introduced a new constitution which laid 
down that manual and intellectual work should be protected and supervised by the 
State which should be responsible for "the promotion of the morale and material 
well-being of the working population". This statement contributed to a deeper 
elaboration and developed public awareness for the need of systematic and 
universal social insurance policies.
During this period further insurance funds were created, either due to 
forceful lobbying or due to dangerous occupational conditions: flour mill and 
bakery workers, printers, dockers, musicians, actors, bank employees, drivers, 
railwaymen, etc. achieved the establishment of their own insurance rights. 
According to the 1928 census 31 per cent of the total working population were 
employees in industry, transportation, commerce, mining and handicrafts; 32 per 
cent of them were self-employed while 8 per cent were employers.
The Draft of the Unemployment Law, 1927
During the mid-twenties the unemployment problem (7) became a major 
source of social upheaval. The massive invasion of refugees was, of course, the 
main reason for the bulk of the unemployed. Unemployment was, in addition, 
enhanced by the measures restricting immigration to the U.S.A., a country 
traditionally absorbing the jobless but the ambitious part of the Greek labour 
force prepared to take risks. The prolonged war periods on the other hand, 
obliged many women to work (8) in order to support their families, replacing their 
husbands fighting in the battle field.
Following international concern for unemployment insurance (9), and 
stressing the risk of domestic turbulence, the "ecumenical government" formed 
after the November 1926 elections, decided in 1927 to introduce to Parliament a 
draft of a law on unemployment coverage. Until then, institutionalized 
unemployment insurance had been achieved only by some organized pressure
39
groups, namely the tobacco, the flour mill and the bakery workers. These funds 
were heavily subsidized by the State with revenues coming from taxes on the 
product of their labour. Finally, unemployment benefits in kind for food, 
accommodation, health care and travelling expenses were provided to seamen in 
order to "protect them from the Communist propaganda and the businesslike 
exploitation by the hotel owners" (10).
The 1927 draft of the law provided for the establishment of an 
unemployment institution covering dependent employees in industry, handicrafts, 
transportation, trade and commerce, mining and building. The Introductory 
Report described in the first place the unemployment policies implemented in 
other countries, focusing on the problem of financing the scheme. The main stated 
arguments were the comparatively low number of working people entitled as 
contributors as well as the "sporadic" payment of contributions. Furthermore, the 
Report attempted to illustrate as causes of the rise of unemployment in the 
country the invasion of refugees and the economic recession "and not the world­
wide industrial crisis or a rapid increase of the population".
The draft was prepared by A. Zakkas, an expert appointed as Director of 
Labour in the Ministry of National Economy. The unemployment scheme would 
be financed by employers’ and employees’ contributions depending on wage- 
classes with an increasing percentage respectively. Employers were required to 
pay contributions higher than those of employees. Unemployment benefits would 
be drawn according to wage-classes as well, while a family supplement for children 
under 18 years of age was provided. Benefits would be given for 45 days extended 
up to 100 days for special cases after permission from the Unemployment Council. 
Exact figures for benefits and contributions as well as the administrative 
regulations were to be defined by a forthcoming special decree.
A decision of the G.C.G.L. to delay the passing of the law in Parliament 
"in order to elaborate the consequences provoked by the new labour legislation", 
as well as the loss of power of the ecumenical government resulted in the
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abandonment of the unemployment draft law. This was an unfortunate 
development which kept unemployment coverage missing from the protection 
sphere of working people for the next twenty years. In addition, this was an 
excellent example of ineffective state action due to political instability.
Earlier in the same year, in May 1927, the ecumenical government 
introduced to Parliament a draft law concerning the insurance of industrial 
accidents according to the employers’ proposals (11). This draft, following the 
concept of the Workmen’s’ Compensation Convention held in Geneva in 1925, 
provided benefits for industrial accidents amounting to from 45 to 60 per cent of 
wages. Contributions would be paid by employers to specific banks from which 
employees would receive the benefits. Industrial diseases were surprisingly 
excluded from this coverage. However, this bill was dropped in Parliament. 
According to some views (12), this frustration was the result of the hidden 
opposition of the Ministry (13), which was preparing itself another draft of a law 
for this coverage. It seems anyway that this proposed legislation became the victim 
of political ambitions as well as of a lack of any coordination for social policy 
measures.
At a time when, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the vast 
majority of working population were still uncovered, the objectives of the labour 
movement remained vague (14). G.C.G.L., the leading trade union body since 
1918, was far from exercising pressure for the extension of social insurance. 
However, the 5th Pan-Hellenic Labour Conference held in Athens from 7 to 15 of 
May 1928 voted for a declaration introduced by D. Stratis, concerning the 
introduction of a complete social insurance system. The declaration emphasized 
that "... in a civilized state, it is unacceptable that the worker-producer of wealth, 
by whose work the society remains alive, is abandoned uncovered to the risks 
provoked by it (the society)" (15).
Of course, the political developments of the early 1920s did not allow 
adequate space for free trade unionism; several unionists were occasionally
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imprisoned or exiled for their political beliefs. Moreover, the confederation was 
experiencing strong conflicts between its members and its two wings, the right and 
the left. In 1925, the left wing unionists were discharged from the G.C.G.L. and 
introduced a second confederation, the "unitive" G.C.G.L. Ideological conflicts 
and personal ambitions resulted in a lack of unity, coordination and common 
objectives, lessening its impact and shrinking its power. In this respect, labour 
representatives in the little space left for proposals and labour demands, did not 
succeed in intervening effectively for the establishment of a national uniform 
social insurance scheme in Greece (16).
Political stability... at last
The Government formed by the Liberals in August 1928 was the first 
after many years with an overwhelming majority in Parliament, allowing 
expectations at last for a some kind of political stability. A prolonged strike of 
tobacco workers provoked a general labour upheaval and an employers- 
employees committee was appointed to alleviate the problems (17). Before the 
end of 1928, the new Government brought to Parliament a bill concerning social 
insurance aiming to improve the situation of the existing funds. The main 
provision of this bill was the introduction of subsidiary funds financed by 
employees’ contributions in order to increase pensions which had become 
devalued due to the high rate of inflation during the post-war period. The Bill was 
finally dropped since priority was given to legislation introducing compulsory 
insurance against industrial accidents which was expected shortly. However, this 
issue entered the agenda and certain groups achieved the establishment of their 
subsidiary fund. Finally in May 1929, a draft prepared by the Labour Directorate 
of the Ministry of National Economy concerning compulsory social insurance for 
employees in urban areas was submitted to I.L.O. for elaboration and further 
suggestions.
During this period, the most powerful occupational groups achieved their
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own pension funds: millworkers and oven-workers; lawyers, notaries and bailiffs, 
custom officers, small traders, employees in commerce and in theatres, 
contractors of public works, marine agents, etc. The insured employees were 
covered against disability, old-age and death by 68 different insurance funds. Only 
half of them provided sickness insurance based on reimbursements.
Health care services were still mainly provided by public assistance and 
the Local Authorities, which concentrated upon institutionalised provisions 
(sanatoriums, mental hospitals, asylums, maternity hospitals) supplemented by 
voluntary bodies. Hospitals were concentrated in the urban areas; official statistics 
indicated that in 1929 one-half of the available beds (5.107) and 40 per cent of 
doctors (1.914) were congested in a range of 200 kilometres around Athens, in an 
area where only about one-sixth of the total population was living. In 1930, in 
Athens and Thessaloniki where 25.2 per cent of the population was living 
according to the 1928 census, 55.1 per cent of the beds available were 
concentrated (18).
The substandard of public health produced embarrassing health indices: 
in 1928 the death rate was 17 per thousand, infant mortality almost 93 per 
thousand and tuberculosis resulted in 20 per cent of annual deaths; one sixth of 
the population was infected by malaria every year in the 1920s while 75 per cent of 
the male population had venereal diseases (19). In addition, the poor housing 
conditions exacerbated the situation; in 1928 more than 75 per cent of workers’ 
families in Athens lived in one room, 10 per cent of these houses had a kitchen 
and just one per cent had a proper bathroom (20). The number of doctors in 1928 
was 6.220 according to the Medical Association and in 1930 only 5.084 according 
to the Greek Statistical Services; the rate of doctors to inhabitants was 1:1.250, a 
relatively satisfactory one.
Large differences were already observed in the way insurance funds were 
organized and financed. Enormous dissimilarities existed on the extent of 
coverage, the contributory conditions, the systems used for their financial
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reserves. This anarchy is explicitly presented in Appendix A, and constitutes the 
basis for the formulation of a fragmented social insurance system.
The introduction of a general social insurance scheme was seriously 
mentioned in public for the first time in 1929. The Prime-Minister Venizelos 
speaking to the people in Thessalonika said: "...a bill is already drafted which is 
about to provide an occupational sickness benefit and a benefit for work 
accidents. The passing of that bill, however, will not complete the concern of the 
State and of society for a permanent improvement in the labour world. This 
concern will be always inadequate, if coverage for sickness, invalidity, old-age and 
death, is not established" (21).
A letter by Albert Thomas, a French socialist leader, director of the 
Social Security Department of I.L.O., written to Andreas Zakkas, director of the 
Employment, and Social Assistance of the Ministry of the National Economy on 
11 May 1929 mentioned: "I carefully read the report of my colleague A.Tixier 
about his mission to Greece, according to my instructions. He reports your wide 
programme of social reform in reorganizing and reinforcing labour inspection, 
better implementation of labour legislation and the introduction of a full 
compulsory social insurance system,... This nice programme is obviously more 
extended than the promises given - substantial but still restrained - to Tbder by P. 
Vourloumis, the Minister of National Economy and by Venizelos himself. Both of 
them take into account what the economy of your country can afford, thinking, for 
example, of implementing social insurance step-by-step, one far from the other...".
Despite all this, the Venizelos’ Government finally decided that the need 
for the introduction of a general social insurance scheme was urgent, and 
anticipated a gradual implementation. This decision caused general disturbance 
and disorder. There was public confusion concerning the concept and the aim of 
the institution. Innumerable arguments were given for and against the application 
of social security. Most of the public writing or talking lacked any scientific 
background or even the necessary width of thinking. Misleading articles by
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amateur social scientists were published strengthening the confusion about the 
usefulness of social security. "Unheard of destruction and an economic disaster for 
Greece will follow the compulsory introduction of the institution" or "it is 
dangerous demagogy in favour of certain white-collar workers" or "it is a useless 
and very expensive institution which is not necessary" (22). On the other hand, 
some articles predicted social progress of great importance for every employee: "a 
golden century with sunshine for every employee" (23). In this chaos of ideas and 
opinions, the directly interested social classes were only slightly involved, misled 
by economic interests, demagogy and ignorance. However, some were found to 
approach the problem scientifically such as Svolos, Kanellopoulos, Agallopoulos, 
Zarras,...
The working people’s position was distressing. The adversities of poverty, 
unemployment, arduous employment, uncertainty, lack of essential health care 
were widespread. The need for state intervention in order to establish a general 
scheme of social security was clear. Unfortunately the lack of information kept the 
interested working population far from any positive reaction.
The base of further development
It was finally realized that social insurance coverage could no longer be 
based and organized on the company level, as it prevailed after the adjustments of 
Law No 2868 of 1922. On the other hand, the vast majority of employees 
remained uncovered, although most of them consisted of the financially weakest 
classes.
In 1931, the working people insured by occupational pension schemes 
were about 100.000 employed in industry, mining, transport crafts, banking and 
commerce; civil servants 47.300; Navy officers, 9.050; lawyers, 6.280; custom 
clearing officers 7.215. The total number of 162.216 people covered meant a low 
percentage of 6.5 of the overall working population (24).
When the Venizelos’ Government was in office in 1929 the establishment
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of a general social insurance scheme, had been seriously mentioned for the first 
time as we have seen, and several preparatory research studies as well as acute 
reactions, started. In abstract, the main arguments in favour of the establishment 
of the new institution were: firstly, that the prevailing long monetary instability, 
could no longer prevent the introduction of universal social insurance, when 
nobody could predict the end of recession. Secondly, that because of the risk of 
burdening employers and their strong reactions, it was emphasized that 
employers’ contributions would be very low at the first stage. A small part of 
employees already paid equal or higher contributions to existing funds.
Due to the low level of pay, employers should at least provide social 
insurance protection. The respectively low burden of contributions would anyway 
be added to the cost of production. Moreover, considering that Greek industry 
has been always protected by several high taxes, employers’ reactions were 
provocative, and unjustified. The opposition to the new institution was 
characterized as "incorrigible old-fashioned evidence of idle spirits of reactionary 
opposition, observed at all times, during the introduction of any progressive 
institutions and social reforms" (25).
The originator and drafter of the Bill was Andreas Zakkas, director of 
the Employment Department of the Ministry of the National Economy. He had 
long been struggling for the introduction of the ideas and developments of 
European Labour Legislation into the country, especially those coming from 
France and Germany.
As mentioned before, the Government asked for the close cooperation of 
I.L.O., which had already been playing a decisive role in developments in Greece, 
since its establishment. On April 1930 the Minister of National Economy 
appointed a Special Committee of Experts "to consider the financial basis of the 
scheme and to elaborate the relevant actuarial estimates". The chairman of the 
Committee was A. Zakkas, the secretary was J. Zarras, an expert of the 
Employment Department and members were J. Michalopoulos, Director of the
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Greek Statistical Service, J. Toumakis, Professor of Economics, C. Agallopoulos, 
Director of the Tobacco Workers’ Fund, and A. Svolos, Professor of 
Constitutional Law. The Minister appointed on top the I.L.O. specialists A. 
Tixier, from the Social Security Department in the I.L.O., and B. Schoenbaum, 
Professor of Insurance Mathematics in Prague University. Emil Schoenbaum was 
to be assisted by J. Stransky and A. Zelenka, two other Czechoslovakian experts 
recommended by I.L.O. as well. In fact, Zelenka became head of the Social 
Insurance Department of I.L.O. after World War II.
Schoenbaum proposed a special census which would produce the 
necessary data for the mathematical calculations of the scheme. In fact, the census 
took place on 4 September 1930 and the information was used by the team of 
specialists under Schoenbaum, in order to formulate the basic regulations and the 
economic calculations of the scheme. With reference to the existing occupational 
funds, the I.L.O. recommended their integration into the new scheme, or as a first 
stage, the establishment of uniform insurance principles.
The Bill based on these principles was introduced on 19 May 1932 by P. 
Vourloumis, Minister of the National Economy having sound views on the issue of 
social insurance. It was accompanied by an Introductory Report written by A. 
Zakkas, including a historical socio-economic analysis and international 
comparisons. The Report emphasized the delay in introducing the institution of a 
general social insurance scheme in Greece, at a time when, neighbouring 
countries with similar basic characteristics and social organization, and world­
wide more than thirty other countries, had established general social security 
system even decades ago. Moreover, social justice would be enhanced by 
ameliorating the working people’s "unacceptable conditions" - of living and by 
avoiding predicted social dangers. The Report concluded: ".... the Government 
strongly proposes the passing of the Bill, being convinced that the general 
implementation of compulsory social insurance will gradually improve the living 
conditions of a major part of the population. The gradual elimination of social
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deprivation, not acceptable by "contemporary consciousness", will decisively 
contribute to the social progress of the country". A Parliamentary Committee 
undertook the study and evaluation of the Bill for the following five months.
In the meantime, employers, doctors and existing funds expressed strong 
reservations for different reasons. It was argued that the employers’ cost of 
contributions would decrease their profits; private doctors’ clients were expected 
to decrease as the result of the establishment of health insurance . Moreover, the 
existing funds were totally against any idea of state control and possible 
amalgamation with the general scheme, as provided by the Bill. The policy 
introduced, based on German experience and the contemporary French social 
legislation, was considered by the Liberal Government as "scientifically perfect".
The main guidelines initially adopted during the elaboration of the new 
legislation were: firstly, that the existing occupational pension funds should be 
integrated into the new universal scheme; in cases where this proved not possible, 
the existing funds should establish uniform principles for insurance eligibility and 
for the introduction of common health services at a national level. Secondly, that 
one sole institution would include coverage both for industrial accidents and for 
the other risks, i.e. sickness, disability, old-age and death. Thirdly, that the level of 
cash benefits for sickness or accidents should be improved compared with the 
existing ones. Fourthly, that special provision should be anticipated for the health 
protection of the agricultural workers.
As will be seen, the new social insurance legislation failed to implement 
the above guidelines fully, thus allowing the generation of considerable gaps in 
provisions.
The Bill of 1932
The Bill provided for the establishment of compulsory social insurance 
for all salaried and wage earning people in the urban areas after the 
implementation of the new scheme. With respect to the risks covered the main
48
regulations were the following:
a. Sickness:
The law provided medical health care and sickness cash benefits equal to 40 
per cent of wages; health insurance included medical treatment, medicines 
and therapeutic requisites for the insured and for dependants to some 
extent. Part of these expenses - not more than 20 per cent - would be paid by 
the insured person with the exception of the industrially injured. No detailed 
provisions were determined for the organization of health care.
b. Industrial injuries:
According to the I.L.O.’s suggestions, this part of insurance would be 
integrated in the other insurance branches, but would be financed only by 
employers’ contributions. In the case of incapacity, the sickness cash benefit 
would be given for 180 days; a monthly paid sickness pension - thirty times 
the daily paid sickness benefit - would be given for up to 18 months; 
furthermore, eligibility for disability pension would be examined. It is 
noteworthy that for financial reasons cash benefits for partially disabled 
employees were not provided. On the contrary, occupational diseases were 
finally included.
c. Disability, old-age and death
Disability pensions would be given to insured employees permanently 
unable to earn more than one-third of the usual earnings of the average 
employee in the same district and occupation in any employment suitable 
for his physical capacities and qualifications. The disability pension would be 
equal to the old-age pension. The old-age pension would be given from 65 
years of age for men and 60 for women to those whose wages were less than 
half the earnings of a physically and mentally capable employee for the same 
occupation in the same district. The level of pension would depend on wage, 
length of contribution period and the level of contributions. Old-age 
pensions would consist of two parts: a "basic" amount of 3.000 drachmas per
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year and a "variable" amount depending on the contribution period and the 
level of earnings. A supplementary benefit of 10 per cent was provided for 
each dependent child or orphaned grand-child. A special supplementary 
benefit of 50 per cent was anticipated for total disability requiring constant 
care and assistance from another person.
The death pension's purpose was to cover only part of the maintenance 
of survivors, but including the employee’s family in a wide sense, i.e. widows and 
orphans, grand children who were orphans, up to 16 years of age. The widow 
would receive an annual pension equal to 40 per cent of the basic disability 
pension which would be given to the insured person if he had not died. Children 
would each be entitled to 20 per cent of the basic disability pension.
A daily allowance equal to sickness benefit was given to women insured 
for six weeks before and six after confinement. A daily nursing benefit equal to 20 
per cent of her earnings after the end of confinement allowance provided if 
necessary, for caring for the baby for ninety days after the confinement.
The scheme would be financed by both employers and employees but no 
state contribution was anticipated, "(the Government)... deeply regrets that the 
present financial problems prevent the introduction of a specific state 
contribution... state support in the future will help towards the improvement of 
the level of benefits" (26).Employers would pay contributions equal to 6.3 per cent 
of wages and employees equal to 5 per cent. Contributions and pension 
supplements would be calculated on a scale of average wages according to nine 
classes (Table 1).
The administrative incorporated public body of the new scheme, the 
Social Insurance Organization (IKA) was to be established in Athens, under the 
"inspection and supervision" of the State, namely the Ministry of National 
Economy. IKA would not start operating before a ten month period after the new 
law passed and should be fully activated within three years .The director of the 
Labour Directorate of the Ministry would be the Government representative
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supervising the implementation of the law. The General Director of IKA would be 
appointed by the Government as well.
In IKA’s Administrative Council, the Board of Directors, four employers 
and four employees representatives and three experts would participate. 
Employers’ and employees’ representatives would be selected by the Minister 
from a list of persons recommended by the employers’ associations and trade 
unions. The advisory body would be the Social Insurance Council, which was to 
consist of employers, employees and at least one doctor representative. Under the 
Ministry of National Economy it would make proposals on legislation, and 
regulations and on research concerning social insurance.
In reference to the existing occupational funds, the Bill proposed control 
on their constitutions and administration. Furthermore, a prerequisite for their 
existence became the equivalence of their benefits to the IKA ones and an 
actuarial examination, if they required contributions higher by 10 per cent than 
IKA’s for equal benefits and if the number of insured people decreased by more 
than 50 per cent, or the enterprise to which the employee was insured stopped its 
operation. The printers’, the tobacco and the flour mill workers’ funds would be 
consolidated with IKA, while a special unemployment scheme would be 
established for tobacco, flour mills and bakery workers. Compulsory insurance 
against sickness and industrial injuries would be exclusively provided by IKA 
Consequently, the miners’ fund would be abolished.
Finally, the introduction of social insurance pension funds for people 
engaged in commerce, small traders and artisans was announced in the law, 
covering old-age, disability and death. Future special decrees would define the 
specific regulations. However, the Bill rejected coverage of agricultural workers, 
people engaged in forestry and stock breeding and some other minor dependent 
employees in urban areas.
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The postponed law
After the circulation of the Liberals’ draft law on social insurance, the 
issue obtained the general interest of the public and dominated in the political 
scene between May 1932 and October 1934. It is that period that needs detailed 
elaboration to show the parameters of the pressures exercised and to understand 
the reasons for the adjustments which finally prevailed.
It is clear that up to 1932 social policy makers had not faced any major 
disputes in establishing social security measures, mainly because this was a minor 
painless part of state intervention. The 1932 draft concerned a major part of the 
working population estimated as around 300.000 employees or almost 15 per cent 
of the total working population, tripling the existing number of insured people and 
was in fact the first general insurance reform. In this respect it provoked extensive 
reactions, discussions and repercussions which a Special Parliamentary Committee 
attempted to appreciate.
The employers’ reactions became vigorous as soon as they realized that 
the initial Venizelos’ policy of gradual "slow step" implementation was reversed. 
The Industrialists’ Association submitted to the Government proposals in favour 
of a policy of improving the existing funds rather than the introduction of a 
general scheme. Considering industry was "in a desperate position" they put the 
draft in jeopardy warning that they would have to "close down their factories and 
dismiss their employees" (27). In an Assembly held in the Chambers of Industry 
and Commerce, (28), the main proposal heard was for the introduction - as a first 
step - of compulsory insurance against industrial accidents, managed and 
administered by private insurance companies (29). Furthermore, theories that 
"the Greek workman’s productivity is the lowest in the world" or that the Bill 
introduced "some luxurious treatments for the working classes" led to the 
conclusion that the estimated cost of the new Bill "would definitely be higher than 
the profit made by the whole of industry" (30).
The main argument used to convince employers to moderate their
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opposition was that of the Minister of National Economy who referring to the Bill 
described it as "... essentially, a conservative measure by which a safety valve will 
control revolutions. Without it God knows where the extension of the labour 
movement would have led, even in the conservative Great Britain.... communism 
would have prevailed in Europe" (31).
In fact the employers’ suggestions were modified towards pressures to 
decrease their financial burdens wishing to "limit the employers’ unwillingness to 
pay their contributions" as stated by their representatives to the Special 
Parliamentary Committee. In their effort to delay the enactment of the Bill they 
questioned the Schoenbaum proposals, arguing that economic conditions had 
changed in the meantime, or that it was not sensible to include both manual and 
non-manual workers in the same scheme. They claimed that medical insurance 
should not provide cash benefits and should be reorganized with the cooperation 
of the doctors’ associations. Moreover, the employers’ side was asking the State to 
participate in the costs of the social insurance scheme. The conservative 
newspapers focused their opposition to the Bill on "the timing" of its enactment, 
asking for its postponement until there was a better period for the national 
economy (32).
Schoenbaum on the other hand argued that, according to comparisons 
with other countries, the establishment of social insurance "had not been an 
obstacle to the extraordinary growth of the post-war Germany economy... The 
employers’ contribution of 6 per cent of wages would increase the cost of 
production by 1.5 per cent assuming that wages covered not more than 1/4 of 
production... A period of economic crisis is the most favourable for introducing 
social measures since the exercised (social) pressures are considerably 
constrained..." (33). Moreover, considering that in Greece a marginal percentage 
of 6.9 of the companies total profit went in taxation (34),while in Germany it was 
41.74 per cent, in France 22.37 and in Great Britain 16.85, employers should be 
more flexible.
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The employees’ position on the Bill was favourable in principle but 
critical of particular regulations. The confederations of trade unions made several 
proposals aiming at upgrading the level of provisions and to extend coverage to 
include unemployment. They asked to be allowed to run unemployment insurance 
by themselves, financed by employers, employees and local authorities and by 
special indirect taxes (35). Seasonal unemployment for special occupational 
groups should be covered by special schemes (36). Politically, unemployment 
coverage lacked any approval since both leading political parties refused support 
on this issue. The only exception made was for tobacco, flour mill and bakery 
workers who would be insured by a special unemployment scheme. In addition, 
the G.C.G.L. suggested the introduction of housing projects financed by the 
accumulated reserves of the funds. However, the G.C.G.L. accepted the general 
guidelines of the Bill but insisted that low earning employees should not pay 
contributions: they should be replaced by a state contribution. At that time many 
received extremely low wages since the existing minimum wage legislation was 
been systematically violated. Even the Parliamentary Committee recognized "that 
wages in Greek industry are exceptionally low" but refused to adopt the proposal, 
solely because of the need of new actuarial calculations which would cause delays. 
Moreover, the Bill failed to protect cash benefits from the existing monetary 
instability, not providing a regulation adjusting them with a price-index.
The unanimous demand for a state contribution to the scheme reflected 
the criticism of the public for the absence of social welfare measures especially in 
the fields of health care and labour protection. Some economists suggested special 
indirect taxation and changes in the national budget’s allocation to finance state 
participation in the new scheme "... now that we have peace, public expenditure on 
the Defence Ministries should be restrained..." (37).
According to many criticisms, a major gap in the Bill was the exclusion of 
employees in agricultural occupations due to intractable administrative 
difficulties. Not only the I.L.O. but many others, proposed that this group of
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workers should be provided with some kind of coverage, considering the lack of 
any insurance, even for occupational injuries.
Agricultural employees amounted to more than 120.000 people (38) not 
united in any labour organization, dispersed all over the country. Their living 
conditions were primitive, "... there are neither doctors, nor dispensaries, nor 
hospitals, nor any sign of public assistance" (39). In fact, the arguments for 
agricultural workers’ insurance coverage remained at a theoretical level, since 
their split power resulted in the absence of pressure for their essential interests.
Among those directly involved with the establishment of the new scheme 
were doctors who should be recruited for IKA’s health insurance services. In 1926, 
doctors introduced a "Code of Deontology", in which it was considered their duty 
to fight and keep the system of "payment per activity", and to refuse any kind of 
"contractual fee" (40). Their first reactions were expressed in January 1930, during 
the National Assembly of Medical Associations and were without reservation 
against the introduction of health care insurance. Ignoring the low standard of 
public health in Greece, doctors made use of old-fashioned controversies in order 
to protect their occupational interests. It should be remembered here that in 1928 
the death rate in Greece was the third highest in Europe, 17 per thousand, and 
infant mortality 93 per thousand. The Medical Association after all, was 
compelled to compromise two years later proposing three main key-points for the 
new scheme: free choice of doctor, exception of high-earning employees and 
doctors’ participation in the administration of the scheme. The Special 
Parliamentaiy Committee then supported only the third claim which, as we have 
seen, was included in the Bill: one doctor was among the expert members of IKA’s 
Administrative Council.
The regulatory framework for the adjustments proposed by the Bill for 
the existing occupational funds caused most probably the major dispute. The 
Liberals’ Government considered all possible solutions. It seems that initially the 
amalgamation of all the existing funds to IKA was seriously considered. However,
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it was at the end preferred "... to paeify occupational funds and only financial 
revival will be attempted .. once again a radical solution has been actually 
bypassed" (41). So, it was finally decided to maintain the existing funds, but to 
intervene by measures aiming at their reorganization on an actuarial basis and the 
guarantee of minimum standards of benefits for all insured employees, according 
to the I.L.O.’s recommendations for uniform principles. The regulations 
introduced envisaged vigorous state control of the administration and the 
constitutions of the funds as well as an upgrade in their benefits to the standards 
within a three-year period. G. Pesmazoglou, a prominent MP of the Populists, 
accused the Government as "indirectly attempting to amalgamate the existing 
occupational funds with IKA, .. the best ... but impracticable solution ... (which) 
would unavoidably provoke disputes which would expose IKA to hazards"
(42) .Some other funds (43) were to be consolidated with IKA because "their 
members were spread all over the country and their insurance coverage by 
individual schemes was comparatively very expensive" (44).
The policy proposed by the Government for the already established funds 
provoked significant reservations and huge opposition from their members. The 
suspicion that the new scheme would be to some extent financed by the resources 
of the existing funds was in the air. The "equivalence test" defined by the Bill was 
not expected to be successful by most of them and consolidation was seen as 
unavoidable. As was obvious, the existing vested interests exercised severe 
pressures, though it was generally accepted, even at that primitive level of social 
insurance development in Greece, that consolidation would be the rational way- 
out of the main administrative and financial hardships of the institutions. 
However, no consolidation policy was implemented. The writer of this era states 
explicitly that "consolidation was obstructed by those in whose interest it was to 
maintain the existing situation, namely those receiving high pensions, by high-level 
employees, by established vested interests and by some politicians" (45).
In brief, the Liberals' Bill of 1932 constitutes probably the most radical
56
and rational attempt to inaugurate a sound basis for a uniform social insurance 
scheme. Strong efforts were made to come close to the recommendations of 
I.L.O. and research and actuarial estimates were used. It might be argued 
however, that the absence of state finance - not in compliance with the policy 
towards the existing occupational funds (46) - provoked a major gap in the 
defence of the Bill. Besides, health insurance did not draw the significant 
attention which it merited in the light of the poor health services available at that 
time. Finally, it seems that certain lobbies prevented the full amalgamation of the 
existing funds to IKA.
In the period between May and July 1932, the Bill though submitted to 
Parliament, failed to pass, concentrating public interest and determining 
developments on the political scene. A government formed by Papanastasiou in 
June with Venizelos’ support, attempted to pass the social insurance Bill 
immediately but Venizelos’ contradictory behaviour on the matter provoked the 
Government’s fall after a few weeks of life. He was still not convinced that the 
timing of the passing of the law coincided with his electoral interests.
However, when Venizelos returned to power, he decided to pass the Bill 
before the forthcoming elections, since suspicions that he was keen to freeze the 
issue prevailed widely. It seems that during this period, the introduction of a 
general social insurance scheme would turn out to a fruitful political benefit. The 
Bill, introduced in August 1932 by S. Kostopoulos, the Minister of National 
Economy, passed in Parliament becoming the Law No 5733 of 11 October 1932, in 
the absence of the opposition Populist party. The law would be enforced five 
months after its official publication but IKA’s function would not start before a 
period of ten months and should be completed within three years.
Venizelos achieved a narrow victory in the elections held in September 
but he failed to form a viable government. On the general elections of 5 March 
1933, Venizelos unexpectedly lost power and the Populists majority party under 
Tsaldaris came into office. Since the Populists were boycotting Parliament during
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the discussions and passing of Law No 5733, they immediately suspended it and 
announced the preparation of new social insurance legislation.
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III
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPULSORY 
SOCIAL INSURANCE, 1934 -1937
Introduction
After all, the Populists party brought to Parliament in late November 
1933, more than a year after the passing of Law No 5733 and about eight months 
after it won the elections, the new draft law concerning the general social 
insurance scheme (1). The draft, though copying the general form, contained 
substantial differences compared with Law No 5733. There were critical 
amendments to the settlement about the existing funds, to the proposed economic 
system and rates of contribution, to the range of coverage and people insured, to 
the administrative decentralization and to health care protection.
The Populists, though a conservative party, had shown a progressive 
character in the past, reinforcing policies in favour of the working class. Dimitris 
Gounaris, the founder of the party, was, as mentioned earlier, the first prominent 
politician who included the introduction of a general social insurance scheme in 
his political programme thirty years earlier: "... it is altogether anti-christian and 
unpatriotic that any protection of the working people is missing in this country... 
Contemporary nations have already provided pensions for the workers, and health 
care in the case of accidents... covering a worker from any deprivation of the 
indispensable needs in any living circumstances" said Gounaris thirty years before 
the introduction of the general scheme (2).
The Government promoted the view that the Law of 1932 was withdrawn 
because it contained "significant disadvantages ... it failed to appreciate the 
present economic difficulties,... it would be better to restrain the benefits in order 
to prevent the failure of the social insurance institution in Greece"(3). In addition.
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it was emphasized that the Law of 1932 had been passed by Parliament in the 
absence of the opposition parties. It was argued that "preparatory work was 
missing, concerning the application of the law". But as we have seen in the 
previous chapter the abandoned legislation had been the outcome of extended 
research and discussions and consequently these justifications were not 
convincing. The G.C.G.L. was campaigning in favour of the legislation of 1932 
established by the Liberals. Evidently the reasons for the "fall" of Law No 5733 of 
1932 were based on political criteria.
This was a crucial moment for social security in Greece. Structural 
changes were enforced in the legislation preventing radical intervention. The 
Government appeared eager to make important adjustments in favour of the 
reacting powerful groups - employers and occupational lobbies: The new 
legislation selectively ignored fundamental recommendations of the foreign 
experts who worked ontiie previous scheme. Though even in these early days of 
social security it was widely accepted that the system was "cut into pieces" and 
that a harmonization of the field was essential, the Bill failed to establish a firm 
policy towards the existing insurance funds.
It was this original law that provided the opportunity to generate an 
effective resettlement so as to prevent the disease of social security in Greece 
becoming chronic. The draft of law was brought to Parliament in 27 November by 
G. Pesmazoglou, the Minister of National Economy; an Introductory Report was 
published the month before on 31 October 1933. C. Agallopoulos, a widely 
respected expert, who participated in the Special Committee of the 1932 Bill as 
well, was the drafter of both of them.
The Minister claimed in Parliament that Law No 5733 was "simply a 
complementary law" of the considerable constitutional Law No 2868 of 1922, 
aiming to remind the house that this premier legislation was passed 10 years ago 
also by his party. The influence of the economic recession and unemployment 
provoked "a crisis in social security" both by decreasing the revenues of insurance
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agencies and by increasing their expenses and devaluing their funds. He clearly 
stated that "the Greek draft was based on the fundamental principle of any 
possible lessening of financial burdens during the economic crisis "admitting that 
in this way the level of protection would be lower than it should be". Despite this 
confession he considered that the social insurance institution was automatically 
"put in order by the new legislation in Greece".
As mentioned earlier, the situation of social insurance coverage in the 
country before the introduction of the general scheme "could not stand up to 
serious criticism". There was a lack of preventive measures to reduce work 
accidents and inadequate means to oblige employers to give compensation. 
Health insurance was described as "in an embryonic condition", but disability, 
death and old-age protection were assessed as significantly developed (4). The 
1922 legislation introduced the legal basis for a wider application of this sector, 
and was highly emphasized to make a political impression.
The Minister concluded that "social insurance is actually in a primitive 
condition and is governed by complementary dissimilar principles. Small insurance 
agencies are run by unique systems; the State’s finance varies between nil and a 
hundred per cent; there are long or short time requirements for eligibility, a lack 
of preventive measures and a complete lack of coordination between the 
insurance agencies". This anarchy could be controlled at this particular time, 
provided that the Government would in practice and not in rhetoric "select a 
rational system based on healthy principles". In this respect, the Government 
should be prepared to bear the political cost of displeasing the reacting lobbies.
The main changes in the Law No 5733
The Government of the Populists party accused Law No 5733 of 
Venizelos’ administration of containing crucial weaknesses which could affect the 
future of the social insurance scheme. The main criticism concentrated on five 
"false ribs" of the law.
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Firstly, though Law No 5733 recognized the need for insurance coverage 
of people living in the country, mainly farmers, it finally contained only a 
potential regulation for the protection of people employed in agriculture, lumber 
and cattle. However, the new Bill also provided protection only to the few 
agricultural employees living in urban areas. Of course, it was said, a general 
social insurance system is expected to provide a uniform level of national 
protection for working people and a minimum standard of coverage, safeguarding 
a uniform standard of living. But, as the Minister argued, the needs of rural areas 
demanded separate insurance coverage adapted to their different conditions. The 
Populists government promised that a special bill for farmers’ protection would be 
brought to Parliament very soon, but it was not. The result of these political decoy 
tactics was that the agricultural population, an unprotected dispersed and badly 
informed pressure group, remained uncovered until 1961, when the Agricultural 
Insurance Organization (OGA), was at last established.
Secondly, the principle of 5733 for the existing funds was that they could 
pursue their operation on two requirements: restoring their finances on to a strict 
actuarial basis and including the same provisions as in the general scheme, 
provided if necessary, an increase in contributions of not more than 10 per cent. 
These adjustments were vigorously opposed by the existing funds since most of 
them could not fulfil the defined requirements. It was argued, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, that under the pretence of actuarial regularity the Bill aimed 
to dissolve these funds and remove their capital in favour of the general scheme. 
The monetary crisis had anyway devalued their funds and assets, reinforcing their 
"anxiety". The Minister emphasized that even Professor Schoenbaum, judging 
from the Czechoslovakian similar experience, considered, two years earlier, that 
this solution was not practical. The main difficulties, he argued, were the 
calculation of the reserves and, on the administrative level, the huge transfer of 
the records of insured employees to the new Social Insurance Organization. The
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Government approved Schoenbaum’s hesitations on this crucial point, displaying 
preference for more "painless" solutions.
Thirdly, the previous Law established a sickness cash benefit, a provision 
which was later considered to be subject to a "significant danger not only of abuse, 
but mainly of huge moral damage to the social insurance organization" (5). It was 
said that, the new scheme could not afford this provision under the present 
economic recession, and the State was not in position to contribute as well. The 
intention of the Government was to abolish sickness benefit, 40 per cent of daily 
pay, considered "worthless" and actually inadequate to cover the needs of the 
insured.
In this respect, the Bill of 1933 did not include a sickness benefit 
provision. As a counterbalance, an "increased" accident benefit equal to 60 per 
cent of daily pay was anticipated, for which the "dangers" were considered limited. 
Consequently, a reduction of 1 per cent of earnings for the sickness sector’s 
contribution would be achieved to satisfy employers.
Fourthly, the economic system of "full capitalisation" for the reserves of 
the disability, old-age and death sectors was established by Law No 5733 
according to Schoenbaum’s view, who characterized this system perfect. The 
Populists on the other side, considered it dangerous and economically heavy. The 
system of full capitalisation reinforces a high accumulation of reserves and is 
dangerous under a situation of monetary instability. Moreover, the total required 
insurance premium for this system was said to be 11.6 per cent of pay - 11.3 per 
cent was estimated in the 1932 Bill - a percentage rather high under the existing 
circumstances. The Government decided "to sacrifice some theoretical principles" 
and favoured a "Pay-As-You-Go system" with yearly adjustments of the level of 
contribution to the anticipated expenses. The pure application of this system, 
however, would provoke contribution increases every year, causing uncertainty in 
economic transactions. So, the application of a "mixed system" was finally decided 
upon, anticipating an increase of 1/3 of the premium every five years until 1964,
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after which it would remain stable. The total premium during the first five years 
would be 6.98 per cent on average for every wage class; roughly half of it would go 
to the pensions’ sector and half to the health one. "The unsuccessful application of 
full capitalisation system forced Germany and Austria to establish the "Pay-As- 
You-Go way of finance" said the Minister and he added "Schoenbaum obviously 
relied on false information, leading finally to mistaken calculations" (6), claiming 
that the social acceptability of this mixed form of finance would be higher, 
meaning employers of course.
Finally, Law No 5733 was criticized for not including specific and detailed 
regulations concerning the administration of the new scheme, the so called. Social 
Insurance Organization (IKA). The State’s supervision was vigorous and IKA’s 
system was "overcentralized". A Government Trustee would be the State’s 
representative in IKA’s administrative council, the "governing body" to supervise 
the exact and full implementation of the law but without voting power. The 
governing body would consist of 11 members, 2 experts and 4 employees’ and 4 
employers’ representatives and the general director, an expert as well.
The Government decided now to decentralize administration to local 
offices where effective employers’ and employees’ supervision would be 
established. The State’s supervision would be restricted to the control "of the 
observation of the law". The new draft anticipated a maximum percentage for 
administrative expenses and a detailed budget for administration and general 
expenses, as well as for the expenses for complimentary health care facilities. 
"Social legislation consists of a general framework gradually completed with the 
participation of the interested classes" (7) said the Minister to justify these 
fragmented changes.
The new draft was brief leaving substantial gaps for insurance regulations 
which would be covered by forthcoming detailed adjustments defined by special 
decrees and circulars. In this way, the adaption of social legislation to changing 
social needs and conditions was said to be more successful.
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The basic "innovations” of the new Bill
The Bill was partly based on Schoenbaum’s Report using "solid principles, 
granting the unrestricted development and implementation of the institution... 
...so, any moral or material disorder of the institution that could harm social 
stability will be prevented" (8).
The draft maintained a significant innovation of the Law No 5733, 
amalgamating the accident sector with the sickness and the pension sector. It 
covered work accidents almost in any case, adjusting the provisions to the 
consequences of the accident, either sickness or invalidity. The partial disability 
benefit was abolished and this gapi/as covered by an extension for up to two years 
of the sickness allowance, which was finally retained. This was based on the 
assumption that, in many cases of partial disability, the occupational skills left 
could be adjusted to other professions, especially after the expansion of the 
"mechanization of labour". The saving would be used to treat accidents out of 
work "more favourably". The Minister underlined, that the only reason why 
accidents out of work were not fully assimilated to accidents in work, was the 
Government’s fear of abuse.
Another "innovation" of the new Bill was considered to be the coverage 
of blue and white collar workers under the same scheme, though this was common 
practice of both preceding state social insurance laws. Such "insurance unity" was 
not to be found in the existing occupational funds organized according to the 
special needs of specific socio-professional groups. The Minister emphasized 
though, the necessity of preventing the creation of "a common insurance 
consciousness which can create a dangerously powerful organization" (9).
Finally and not unexpectedly, the new Bill did not provide unemployment 
insurance coverage. The main explanation was the critical economic situation and 
the lessons of the British and German experience. Before the establishment of 
such coverage "all the curative means against this social disease must be
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exhausted" (10). Therefore, the Government promised to organize an 
employment policy "based on healthy measures and not on unemployment 
benefits". It was emphasized the unemployment risk was based on non- 
predictable factors, such as the economic conditions and the demographic 
problems of the country. Unemployment, a burning domestic social problem after 
1922, had been passed over by the new general scheme since at this early stage 
unemployment benefits might be proven a factor of instability.
The existing funds: The piecemeal feature of Greek social insurance
As we know, the evolution of social security in Greece had started more 
than sixty years before the State’s attempt to introduce a general social insurance 
scheme. Many insurance agencies - called funds - already existed, covering specific 
occupational groups. At the time of the State’s intervention it was widely 
accepted that the existing funds, "the mosaic" (11) as Zarras called them, were run 
on an irrational basis without planning, coordination, economic or insurance 
study. These funds were adapted to the special needs corresponding to the 
occupational interests of their members and provided mainly pensions. The 
Government was facing the dilemma of confrontation with these lobbies, 
frightened by its crucial socio-economic and political impact.
As we have already seen, the Liberals’ law of 1932 required the existing 
funds’ restoration and the assimilation of their insurance conditions and 
provisions including the passing of the so called "equivalence test". This provoked 
strong reactions from the organized occupational pressure groups and respective 
conservative interests. The general political atmosphere - as it is described in the 
earlier stages of this thesis - was not conductive to produce the necessary 
consensus, for widely accepted structural solutions, such as the resettlement of the 
social insurance network.
The conservative Populist government under P. Tsaldaris, deliberately 
retained the existing situation and avoided reasonable and scientific
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argumentation. "All the existing funds will keep on functioning" (12); this was the 
message. As recognized, "recent inflation created deficits in these funds,... (their 
financial situation) would prevent them from granting benefits equal to those of 
IKA as the Liberals’ Law required" (13). Theoretically, these funds had to transfer 
to the new scheme that part of their contributions which should have been paid to 
it if they did not exist. The general scheme on the other hand, would provide their 
members with the same level of provision which its own insured enjoyed. In other 
words, the existing funds were reinsured by the new scheme. The practical 
outcome of this settlement was questioned to a great extent.
The Government considered that this solution contained important 
advantages. It secured a minimum level of benefits and contributions without 
affecting possible wider coverage. No political, administrative or organizational 
difficulties would emerge from this settlement, and it was thought that more than
100.000 of the highly paid insured employed, considered to be "good risks", would 
participate in the general scheme. The Minister believed that "the insured in the 
existing funds will follow the fate of those insured in the scheme". On the other 
hand, "all the existing regulations of the existing funds remain valid. The only 
possible problem will be the differences in the provisions, such as the definition of 
disability, the age limit for pensions and the duration of contributions" (14).
The strongest reactions against any idea of amalgamation with the 
general scheme were expressed by the administrators of the existing funds who 
wished to keep their highly-paid positions. They launched biased campaigns 
among their members to convince them that their interests were at stake. As the 
Supreme Economic Council reported, the executives of these funds confronted by 
any means the attempted reform of the 1932 legislation (15).
However, the new Bill provided for an important development by 
forbidding the foundation of further occupational funds in the future. Only 
supplementary agencies, which would provide additional benefits to the insured 
employees, were allowed to be established. The abolition of funds which "after the
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transfer of their contributions to the scheme could not justify their existence by 
their accumulated capital" was vaguely anticipated by the Bill (16). The voluntary 
amalgamation of any fund to the scheme would be feasible, if this was required by 
3/4 of those insured by the fund. In the case of liquidation of a company having its 
own fund, as Law No 2868 of 1922 provided, this would be compulsory 
amalgamated to the Organization. Furthermore, the amalgamation of the Miners' 
Fund with the Organization was announced, because the coverage it provided to 
people working under especially dangerous conditions, was considered 
inadequate.
The Government expressed the expectation that all the existing funds 
would be adjusted to the progressive principles of the general scheme. In the 
opposite case, the State could intervene by virtue of the older Law No 5376 of 
1932. The essence of the established policy was not to harm the existing 
occupational insurance interests of the respective pressure groups, in order to 
retain their political support. Even the Minister Pesmazoglou himself accepted in 
an article which appeared during the discussions in Parliament, that the complete 
independence of the existing funds would provoke their financial deadlock. He 
considered that, if the members of Parliament should accept the pressures 
exercised by the groups involved, they would undertake their responsibilities and 
vote for this adjustment (17). However, he did not forget to underline that the 
amalgamation of these schemes "... would damage private initiative which always 
keeps a leading role in Greece" (18). Moreover, as P. Kanellopoulos, a Populists 
MP, described in Parliament, the interested lobbies exerted extended pressure 
towards the Populists MPs in order "to stop any significant changes in the 
occupational funds" (19).
The economic organization of the scheme
The Bill was based on the principle that social insurance constitutes 
compulsory saving for individual and social care, aiming to supplement the
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employees’ income in case of unexpected and urgent risks. It was considered that 
compulsory contributions would create "insurance consciousness" and greater 
concern for the problems of the schemes. As already mentioned, the contribution 
calculation, based on the "mixed distributed system", was defined as 6.98 per cent 
of remuneration. The contribution rate for the sickness sector would be stable 
while the pension contributions would be increased over the years. The sharing of 
contribution corresponded to 60 per cent for employers and 40 per cent for 
employees. The higher employers’ percentage was justified by the coverage of 
work accidents and occupational sickness. Contributions were almost equally 
shared between the sickness and pension sector. The percentage of the pensions’ 
sector was to be increasing until 1951, after which they would remain stable (20).
The Law finally provided eight insurance-wage classes shown in Table 2. 
Contributions were to be calculated on the average notional wage of each 
respective class for the sickness and for the pensions’ sectors independently, 
according to Tables 3 and 4 respectively. The Bill initially proposed however, a 
scale of five classes. This provoked the G.C.G.L. reactions, considering this 
change’s aim was to decrease employers’ contributions, since the majority of 
insured employees, 57 per cent of them, would be classified in classes I and II. 
The data collected after the first years of IKA showed that two-thirds of its 
members belonged in Classes II and III, having wages between 30 and 90 
drachmas. It is to be emphasized that wage classes determined as well the pension 
supplements for each day of contribution on top of the basic pension.
The Bill introduced the principle of "ipso jure" which meant that the 
insurance coverage was to be provided to the insured employee, irrespective of 
the employers’ payment of contributions. The insurance stamp system was 
suggested as the appropriate collecting system for contributions, as having 
successfully being implemented in other countries. However, the final decision 
was left for a future special decree.
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General directions for the sensitive issue of IKA’s economic policy and 
for the investment of the accumulated funds were introduced. Forthcoming 
circulars would give the details. Investments should be directed towards the 
development of national purposes and for the establishment of IKA’s health 
services premises, if needed. Securing a high concentration of capital was not 
expected, as a result of the "mixed distributional system". The expected circulars 
would determine a detailed programme of economic policy, needing the 
confirmation of the "Highest Economic Board", which defined the general 
economic policy of the country.
Health insurance
Insured employees, pensioners and their family members were entitled to 
sickness provisions on the condition of 50 days of work; in the case of work 
accidents and occupational diseases, the insured were covered from the first day. 
In the case of stoppage of employment, the eligibility lasted as long as the insured 
had at least 50 days of work in the last twelve months; in other words the duration 
of eligibility was 315 days, a period considered comparatively long.
Health benefits were mainly in kind providing medical, pharmaceutical, 
hospital, home, sanatorial care, "according to contemporary scientific and 
technical means" and would be provided in "centres" organized according to a 
forthcoming circular (21). A cash benefit was initially introduced only in case of 
work accidents or occupational disease after the third day. As we have already 
seen, the Government did not intend to introduce a general sickness cash benefit 
provision because "... this provision has, from the economic point of view, utterly 
destroyed the institution in the countries where it was established", and because 
there was a fear of abuse (22). However, during the Parliamentary discussions 
this particular point changed and the final legislation introduced a wider sickness 
coverage in cash. In the case of sickness, a benefit equal to 40 per cent of wage
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was to be provided after the 5th day, for a maximum of a 180 day period. This 
regulation would become valid two years after the passing of the law.
The scheme would provide an accident cash benefit in the case of a work 
accident or occupational disease, not caused by "inexcusable negligence", as this 
was defined by a special decree in 1920. The benefit would be provided for a two 
year maximum period; if disability still existed, the insured would become a 
pensioner. The accident cash benefit would be equal to the sickness benefit 
increased by 50 per cent.
Maternity provisions were anticipated by the new scheme including the 
wives of the insured, including either institutional confinement care, or a 
confinement allowance. A maternity allowance equal to 1/3 of average daily pay, 
would be provided to insured women, six weeks before and six weeks after 
confinement. A baby’s feeding allowance would also be provided for sixty days 
after the stoppage of confinement allowance and equal to it.
Small charges by the insured for medical and pharmaceutical expenses 
would be included in a forthcoming circular, not exceeding one fifth of the 
respective expenses but not including accident care coverage. The provision of 
"limited" out-patients medical and pharmaceutical coverage for the family of the 
insured was introduced. The circle of the family’s members entitled to provisions 
was widely defined, "based on the Greek notion of the family"(23). Funeral 
expenses were covered as well.
In the "disputable question" of doctors’ status in the scheme their 
organizations strongly supported, as already stated, a system of patients’ free 
choice of doctor on a "payment per visit" basis. This controversial point was 
bitterly realized to be of significant importance for the provision of effective 
health care coverage. The Bill finally anticipated free choice of doctors, midwives 
and pharmacists. The organization of doctors system would be authorized by the 
Greek Medical Association financed by the corresponding contributions for the 
sickness sector and the patients’ charges receipts. A condition defined was that at
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last half the doctors of each health "centre" would provide services to IKA’s 
members. Doctors would have to report to IKA for the patient’s condition, for 
statistical and preventive health reasons, and would be under disciplinary control. 
The doctors’ system of payment was not included in the Bill and was left for a 
forthcoming circular; however, the Introductory Report anticipated that the 
system of payment could be different in the various regions of the country (24).
Pensions
The Bill introduced disability, old-age and death pension insurance. 
Incapability, based on the definition of relative disability, was defined as the 
permanent loss of 2/3 of normal working capability, determined as the incapability 
of a person to earn more than one-third of the usual earnings of a healthy person 
with respective qualifications, in the same occupation and district. The annual 
disability pension would consist of two parts: a basic one equal to 3.000 drachmas 
and a secondary one related to the level of contributions paid (25). In this case of 
total disability requiring permanent attention, pension would be increased by 50 
per cent.
Old-age pensions were provided for women after age 60 and for men 
after age 65 and were equal to disability pensions. It was anticipated that 
pensioners could have part-time jobs, earning not more than 1/2 of normal 
relevant remuneration. In this way, the low level of pensions was indirectly 
recognized but considered "inevitable for the early period of the organization"
(26). Death pensions were provided for the members of the insured’s family 
corresponding to 40 per cent of the insured’s disability pension for the widow, and 
20 per cent for each of the other members. The total death pension could not 
exceed the normal pension received by the insured before death. The insured 
were eligible for pensions’ provisions after 750 days of work, 300 of which had to 
be in the last 4 years. Additionally, special institutional care for pensioners would 
be provided (sanatoriums, asylums, etc.).
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At the end, the Bill contained general regulations concerning: the 
establishment of preventive measures (either technical or medical aiming mainly 
for the prevention of "social sicknesses" such as TB and cancer); the voluntary 
participation in the general scheme; the forthcoming establishment of insurance 
funds for people engaged in commerce, and for professionals and handicraftsmen; 
the establishment of a Social Insurance Council consisted of specialists academics, 
doctors, lawyers, administrators and of employers’ and employees’ 
representatives.
The instigators of the Bill were C. Agallopoulos for the general legal- 
technical frame, El. Zarokostas for the mathematical insurance calculations and 
M. Metalinos for the health care programme. The Bill passed in Parliament in the 
absence of the Liberal party, the main party of the opposition, copying the 
Governments’ behaviour when it was in the opposition benches. Discussions lasted 
very long, almost a year. The Bill became Law No 6298 ratified on 10 October 
1934. As the Minister emphasized: "the law represents a real stage in the social 
life of the country". Immediately IKA’s Board of Directors was appointed under 
the Presidency of Professor P. Kanellopoulos and later of Professor S. Koronis, 
and established the organizational and administrative basis of IKA.
The political and labour unrest, 1934-1937
After the legislative establishment of the compulsory social insurance 
scheme, the Government was expected to proceed to the necessary steps for 
implementation. On 31 October 1934, a few weeks after the passing of Law No 
6298, the Minister of National Economy said in Parliament: "...the Greek Law is 
adapted to the conditions of the Greek Economy without being inferior to the 
social legislation of other countries... The Government believes that by the 
amendments of the Law No 5733, the foundation of the most significant social 
reform of this country is achieved on an unshakeable basis". As said, in December
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1934, IKA’s first "governing body" (Board of Directors) (27), was set up aiming to 
deal with the mass of administrative and organizational problems.
But political instability was to intervene once again in social policy 
developments. The Populist government, always willing to reinforce the 
monarchy’s restoration, provoked on 1 March 1935 an anti-govemment coup by 
the republican part of the army under General Plastiras. The failure of this 
movement was the start of the most extensive eliminations and reign of terror met 
so far in the fragile Greek armed forces. Venizelos who was the instigator of the 
coup, was exiled to France and many of his supporters in the civil service or even 
in the universities were also purged. In the middle of this storm, the General 
Director of IKA reported in May 1935 to the I.L.O. that the preparatory work was 
developing well and that it was expected to be completed within the following five 
months.
In the elections of June 1935 the Liberals abstained and the Populists 
won 287 out of the 300 parliamentary seats while the Royalist Union under 
Metaxas took 7 seats, obtaining a key-role in the forthcoming period. Some days 
later, the former Minister Pesmazoglou "confessed" at the Conference of the 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce: "All political parties want social security in 
Greece. When I became Minister 1 found a social insurance law (5733) which 1 
suspended for six months, in order to have the opportunity to prepare a better bill 
and 1 achieved:
a. The reduction in the burdening on the national economy. Instead of a stable 11
per cent, contributions will start from 6.90 per cent and will gradually 
become 12 per cent after 20 years.
b. The old legislation provided sickness allowances from the second day of
sickness, while I constrained the possibilities for abuse by providing it after 
the 5th day.
c. Although the old legislation amalgamated the existing funds, I did not; 1 simply
asked them to contribute to the common money-box of the new scheme.
77
In conclusion, by the new bill 1 succeeded in substantially relieving the 
employers".
A plebiscite on the issue of the restoration of monarchy was held on 3 
November 1935, which resulted in an overwhelming majority for the King’s return
(28). These, explicitly distorted results, showed however that the Greek people 
were deeply disappointed by the long-existing political upheaval and some of them 
were expecting a degree of improvement from King George’s second return.
The elections held on 26 January 1936, the first under a system of 
proportional representation, led to a perplexing outcome: the Populists and their 
royalist allies attained 143 seats, the Liberals and their allies 141 seats and the 
Popular Front, a communist-oriented grouping, 15 seats, thus determining the 
majority. The following negotiations, secret or not, provoked strong envy from the 
traditional socio-political framework and the army was the first to warn that a 
bargain with the communists would not be accepted.
In mid April 1936, the King appointed General John Metaxas, the 
Minister of War, as Prime-Minister. The political disorder in the metropolis 
coincided with extended labour unrest in the rural areas. A huge demonstration 
was held in Thessaloniki, the second large city of the country, on 9 and 10 May, 
when the tobacco workers went on strike. The Greek tobacco industry had been 
particularly hit by the world-wide economic crisis. The police and the troops were 
used to maintain order: They broke ranks and 12 strikers were killed. This 
provoked a spontaneous unification of the trade-unions and G.C.G.L., which 
temporarily attained the power of representing the whole labour movement and 
threatened a general strike. The King came to accept Metaxa’s proposal for "a 
strong government" and agreed to his insistence on proroguing parliamentary 
procedures for five months until 30 September, with the agreement of the leading 
politicians who miscalculated Metaxaf' intentions.
On 15 July, a pan-hellenic congress of trade unions held in Piraeus 
addressed the following demands to the "government": immediate full operation
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of IKA including unemployment insurance, the establishment of a minimum wage 
policy and wage rises, unobstructed trade-unionism and the abolition of a 
committee appointed "for the solution of urgent labour problems".
On 22 July, the leader of the Populists Theotokis and of the Liberals 
Sophoulis came to a compromise and proposed to the King a coalition 
government. Six days after, the united G.C.G.L., announced a general strike for 5 
August, to protest against a proposed compulsory arbitration system for labour 
disputes. Metaxas managed to convince the King that this "... is a direct 
communist challenge to the King’s authority" and on the eve of the general strike 
declared a dictatorship, suspending the key articles of the constitution.
The establishment of the dictatorship was confronted by comparatively 
mild reactions, due to the prevailing public feeling that the politicians had failed 
to lead the country effectively, since they were committed purely to their political 
interests and were absorbed mainly by their political disputes. Metaxas, the most 
clever dictator Greece ever had, put an ex-communist as Minister of Labour and 
attempted to build a social image by several progressive adjustments such as 
freezing peasant debts or protecting the rights of workers. In this respect, he 
announced that IKA would begin operating before the end of the year.
Finally, IKA commenced its activities on the 1 December 1937, the 
momentous date in the history of social security in Greece. The first established 
regional offices were in Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki. This was at last, the 
fruitful outcome of three decades of efforts from those concerned with social 
insurance. This was definitely not, however, the outcome of "a kind heart 
(Metaxas) inspired by God", since the timing when the social insurance general 
scheme was put into effect, made many believe that this was one of the dictator’s 
"achievements" (29).
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An exploration of the flourishing insurance privileges and discrepancies
For obvious reasons insurance privileges of certain groups have been 
always accompanied by secrecy and lack of information, since publicity is a real 
enemy to their perpetuation. In this respect and, considering that the occupational 
funds established in the 1920s and 1930s were not organised, and belonged in the 
jurisdiction of several Ministries respective to the nature of occupation, research 
in this issue for this period is an arduous task.
Pluralist theories provide a credible justification for the distribution of 
power within a national social insurance network. Besides, social insurance is 
composed of a large number of different groups, fighting for resources and most 
decisions come from bargaining between governments and these groups. It is the 
socio-political power of each group and the political objectives - almost always the 
same - of each government which determine the outcome of negotiations. As in 
other countries, Greece has developed a social insurance system in which 
priorities have been defined not by need, but by socio-political impact. The 
establishment of the huge number of schemes already described so far, 
demonstrates that almost in any case, the prevailing socio-professional lobbies of 
each era - again, almost always the same - fulfilled their social insurance, even 
absurd, objectives. The overwhelming dispersion of the field reinforced such 
objectives contributing to the establishment of small, medium and great privileges.
In 1929, J. Zarras successfully depicted the exercised pressures: "Every 
single group of working people, from the most squalid proletarians to tradesmen, 
stockbrokers or even artisans, has put the establishment of its independent 
insurance fund as its major occupational objective. Under this widespread 
pressure the State concedes, allowing the messy establishment of pension funds"
(30). Following this concept, numerous occupational funds were created after the 
mid-1920s and in the 1930s.
Most of the insured people in the late 1920s were provided with pensions 
for old-age, disability and death. However, the tobacco workers’ fund, the flour­
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mill workers’ fund and the bakery workers’ fund provided on top sickness 
coverage and unemployment insurance. Notably, all these funds were heavily 
subsidized by the State: 60 per cent of the flour mill workers’ fund revenues, 
almost 70 per cent of the bakery workers’ fund revenues and a varying annually 
percentage of more than 30 per cent of the tobacco workers’ fund revenues came 
from "social resources".
In 1931, there were 33 occupational funds with 99.371 insured members; 
the total number of insurance schemes including public servants, pension funds 
and supplementary funds was 50 (31) covering in total more than 160.000 people, 
a poor 6.6 per cent of a total working population of 2.415.078 people according to 
the 1928 census. Between 1926 and 1931, the existing schemes increased by 70 per 
cent indicating the anxiety of the working people, due to the extended wars and 
the perpetuated financial monetary and political instability.
In the period between 1931 and 1937 the number of occupational 
schemes increased by 200 per cent (32), and in addition many subsidiary schemes 
were introduced providing mainly lump sums on retirement. The undecisiveness 
of the general social insurance legislation of 1934, and the endless bargaining 
between influential occupational lobbies and weak governments, provoked a real 
explosion in the number of insurance schemes sharing common structural 
weaknesses: lack of organization, weak financial basis requiring external support, 
lack of actuarial estimates, extreme discrepancies in contributory conditions and 
in the range and level of benefits.
During a period when the State, through both Liberals’ and Populists’ 
governments, persistently refused to participate in the financing of the general 
social insurance scheme, the "policies "pursued for occupational schemes were 
completely contrasting.
The following table is very enlightening (33):
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PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE (1932-3)
INSURANCE FUNDS 
FOR :
SOCIAL
RESOURCES
EMPLOYER
CONTRIBUTIONS
EMPLOYEE
CONTRIBUTIONS
INV/ENTS.
OTHER
RECEIPTS
Actors, musicians, 
authors and theatrical 
technicians
88 - 2 10
Bakery Workers 68 15 15 2
MPs and Senators 67 - 29 4
Flour mill workers 62 18 18 2
Priests 55 30 - 15
Hellenic Electric Co. 46 21 21 12
Retired Railwaymen 
(subsidiary) 99 - - 1
Average for other 77 
hinds 14.5 13.9 33.4 38.2
Social resources were state subsidies collected from indirect taxation, 
called "social taxes", charged on luxury goods, imported goods, transport tickets, 
entrance tickets, alcohol, tobacco, gas, petrol, freight charges, newspapers and 
generally on services and consumer goods. In this respect, the mass of consumers - 
most of them lacking any insurance coverage - were paying for provisions for small 
but influential groups, such as MPs themselves, which constituted the "privileged 
employees". Notably, the category "various receipts" included revenues coming from 
fines, entrance fees, donations, fees on marriage, etc.
The situation in occupational schemes for influential self-employed 
groups was even more fascinating. The available information is very limited, 
fragmentary and contradictory; here are some examples of 1937: the public 
contractors’ fund absorbed from social resources almost 73 per cent of its total 
revenues, the doctors’ fund 54.1 per cent; the lawyers’ fund 36.2 per cent (34). In 
the financial year 1937-8, the State provided the following subsidies per insured 
person in drachmas: stock-brokers’ fund 24.813; actors’, musicians’, authors’ and 
theatrical technicians’ fund 16.280; flour-mill workers’ fund 5.500; public work 
contractors fund 4.690; bakery workers’ fund 2.700 (35). Between 1927 and 1937 
the revenues from state subsidies increased in a sample of funds by 42 times while 
the relevant employers-employee contributions were only tripled (36). Between
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1933 and 1938 the same sample of funds increased its revenues in general from 
153 to 690 per cent (37), reflecting, of course, the overwhelming inflation rates of 
that period. Employers and employees contributions in most occupational funds 
were at an equal rate, fluctuating from 2 to 7 per cent of wages. Obviously, the 
lower employers’ and employees’ contribution rates, the higher respective state 
subsidies were required.
In terms of other contributory conditions, the situation varied 
considerably. Most occupational funds had not a defined specific minimum 
retirement age, granting pensions’ eligibility after 25 to 30 working years. Where 
determined, the retirement age was at 50 or 55. It was reported that insurance 
funds usually granted "special favourable conditions for their first members and 
founders" (38), provoking a relatively high percentage of pensioners and financial 
imbalances. In addition, all these funds had high administrative expenses ranging 
from 10 to 36 per cent of their total expenditure, as reported by the Supreme 
Economic Council in 1937.
In terms of benefits, most pension schemes had no ceiling, providing in 
many cases very high, eamings-related old-age pensions. The occupational 
schemes of the self-employed provided varying pensions, related to a respectively 
varying contribution rate. The uncontrolled expansion of supplementary funds, 
mainly due to monetary instability which undervalued the main pensions, 
exacerbated insurance inequalities and favoured selective state measures. 
Moreover, several groups of employees or self-employed "participated in more 
than one scheme for the same risks,...(due to) omissions or obscurities in the 
constitutions of these organizations" (39). This brought many people into the 
position of receiving pensions from two, three or even more funds. The funds of 
bank employees, traditionally a perfect example of insurance generosities, 
provided usually very high pensions ranging from 1000 to 40.000 drachmas 
monthly (40). In comparison with average IKA’s pensions these pensions were 
approximately five to ten times higher.
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According to many writers of that era (41), high pensioners composed a 
considerable part of the total number of pensioners of the occupational schemes. 
The comparison between pensions and working earnings varied, but clearly many 
pensioners received much more money after, than before retirement. As noted 
earlier, information on the insides of most occupational schemes was either 
minimal or contradictory. This was a secret that everybody knew but "... (it is well 
known) both inside and outside Parliament (that) some pensioners received 
monthly tens of thousands.... (this information) are strictly covered by mystery"
(42).
In terms of health insurance, comparisons in provisions are not feasible 
before the establishment of IKA, since the situation until then was primitive and 
health insurance coverage itself composed a privilege. In 1931, only tobacco, flour 
mill and bakery workers were provided this coverage according to the official 
statistics (43), composing an extreme minority of 1.7 per cent of the total working 
population. It might be that from 1922 onwards, employees of the Bank of 
National Economy were provided with health coverage (44) presumably by private 
doctors, since this was later the traditional way of bank employees funds’ health 
care coverage. Larger differences in health insurance provisions were in fact 
generated after World War II, simultaneously with the development of private 
medicine and of modem big hospitals.
Public servants: ratifying privileges
In the case of the public servants’ pension scheme, interesting 
developments arose in the mid 1930s, as the result of the general expansion of 
welfare benefits. In June 1935, a compulsory law concerning adjustments for the 
pensions of public servants and officers in the armed forces was passed by the 
Tsaldaris government. This law increased pensions, which were now related to 
earnings of the last month of service, at a rate ranging from 85 to 60 per cent (45). 
In return, a contribution, but of just 4 per cent on salary, was enforced (46).
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Some months later, in October, a royal decree passed by the Kondylis 
government, redefined their pension regulations framework, including all the 
dispersed adjustments introduced since the decree of April 1923, referring even to 
one single person’s pension. It is this law which established a qualifying period of 
only 15 years for pensions for married women (47). The regulations granting 
pension after 10 years of service at the age of 60, and in most cases after 20 years 
of service were retained. The law introduced a ceiling of 8.500 drachmas for 
monthly pensions, while salaries in service were ranging from 4000 to 14000 
drachmas per month, and maintained contribution rate at 4 per cent (48). 
Pensions were calculated with the system of fifties according to which full pension 
was granted after 35 years of service and half of it after 25 years, and were 
considerably increased by several supplements respective to employment status 
and family conditions. Invalidity pensions were provided, but in the case of 
invalidity which did not occur during service, a ten years working period was 
required; doctors retained eligibility for invalidity pensions according to the 1923 
decree. Death pensions were provided at a very extended range including not only 
widows, orphans and destitute parents but also destitute unmarried sisters and 
divorced daughters. Female orphans received pensions as long as they were 
unmarried and male orphans received them if either under 18 years of age and 
unmarried, or over 18 years but disabled and unmarried.
The legislation of 1935 concerning public servants composes a 
remarkable piece of social insurance regulations. It not only reconfirmed existing 
generosities, but it introduced several new ones such as the "distinguished" one of 
providing married women with an early pension after 15 years of service, at a time 
when women already composed roughly 30 per cent of working people. Pensions 
were transferable almost in any case to survivors but disability was poorly covered. 
Moreover, health insurance was once more totally neglected. Concerning the 
dissimilarities with IKA’s regulations established exactly one year before and 
already discussed, the conclusion is reached that social insurance principles had
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been in this case greatly violated, or that the Greek State considered several types 
of the same thing, at the same period.
Criticisms and Reflections
Law No 6298 of 1934 was practically the landmark of universal social 
insurance protection evolution in Greece by establishing a substantially wider 
coverage for blue and white collar employees. A comparatively reasonable part of 
the expenses of the scheme was placed on working people’s shoulders, who 
covered 40 per cent of IKA’s revenues, but the State did not participate. But the 
scheme excluded many important categories of working people, particularly 
farmers - it should not to be forgotten that Greece remained an agricultural 
country - and employees in rural areas where no insurance centres were 
established; a small part of public servants, most of whom where already insured 
by their special scheme; employees with non-permanent jobs,... Furthermore, it 
did not provide unemployment coverage. The law considerably decreased the 
contribution rate introduced by the social insurance legislation of 1932.
It should be emphasized that this was the first time ever that social 
insurance issues were paid such attention. As the Populists’ MP. K.Kanellopoulos, 
described "...workers in the bakeries, railways and tramways went on strike,... all 
the existing occupational schemes were struggling to prevent amalgamation with 
IKA,... the representatives of more than 150.000 insured employees expressed 
their determination to preserve the independence of their funds at any cost (49).
Furthermore, as Gilbert has depicted " The story of the growth of 
national health insurance is to a great extent the story of lobby influence and 
pressure groups" (50). The nature of the respective development in Greece 
demonstrates the same conviction. As noted, the social insurance legislation of 
1934 was not introduced without a struggle. The considerable decrease in the rate 
of contribution, 6.98 per cent of earnings compared with 11.6 per cent of the 1932 
Bill, appeased employers’ reactions who realized that the time had come. But
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particularly on the issue of health insurance, strenuous opposition was asserted by 
the medical profession.
Greek doctors declared an open war against health insurance from 1930, 
following the pace of their colleagues in other countries and especially Germany, 
in relevant disputes. Doctors were mainly concerned about the possible financial 
consequences and state control on their work. However, the Pan-Hellenic Medical 
Association addressed to the Special Parliamentary Committee of 1932 an 
appeasing letter asking for a "system of free choice of doctor" and "payment for 
every single patient’s visit", administrative power within the scheme and exclusion 
of highly paid employees from health insurance as achieved by GPs in Great 
Britain. As explained in the previous chapter, they achieved administrative 
representation in IKA’s Board of Directors, and in this chapter, they passed into 
the Law a definite statement that the system of free choice of doctors would be 
followed. The exclusion of highly paid employees, which would grant doctors a 
valuable source of extra income, was disregarded. On these conditions, 
cooperation was achieved and doctors were persuaded to participate in the 
scheme, providing both in and out-patients’ services.
IKA’s health insurance legislation of 1934, the original in fact general 
framework of these services in Greece, failed to address the gravity of the 
problem of poor health care provided up to then, and to introduce a competent 
basis for its development. Most of the crucial issues have been theoretically 
approached, left for definement by forthcoming adjustments, "circulars" as the law 
called them. Such issues were everything concerning the "centres" since the law 
did not clarify if they were for primary or secondary health care; the way maternity 
care was to be established; the details for the charges put on the services; the 
means and way in-patients care would be provided; the method of IKA’s control 
over the medical and pharmaceutical treatment provided; the process for doctors’ 
reporting to IKA; the system of medicines’ provision; the sanatorium care 
provisions and the patient’s financial participation. The law actually excluded
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dependants from hospital provisions except maternity care. Most importantly, 
according to the law the organization of health care would be authorized by the 
Medical Association, which would allocate all IKA’s health receipts and was to 
define the details of the system of free choice of doctor and of doctors’ payment. 
This adjustment was heavily criticized: "... no foreign legislation, not even the 
French has placed health insurance in doctors’ hands without any control... many 
Greeks, who enjoyed so far health treatment only when they managed to 
overcome doctors’ ignorance or to assist their (doctors’) political ambitions, will 
now become simple money bringing clients .. (the Bill’s original concept) of 
workers’ health insurance organized properly on financial and moral principles is 
overtaken by the concept of making social insurance more profitable to doctors" 
(51). Finally, the law satisfactorily clarified the cash benefits for accident, sickness, 
invalidity, maternity and funeral expenses.
In this respect, IKA would provide health insurance coverage in the 
urban areas according to the plan introduced in 1934 and in a form which would 
be defined afterwards, based on doctors’ directions and the amount of employers’ 
and employees’ contributions. The Government faced the whole issue as a private 
matter regarding the groups involved and not as an overwhelmingly urgent 
priority, concerning the unacceptable low level of health care services in Greece. 
In 1934, for example, the country needed 28.500 hospital beds and the State 
provided only 13.000 (52), concentrated of course in the urban areas. The 
conditions of public health in the early 1930s have been described in the previous 
chapter.
In February 1940, the long discussed circular defining most of the 
guidelines for the health insurance services provided by IKA was at last issued 
(53). Primary care was to be provided in IKA’s "own polyclinics" (54), the "centres" 
of the law, or by home visits. Hospital care would be provided either in IKA’s 
hospitals and clinics or in contracted private clinics (55).
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IKA’s polyclinics would be established in local areas after a decision of 
IKA’s administration and local branches’ committees, approved by the Minister of 
Labour. Polyclinics would include all or part of the existing specialities and would 
be directed by a doctor, employed as IKA’s inspector (56). IKA’s doctors would be 
divided into three categories: hygienists, inspectors and therapists. The first and 
second category would be salaried doctors; therapists were divided into those of 
polyclinics (GPs, specialists and dentists paid all by monthly salary) and those for 
home visits, either GPs or paediatrics, paid on a fee-for-service basis (57). 
Therapists might be asked to provide hospital services as well.
In case a polyclinic lacked a sufficient number of doctors or certain 
specialities, IKA would contract with doctors, either of general practice or 
speciality, having their private surgery in the area. These doctors would be 
providing services in their surgery, in IKA’s contracted clinics and in patients’ 
homes, and would be paid either by monthly salary, or by fee-for-service. This kind 
of salaried doctors might be granted a "bandage allowance" (58). Finally, IKA 
determined specific general conditions for those doctors wishing to cooperate with 
the scheme (59). In the absence of GPs, general practice was provided either by 
pathologists or by doctors without speciality.
Up to the end of 1940, IKA’s health services were expanded: 350.000 
insured were looked after by 624 doctors and 268 nurses; health centres, the so 
called "polyclinics", were established in 13 cities; Almost 2 million medical 
examinations were provided in 1939, increased to 2.8 million in 1940 (60). 
However, the problem still was the lack of hospital beds: the number of beds 
needed in 1940 was 34.000 while only 15.500 existed (61). This might mean that 
IKA had somehow contributed in this field, since beds increased between 1934 to 
1940 by 2.500, but reliable statistics are not available. The number of doctors in 
1935 was around 6.200 (62), increased to 7.365 in 1940 (63), i.e. one doctor for 
1.061 inhabitants in 1935 and for 997 inhabitants in 1940, a traditionally 
competent ratio.
89
In terms of pension regulations, the law of 1934 was clear and relatively 
competent, and provided detailed regulations based on actuarial estimates, 
international and domestic experience. The major problem here was the low level 
of benefits which was considered essential for the first steps of IKA, especially 
since the concept was not to provide high pensions but to include in the scheme 
older people "... having no responsibility that general social insurance has not been 
established earlier" (64). However, the law did not include absurd generosities 
aiming to "supplement" and not to maintain income (65). The scheme was in 
principle based on the Bismarckian principles of eamings-related benefits. The 
flat rate basic pension introduced at 3.000 drachmas was increased by eamings- 
related supplements on top, established a minimum pension according to the 
Beveridgean model aiming to preserve standards of living - to a small extent - and 
to reduce poverty. Thus the scheme followed a combination of Bismarck - 
Beveridge principles.
In brief, the Law No 6298 of 1934 established for its members a uniform 
social insurance scheme for the urban areas providing low pensions and vaguely 
introducing health insurance. This was achieved only after satisfying most of the 
demands of the influential interested groups - employers, members of the existing 
privileged insurance funds and doctors - who lobbied against the social insurance 
reform proposed in 1932. This original law and the gaps it left, as shaped by the 
compromises made, contains the elements which represent the foundation and the 
piecemeal development of Greek social security: low benefits, poor health 
services, discrepancies, inefficiencies, inconsistencies and inequalities.
In the aftermath of the social insurance legislation of the 1930s
Law No 6298 - the most concise of all acts concerning social insurance so 
far - achieved the fundamental aim of establishing the institution in Greece. This 
was done in a very dark period, before, during and after the Second World War. 
On the other hand, the existing situation of insurance schemes was beyond any
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control and the law failed to establish the basis for reorganization. The remaining 
social security gaps, the prevailing anarchy and the lack of political will, provoked 
the unplanned expansion of further occupational funds. This was only 
theoretically banned by Law No 6298, since the law itself provided for the 
establishment of new funds! These funds exacerbated the unorganized mode of 
the system, lacking in most of the cases any rational economic or actuarial study. 
Occupational schemes introduced their own supplementary funds aiming to 
provide additional benefits, mainly pensions. Moreover, following the law’s 
regulations, the Professionals and Handicraftsmen insurance (TEVE) fund with
125.000 members and the Traders one (TAE) with 25.000 were established, on the 
condition of excluding health insurance coverage.
In 1937, the Law No 591 established by Metaxas, introduced a Financial, 
Statistical and Accounting Office in order to coordinate the measures needed to 
keep a balance between the income and the expenditure of the social insurance 
agencies. Metaxas’ concern was the financial survival of these schemes but he was 
against amalgamation with IKA. His Minister of Labour clarified in December 
1937 that "....nobody will be allowed to touch them (the occupational funds)" (66).
It is fascinating that between 1915 and 1940 the number of Funds 
increased from 9 to 150 and the number of insured employees from 5.000 to more 
than 800.000. Before 1934, there was a working population of more than
2.530.000 of whom only 209.000 were covered by the existing social security 
agencies, less than 10 per cent. In December 1939, IKA had 325.853 insured 
people, 75 per cent of whom were men and 80 per cent manual workers (67).
Pensioners increased rapidly and this fact combined with the low level of 
pensions and high inflation contributed to the rapid development of 
supplementary insurance agencies aiming to provide additional benefits, mainly 
lump sums on retirement. The number of main and subsidiary funds increased 
dramatically especially between 1934 and 1940, from 93 to 150 (68). It was 
believed that around one fourth of the total number of working people was
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insured before the war, but only six of all the existing occupational schemes had 
more than 10.000 members.
As noted earlier, the main insurance gaps left by the general scheme were 
the exclusion of the agricultural working population and of the unemployed. 
Agricultural insurance had been deliberately neglected by the policies of both 
leading parties which argued in favour when they were in the opposition and 
claimed the difficulties to justify postponing decisions, when they were in office
(69). However, all recognised the need to cover the agricultural population while 
Law No 6298 provided coverage to the few agricultural workers employed at the 
insurance centres. No reliable data exist for either the large number of 
agricultural workers uncovered in the rural areas, or given this limited coverage in 
the urban areas. The special bill promised therefore by the Government was never 
presented.
In the case of unemployment insurance, the background stated earlier in 
this thesis explains the reasons for exclusion. Still in 1940 only three schemes, the 
tobacco, flour mill and bakery workers funds, provided unemployment coverage to 
their 40.000 members.
According to the legislation the main part of IKA’s reserves were 
invested in state securities (70). By the end of 1940, 60 per cent of net assets were 
used by the State through low interest loans and 30 per cent were in deposits kept 
by IKA. In other words, the dictator Metaxas established the precedent of using 
IKA’s reserves to finance "national plans", introducing a practice which was 
followed by almost all the post-war governments against the interests of the 
general social insurance scheme and its paying members (71). IKA’s members 
were subsidizing the other employees’ funds through direct and indirect taxation, 
while their own fund began having financial deficits and lacked any kind of 
financial state support.
Just for the history it should be mentioned that between 1935 and 1941 
the State attempted some minor, mainly unsuccessful interventions in the field
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aiming: to increase control over the existing occupational schemes (72); to 
organize the Ministry of Labour (73); to establish uniformity among the existing 
schemes (74); to preserve pension rights in case of insurance transfers (75). Even 
in 1941, during the war, Decree No 671 attempted "to put things in order" and 
establish the Directorate of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Labour . In the 
introduction to this decree it was emphasized that after an investigation it was 
found that particularly social insurance funds are in astonishing anarchy ... 
due to the absence of an effective policy of coordination and efficient government 
control...". This decree ordered the amalgamation of five pension funds with IKA. 
These powerful funds were covering the employees of the Greek Electric 
Railways, the Electric Transport Company, and its subsidiaiy fund, the Athens- 
Piraeus Electric (Company, the Electric Transport Company and the Railways of 
Athens. The members of these funds severely opposed this adjustment which was 
finally not implemented.
During the four years of German occupation (1941-1944) - which 
followed the Greek-Italian/German war (1940-1941) - IKA’s activities decreased 
dramatically. The scheme was actually transformed into a universal social security 
and social assistance institution: the main effort was concentrated on health and 
hospital care. IKA spent all its funds and deposits about 450 million drachmas, 
because it tried simultaneously to provide cash benefits adjusted to the changing 
monetary conditions. From 7 January 1942 onwards IKA organized in Athens 
common meals for its members: tuberculosis patients, epileptics, the insureds’ 
children, its own personnel.
Whatever IKA achieved during that period, was under German cruelty 
and the State’s apathetic position. On top of that, IKA was forced to increase its 
manpower. In October 1943, in times of dramatic economic conditions, more than 
three thousand employees were appointed by the Government. IKA could barely 
afford both its administrative and benefits cost. This was the first but not the last 
time that IKA was called upon to defend the State’s social policy, without any
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financial aid. In conclusion, IKA’s course during the war period could be 
described as "horizontal with weak curving trends" (76) .Unfortunately, the cruel 
civil war which prevailed in Greece (1946-1949) exacerbated the existing socio­
economic chaos and additionally provoked a huge ethical crisis which heavily 
influenced IKA’s evolution. The continuous political instability still violated 
Greece’s socio-economic life.
Conclusion
The original legislation of 1934 introducing IKA was to a considerable 
extent a balanced framework for the establishment of uniform social insurance. 
But, as is the tradition in Greece, this legislation was widely violated and abused 
from all sides; while IKA was established in order to function as a social insurance 
organization, it was gradually asked to operate as a social policy instrument. As 
depicted, "IKA functioned with a social insurance income, but with a social policy 
expenditure" (77). Many insured, who regularly ought to eontribute for longer 
periods in order to obtain eligibility for insurance provisions, were entitled by state 
interventions to IKA’s benefits and especially premature pensions earlier than 
normal (78).
During all this period, the unplanned establishment of several main and 
supplementary social insurance funds, according to occupational classes 
flourished. This was not only the outcome of the prevailing upheaval - even during 
the war painful measures were dropped - but the consequence of loose legislation 
concerning the occupational schemes. As was bitterly recalled in 1947, "the 
members of the existing schemes were struggling (in the period 1932- 4) in favour 
of the interests of the privileged categories of employees ... even voicing that they 
did not care whether social insurance benefits would be provided for other 
employees or not (79). The dissimilarities of the Greek social security system were 
continuously growing in terms of the level and kind of provisions, the range of 
coverage, the carve up of the funds, the discriminations in the State’s finance and
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the exclusion of major groups of the working population, almost all those 
employed in the rural areas. This is not to forget that the supervision of social 
insurance schemes was always split among various ministries, making coordination 
an impossible task. In the late 1940s, the reorganization of the whole social 
security system, the "harmonization" as traditionally called in most legislation, was 
-once again - recognized as an urgent and necessary task for everybody concerned 
- politicians, trade unions, scientists, employers and employees most of all, on the 
condition that all of these groups would manage to overcome their prevailing 
individualism.
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IV
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN GREECE AFTER THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR, 1944-1960
Introduction
This chapter describes the desperate efforts of the Greek State in the 
aftermath of the Second World War to provide essential protection in a 
paralyzed, split country, experiencing prolonged and widespread misery and 
upheaval. In the absence - or extreme undervaluation - of most of the social 
insurance normal benefits, enlarged social assistance services under poor financial 
and organizational conditions, played the leading role in the survival of the nation 
in the 1940s.
This is the way "the colossal social problem" was depicted by the Ministry 
of Social Welfare": It is time that the Social Policy of any State must always be in 
relation to its financial means, it is self-evident that a social problem of such 
magnitude, exceeds the limits of the Greek Economy. ... In the interval of one 
human generation Greece has suffered two tremendous disasters. The one in 1922 
and the present one. But in 1922 Greece fought in foreign countries without 
internal destruction and with a powerful national economy and a flourishing 
agricultural production. ... Whilst today, after a hard and unequal fight, after 
many years of exhausting enemy occupation, the consequence of which was the 
destruction of 158.000 buildings and the greatest and most important public 
works, and after the terrible activities of the Communists, Greece is in an
infinitely worse condition Yet, today Greece, under the most tragic conditions,
with no resources of her own and with a growing deficit in her budget, is called 
upon to meet alone the tremendous social problem of the maintenance of 700.000 
refugees. ... 1.753.000 Greeks i.e. 24 per cent of the whole population, excluding
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the guerrilla-striken refugees, are officially certified indigents and lacking the 
means to provide themselves with 1/4 of the minimum basic diet recognised as 
essential for the maintenance of health. 340.000 orphans are expecting assistance 
from the State. Furthermore the disabled and the victims of war absorb 400 billion 
drachmas or $ 40.000.000 per year for their pensions" (1).
Theoretical Framework
Social or public assistance is the oldest part of social security, or rather of 
social protection, including voluntary schemes. Early provisions of social 
assistance started hundreds of years ago, in charitable giving which was 
strengthened and supported by the most powerful religions of the world. Since the 
sixteenth century, countries such as England and Germany had passed poor laws 
financed by local taxes.
According to the International Labour Office the following three criteria 
define a social security system:
1. " The objectives of the system which must be:
a) to grant curative or preventive medical care.
b) to maintain income in case of involuntary loss of earnings or of an 
important part of earnings or
c) to grant supplementary income to persons having family responsibilities.
2. The system must be set up by legislation which attributes specified individual
rights to, or which imposes specified obligations on a public, semi-public or 
autonomous body.
3. The system should be administered by a public, semi-public or autonomous
body".
Social assistance is based on need and requires declarations of income, 
family size and other circumstances and is provided after a "means test" or 
"income’s test" procedure. In many countries social workers, the scheme’s 
"operators", decide whether people are eligible for help and for how much.
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In advanced societies, a series of specific regulations determine the right 
for assistance and the discretional character of the schemes is significantly 
decreased. However, in most countries social assistance plays a restricted role, 
mainly because of the cost characterized as a non-productive investment, as well 
as of the operational disadvantages it carries. Stigma is the most traditional social 
one, and this is the main reason why social assistance programmes tend to have 
many diverting names in order to become more acceptable to people in need.
Another defect of social assistance is that any form of source income is 
usually deducted from the benefit originally payable. Additionally the complexity 
of entitlement regulations, in combination with the usually low educational level 
of the people entitled, provokes a significant gap between the people eligible for 
social help and the people actually receiving it. Social assistance’s eligibility rules 
vary significantly among countries and are usually determined locally rather than 
centrally.
Social assistance schemes are in general financed by the State, either by 
local or by general taxation. In most countries where social assistance is 
established as a right, it is mainly concentrated in the provision of free health care 
services for the low income groups. Additionally, social assistance programmes - 
including voluntary action - which are benefits in cash and in kind are usually 
directed to disadvantaged and high risk groups, such as the disabled, the aged or 
the unemployed, in other words to low income unprotected people.
The socio-political upheaval of the post-war period, 1945 -1950
Despite the German occupation (2), politics never stopped playing an 
overwhelming role in this strategic region of the European map with its own 
peculiarities. Great Britain remained closely involved in Greek affairs, aiming to 
maintain its influence in the area after the war by entrusting the country to the 
constitutional monarchy. During the early stages of the occupation, the workers’ 
National Liberation Front (BAM) was organised, aiming to unite and motivate
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the working people of the urban areas, having at the same time a strong military 
branch, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) fighting the Germans on 
the hills and mountains. Simultaneously, some other non-communist resistance 
organizations were formed. The National Republican Greek League (EDES) was 
the most powerful of them. It is not within the scope of this thesis to elaborate the 
dignified years of Greek resistance during the German occupation.
However, the above mentioned social organization should be mentioned 
as one memorable but rare example of a social movement, partly a consequence 
of the weak and rather unconscious labour movement existing so far. Moreover, 
this kind of organization was one of the factors which led to the bitter civil war 
experienced after the Second World War.
In early October 1944, the German army was withdrawn from Greece 
leaving unforgettable harsh memories behind. A government of national unity was 
established on 18 October 1944 under G. Papandreou with full British support but 
with weak, impact and power. EAM acquired massive support during the 
occupation - though its communist orientation - providing the Greek people with 
a vision of the future, far beyond the experience and competence of the old 
politicians. Moreover, EAM paid much higher attention to the problems of the 
suffering working people of the rural areas.
The Papandreou government was to face intractable problems. The 
Greek Economy had been crushed during the occupation. The inflation rate could 
not even be counted and most of the population in the urban areas relied on 
international relief supplies, queuing by day and night. The prevailing political 
concern was the procedure for a peaceful disarming of all sides and the re­
establishment of a national army. Papandreou’s negotiations with the left wing 
ministers, though promising in the beginning, did not have a fruitful end. General 
demobilization was announced for 10 December but the conditions set did not 
meet EAM’s approval. The British on the other hand declared their 
determination to use British forces in order to guarantee the implementation of
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the legally constituted government’s decisions.
The left wing ministers’ resignation was followed by a massive 
demonstration in Athens on 3 December organized by EAM and supported by the 
communist party (KKE). The fifteen or so killed by police fire would be the first 
of thousands of lives lost during the following years. Papandreou resigned, 
succeeded by General Plastiras on 3 January 1945 while even Churchill, who 
visited Athens on Christmas Eve 1944, failed to achieve reconciliation. During the 
following years even brothers killed each other...
By autumn 1949, the national army with full American support won the 
"war" and the Democratic Army was exterminated. The British influence on 
Greek affairs between 1944 and 1947 was vigorously replaced by an American one 
since November 1947, when a joint Greek-American military advisory body was 
established.
Greece had experienced a tragic period of nine years at war (1940-1949), 
the second part of which left, once more, a deeply divided and wounded nation. 
The civil war left the country with 80.000 people killed and almost 700.000 
refugees (3) - people forced to leave their homes. Moreover, this dark period 
obscured the political and social life for the next decades, dominating the 
evolution of the country.
The existing social assistance potential
As we have seen, Greece entered a black period after World War II due 
to the civil war which was suffered for almost five years. In this sense, the country 
remained at war until 1949 and valuable time and resources were lost. Moreover, 
the population’s morale collapsed and the nation’s identity was split for the 
remaining half of the 20th century. The civil war battles forced at least 10 per cent 
of the population to become refugees, to leave their homes in the rural areas and 
to concentrate in bigger cities’ "security centres", to be safer. In this respect these 
people were "in a condition of poverty and starvation, most of them sick from
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exhaustion, suffering and without any visible means of support" (4), a bitter 
picture reminiscent of the 1922 situation.
Under these circumstances, the recovery of the country got nowhere and 
the development of social protection slightly evaded this general rule. The 
planning of social assistance was based on the concept of national rehabilitation 
and the establishment of a basis which would create jobs and provide a minimum 
standard of living for all the people. At that moment, the majority of both the 
rural and urban population were facing huge difficulties and the scope of social 
assistance was to secure basic needs. The State was forced to maintain a net-work 
of protection, aiming to secure the survival of the population in a widely destroyed 
country, and to remove the war-induced damage.
The "Programme of Rehabilitation and Protection", the main feature of 
social policy measures in the mid-forties, relied on help from abroad. This help 
started with basic consumption goods (food, medicines, etc.) and was continued by 
the influx of further investments (5). The main targets of the programme were: 
firstly, the restoration of War destruction. The wreckage left after the war was 
beyond words: 226.500 families were living under awful sanitary conditions and 
poor nutrition; the impact on health was enormous and in 1945 the number of 
deaths in affected wounded areas increased by 50 per cent. According to a brief 
statistical report (6), the picture in Greece after the World War II was: more than 
20 per cent of houses destroyed, 20 per cent of the population without shelter; 10 
per cent of the population killed during the war; 10 per cent of the population 
suffering from tuberculosis - half of them were going to die within the year if 
urgent care was not provided; 25 per cent of children were orphans; 33 per cent of 
the population suffered from malaria; 90 per cent of railways and bridges were 
destroyed; 75 per cent of the navy was sunk. Secondly, the completion of major 
projects remained unfinished because of the war. Thirdly, the implementation of a 
national policy to restore the financial and social situation, was an urgent task.
Free provisions systematically given from abroad created a false feeling
105
of security, on top of the disasters extended by the civil war (7). The main 
supporting country was the U.S.A. in the frame of a general world-wide plan with 
obvious and hidden political and financial objectives. This aid started immediately 
after the War under UNRRA, the United Nations body, which was mainly 
financed by the U.S.A. In 1947 American aid enforced the "Truman Dogma" 
which anticipated aid for Greece and Turkey and was completed with the 
"Marshal Plan", implemented from 1948 to 1952 by the Administration of 
Financial Cooperation.
The Marshal plan proved to be of crucial importance for the survival of 
the Greek people. In the beginning, 85 per cent of this aid consisted of basic 
goods such as nutrition and clothing. At a later stage the aid was oriented towards 
works of a permanent rehabilitation character. It was estimated that almost half 
of the American aid (8) spent before 1952, was given for the housing and the 
protection of refugees from the civil war (9).
People coming home found almost everything missing and destroyed, 
even the land was sometimes burnt. The State provisions for these refugees was 
organized on the basis of both cash and kind i.e. nutritional goods as long as they 
were far from their homes and after returning home and for the first two months 
60 drachmas for one person per month, 200 drachmas for a 3 member family and 
300 drachmas for over 3 member families. Additionally, the Ministry of 
Agriculture provisions were directed to the refugees by giving them mules, 
ploughs, tools, seeds and fertilizers. In 1950, Law No 512 provided benefits for the 
families of those who had seriously suffered, or died during the 1940 -1944 war.
The reason for the massive American support were described by the 
words of R. Lapham, the Chief of the US. mission in Greece:...." The American 
citizen made investments of 2 billion dollars in nutrition, raw materials, machinery 
and technical know how, so that Greece would restore some of the most 
significant disasters created by the War, the Occupation and the Civil War; The 
benefits from this help will be the restoration of the Greek Economy, which will
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provide the great Greek people with the power and the willingness to pay a 
considerable part of the military burden of the Western world...”.
The social assistance services
The Ministry of Social Assistance, in cooperation with the American 
Mission and private voluntary organizations, was responsible for the formation 
and implementation of social programmes. It was divided into three general 
directorates: of Sanitation, Social Assistance and Housing; and provided regional 
services: "Sanitation Centres”, "Social Assistance centres’ and "Rehabilitation 
Services". Most of the "Social Assistance Centres" became universal public 
services of the Ministry in 1944 (10).
The American Mission played a considerable role in the reorganization 
of social assistance services and in the formation of social programmes operating 
"Branches of Social Assistance and Public Health". Under the administration of 
American specialists, these branches contributed to the improvement and 
reorganization of public health and provided particular provisions for unprotected 
orphans, for those incapable of work, for the unprotected disabled and for elderly 
and sick people. The American specialists additionally provided technical support 
for the reorganization of social assistance services, and undertook the training of 
personnel.
Social Workers in Greece
The need for social work, as the result of the immense development and 
the extreme complexity of procedures and organizations covering basic human 
needs in contemporary societies was recognized in Greece after comparative 
delay. The psychological and adjustment problems of people in need leading to 
the development of social work were minor, considering the general socio­
economic picture.
According to world-wide developments, protective measures for people
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in need were not restricted to mechanisms of material provisions to secure basic 
needs. Special thought was given to the mental and psychological support of those 
people or groups aiming to encourage and motivate them in order to overcome 
their difficulties, to adjust to social conditions and become full members of 
society. The realization of their disadvantages and the development of initiatives 
and self-help was a main objective of this "scientific technique" called social work, 
implemented by social workers.
Social workers are divided into categories depending on the field of 
social work for which they are trained. Their education is based on the social 
sciences and especially on sociology, psychology, economics. They deal with 
individuals, families, groups or communities, or they even act within social service 
institutions. Their education is in most countries of a university level (11). Social 
workers are the persons implementing social protection measures: they are the 
connection between the means and the ends.
Social worker training in Greece started in 1948, including both 
theoretical and practical teaching, aiming to give social workers some necessary 
background in order to cope with the problems of individuals, families or groups 
of people. Four schools of social work were established, providing 12 month 
courses, but prepared only 40 social workers every year (12).
In 1957 all these schools organized a special course "Training and 
practice in social work" run by foreign specialists; several other lectures for the 
development of educational social work programmes, were also organized. The 
"National Council of Social Work" was established in 1955 and a year later the 
"Social Assistance Journal" was first published.
The Ministry of Social Assistance was responsible for the practical 
training of social workers in "Centres of Practical Training" and proceeded to 
evaluate some of them. In 1959, a law "about the social workers' institution" 
recognized the significant role of social workers; introduced a special license for 
social workers, defined the education and training for entry, established the
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"Social Work Committee" as the central ruling body for social work issues in 
Greece (13). This legislation was general and descriptive not specifically 
determining the development of the social work institution in the country, keeping 
this profession in a low-status profile.
The role of social work became widely recognized in Greece only during 
the 1950’s when the Social Assistance Ministry started to use professional social 
workers in several programmes and established the "Social Workers Service" and 
a social workers’ selection committee. The transition to selective means-tested 
services obviously required trained persons. Social workers were used in child 
protection programmes, in hospitals, in rehabilitation centres for the disabled, in 
centres for infant protection, reformation centres, even in remote areas. They 
were employed according to specific - not very strict - prerequisites, since no 
organized social work training existed at that time and were distributed to the 
social assistance centres mainly for the implementation of the protection of 
children in foster families as a pilot project.
But even in 1959, the number of social workers employed was around 100 
and obviously they could not cover the vast needs. The other organizations of 
social protection started gradually using social workers and in the same year 85 
social workers were employed in hospitals and other institutions. They were few 
and their earnings were low, lower than those of nurses or primary school 
teachers. In brief, the lack of trained personnel made the unprevented operation 
of social assistance, a hard objective to achieve.
Considerable promotion of the, more or less, neglected issue of social 
work in Greece was noticed in September 1964 as the influence of the Twelfth 
International Congress of Schools of Social Work held in Athens. Professor 
Titmuss, in a memorable lecture, examined the relationship between schools of
social work, social research and social policy and concluded: " if schools of
social work are not to be limited to training in techniques they also must now have 
a function moral element built into them" (14).
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The Voluntary Sector
The activities of the voluntary sector, which was the pioneer of the field, 
were mainly enforced by the initiative of the Kings of Greece who established 
important social assistance organizations, operating on a scientific basis and 
having considerable impact on the improvement and extension of social 
protection. These organizations are described in Appendix B.
The Programme of Means Testing Destitution
Destitution was certified by the local authorities, parishes, municipalities 
and the police, according to the judgement "of a good and honest man". Until the 
mid-forties the social regulations, i.e. the existing mentality that stigmatised 
people who were officially certified as destitutes, prevented many people from 
using social assistance provisions and of course kept abuse to a minimal level.
The difficulties after liberalization, described earlier, and the general 
distribution of goods and free services alleviated stigma. This became evident 
when gradually the free services were restricted and entitled persons had to be 
characterized as destitute. Many people attempted to be included in the eligibility 
lists and the need for the introduction of specific criteria and testifying procedures 
was evident. The crucial decree of 11 May 1946 "about the concept of destitution 
and the way of testifying it", was introduced, completed by several ministerial 
decrees defining the procedures and the criteria of destitution.
According to the second article of the 1946 decree "destitute" was 
considered a person, irrespective of religion or nationality, who neither by his own 
nor by his family’s means could have adequate resources in order to meet basic 
needs. The lack of resources was considered in each individual case in relation to 
the income of the person and personal and family needs, according to broad 
guidelines issued by the Ministry of Social Assistance.
The new legislation was implemented by a new operational structure 
consisting of "Centres of Social Assistance" established in each province of the
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country. According to the third article, each parish or village would have an office 
authorized by the Centre of the province where it belonged; these officials were 
handling the applications for destitution certificates, i.e. for eligibility for social 
assistance provisions. In this way political criteria became prominent for defining 
poverty, and indeed, until the end of the 1970’s, when the policy of "destitution 
certificates" was finally abolished, it constituted a significant means of socio­
political control.
Due to the scarcity of available national resources, the destitution criteria 
aimed to establish three degrees of destitution in order to secure protection of 
those most in need. In this respect, the established criteria, varying according to 
the socio-economic conditions of specific areas, determined three categories (A- 
B-C) of destitutes. The implementation of specific programmes requested in 
addition special criteria, varying according to the socio-economic conditions of 
specific areas, for these particular provisions.
The reactions to the new legislation were rather unexpected for the 
Ministry. In the beginning, people had reservations about applying but this 
situation changed rapidly. A prominent administrator wrote: "When the Greek 
realizes that his neighbour, who is in the same position as himself, receives a 
benefit then a question is simultaneously coming into his mind: why him and not 
me? And millions of applications were submitted in order to take the title of 
destitution"(15). The bureaucracy created was huge",... tons of paper and ink, 
many circulars, leaflets, and instructions, use of mathematics to determine the 
income of applicants and inclusion or not in a destitution category, different 
minimum standards of living in each province; monthly statistical information of 
great usage especially to the foreign experts. Were this data accurate in relation to 
its substantial basis? I have serious doubts" (16).
The point was that the destitution criteria were very generous in relation 
to existing resources; "...We started vice versa. We introduced in a poor country, a 
destitution basis which was not applicable even in the prosperous countries..."
I l l
(17).
The number of public servants who were employed to implement the new 
Welfare State in Greece - according to the fathers of the 1946 decree - was more 
than 4.500. It was made an attempt" to transplant into Greece new scientific and 
social institutions. It was believed that this 4.500 people would be adequately 
informed of their objective and the intangible utopia would be realized by 
continuous long instructions sent from Athens, instructions which were never 
read, studied or implemented..." (18).
This pressure led to Law No 618 which attempted - on paper - to 
introduce specific qualifications for the social assistance personnel, to discharge 
the unsuitable ones and to secure the employment only of suitable ones in the 
future. The effectiveness of this law proved limited; however "...it is true that a 
percentage of this personnel consisted of good servants, providing the confidence 
that would develop in distinguished social workers..." (19).
The "Welfare by Employment" Programme
This programme was carried out nation-wide in the refugees’ "Security 
Centres" aiming to keep their morale high by working and receiving some money, 
executing simultaneously public works. Additionally, the destitute people of the 
rural areas could find work and low pay in this programme, having the feeling of 
contributing to the rehabilitation and the development of the country. The reward 
for their work was 11 drachmas and 7 drachmas for men and women respectively, 
as well as 90 drachmas worth of flour. In this respect, the "Welfare by 
Employment" programme attempted to improve the rural population’s living 
standards, both by financing poor families with no other income and by 
constructing works for the common welfare. The money spent on these projects 
was from loans to the parishes refundable in 5 years with a low 8 per cent interest 
rate.
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Housing Programme
The extent of the housing problem in Greece, as already described, was 
immense and pressed for a solution. At the end of the 1940s more than half of the
10.000 parishes of the country were suffering overwhelming damage. The cost of 
reconstruction was far beyond the strength of the national budget and the 
necessary construction materials were difficult to find even abroad. The pressure 
of the situation demanded immediate collective action which was expressed in the 
"Self-housing programme". According to this programme, peasants were given 
construction materials such, as timber, cement, lime, etc. as well as a cash benefit, 
in order to build or reconstruct their homes by their personal and their family’s 
work. In their efforts, the former refugees were helped by technical training, 
organized by the American Mission, provided during their stay in the security 
centres, coordinating afterwards other peasants of their village. The Self-housing 
programme was carried out in 1950 and 1951 and its success was beyond 
expectations. Even if some families had to live in one single room, no one 
returned to the "Refugees’ Centres".
Under Law No 2386 of 1953, the General Administration of Housing and 
Rehabilitation was surprisingly transferred from the Social Assistance Ministry to 
the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works. The Law aimed at the 
"unification and decentralization of the public technical services". The Social 
Assistance Ministry kept a "Housing Administration", which undertook the project 
of collection and evaluation of data on the remaining rehabilitation needs of 
housing in the country. In general, this Administration undertook all aspects of 
"Popular Housing" - the study, introduction and implementation of general 
programmes covering housing provisions and needs, aiming to resolve the 
housing problem of the low income population. On top of all the adversities, the 
very strong earthquake in 1953 killed hundreds and almost ruined the Ionian 
Islands and provoked huge catastrophes in Western Greece, exacerbating existing 
housing problems.
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Housing in urban areas was gradually becoming problematic over these 
years. The huge and unplanned increase of the population of big cities resulted in 
uneven building in the absence of any plan, coordination or even common sense. 
In the early 1950s more than 700.000 homes were needed and housing became a 
major social problem, preventing up to an extent the further socio-economic 
development of the country. The need for decent housing for all became a 
decisive factor for the necessaiy improvement in the country’s living standards. 
(20).
The programmes implemented aimed to provide shelter to those who 
could not build their own homes by their own means. In 1951, legislation "about 
popular housing" introduced relevant regulations (21), while a year later a royal 
decree provided the criteria for eligibility for public aid for a home (22). This 
legislation anticipated the procedures for the acquisition of land to be used for 
public housing, for the building of houses, for loans for self-housing or 
reconstruction or enlargement. Eligible were the members of "Construction 
Associations", with low family income, who lacked for at least 5 years an 
appropriate home in the area in which they permanently lived or those whose 
homes were in very bad condition, or of very limited space for each member of the 
family (23). These prerequisites were applicable to all the members of the family, 
wife, children and parents. A "Public Housing Committee" was established in each 
prefecture, defining the list of those eligible, according to the criteria established.
Numerous construction associations played a decisive role in the 
development of public housing in Greece, although operating without any 
planning and coordination which led to the financial decay of most of them. In 
1957, special treatment was anticipated for the housing of the families of the 
Disabled and Victims of War (24) and the relevant criteria were set out in a royal 
decree (25).
The housing needs of working people were seldom met until after 1954, 
due to the financial difficulties of the country after the wars, the lack of
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coordination and of comprehensive mid-term policies. The legislation recognized 
and enforced the development of private home for working people. Several minor 
programmes were conducted aiming at the improvement of people's living 
conditions or at finding them suitable low cost housing. In 1954, a law "about 
Labour Housing" introduced an organization for the implementation of 
programmes establishing Labour Houses for low income working people (26).
After 1946, it was estimated that about 18.000 refugees from the Eastern 
Europe Block came to Greece. Most of them were Greeks, some were Bulgarians 
and Albanians. They found shelter and food in "Foreign Refugees’ Care Centres" 
in big cities. In 1952 the United Nations paid half the cost of their protection, in 
cooperation with the Refugees’ Special Services of the Social Assistance Ministry 
which was covering all expenses of the provisional measures. Between 1947 and 
1957 the cost of foreign refugees’ protection amounted to 51 million drachmas. 
The cooperation of the Greek State with the United Nations on refugees’ relief 
had considerable success. These people were encouraged to overcome their 
psychological and financial problems and to gradually become active members of 
society.
Children's Protection
The overwhelming and unmanageable difficulties of the first half of the 
century led to an extended lack of family care and orphanages for a considerable 
part of Greek children. Population mobility, the dissolution of families, the 
physical and morale exhaustion, sickness and malnutrition made children the most 
vulnerable part of the population. In 1948 almost 325.000 children under 18 years 
of age, one in eight children were orphans (27).
The traditional solid links within Greek families and the strong spirit of 
mutual support alleviated most of this problem. Almost 75 per cent of 
unprotected children became new members of relatives’ families or of foster 
families. The remaining children - around 125.000 in 1946-1948 - were in
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conditions of absolute need and attracted the interest of social assistance services 
or private voluntary organizations. The provision of normal conditions for the 
children's upbringing was the main objective .
The institutional care for children could not cover more than 7.500-8.000 
children in all private orphanages of the country. The burden of establishing new 
ones could not be carried by the State. This situation, in combination with the 
international trend of non-institutional provisions, determined the guidelines for a 
general programme of children’s protection, which had an urgent character and 
aimed at the introduction of a unified organization for the protection of children:
a. Replacement of natural families by a relative or a foster one. Financial aid was
to be given to these families in order to care for these children, with social 
workers to alleviate the potential family problems.
b. Institutional care for special cases under specific prerequisites, which included
the reorganization of institutions, use of modem methods and facilities and 
training of personnel. The emphasis was on preventive health care and 
overcoming the disadvantages of institutional care. There was institutional 
care for working mothers’ children and special institutions for physically and 
mentally handicapped children.
c. Unprotected children were to have priority over any other group of people in
need.
d. The kind of help provided should be based on the professional judgement of
social workers and social assistance officials aiming to cover needs within 
the family.
e. Emphasis was given to the protection of maternity with consultancy services and
visiting services especially in the mral areas.
f. Employment of appropriately trained personnel for the implementation of the
programmes.
The financial support to families caring for unprotected children was 
given in the form of family allowances under specific regulations and aimed to
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secure foster families. The role of social workers should be decisive in order to 
testify and evaluate the real pressure and need for help. But, there were 
overwhelmingly few trained social workers, that they could not cover the needs. 
On the other hand, a reorganization of the activities of the institutions of 
Children’s Protection was attempted by increased financial support, the 
reorientation of objectives and purposes, the introduction of modem methods of 
care, the encouragement of private initiative and the coordination and planning of 
services (28).
Several other Ministries developed programmes for children’s protection, 
such as the Ministry of Justice for the prevention and restriction of criminality of 
children, the Ministry of Employment for the social, professional and cultural 
support of young working people, the social security provisions including 
maternity protection, the Ministry of Education for School Health programmes, 
scholarships and school camps, the Ministry of Agriculture for the improvement 
of living standards of children in the mral areas, the Ministry of Defence for war 
victims’ children and people in the armed forces.
The general programme of the Social Assistance Ministry developed 
gradually due to the huge difficulties and after detailed examination so that 
priorities could be established. In 1950 the Ministry’s Administration of National 
Orphanages clarified the adjustment of scientific methods in the circumstances of 
Greek life (29).
Non-institutional Public Family Protection
The implementation of this programme started in 1950, providing care 
for children younger than 15 years of age (later 13 years), lacking paternal 
protection (orphans, illegitimate children, disabled father, father in prison or in 
the army), with a family income lower than a specific level determined by the 
number of family members.
The programme was initially financed by the Greek-American War Care
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Fund and after 1950 by the Royal Welfare, namely the national budget; it was 
administered by the National Orphanages and Children Centre Administration. 
The implementation of this programme was undertaken by the Children 
Protection Services and the examination of the cases should be carried out by 
trained social workers, and teachers in the rural areas. The financial 
administration was undertaken by the Organization of the Mail Savings Bank in 
order to provide the cash benefits all over the countiy.
The protection was a family cash benefit every month based on family 
income, supplementing it in order to reach an "adequate" defined level. On the 
other, hand help should be provided to these families by social workers, in order 
to overcome their difficulties and to develop their abilities. Between 1950-9, 
almost 150.000 destitute and unprotected children were covered by the 
programme, belonging to the following categories: orphans from father (51 per 
cent), orphans from both parents (1 per cent), soldiers’ children (15 per cent), 
children of disabled fathers (12 per cent), illegitimate children (6 per cent), 
abandoned children (8 per cent), children of divorced parents(Yjper cent), 
children of immoral parents (0,5 per cent), children of lost soldiers of the civil 
war (3 per cent), children of prisoners (2 per cent), and finally children of any 
category of foster families (2 per cent).
In 1958, 19.500 poor foster families and 2.500 children were provided 
with coverage. The course of the expenditure on this programme appears in Table 
5, which shows the initial increased coverage due to the post-war difficulties and 
the gradual decrease due to general national development (30).
In conclusion, this programme was universally implemented in 6.100 
parishes and communities using fast and effective procedures run by social 
workers with the cooperation of local people. It should be mentioned, however, 
that the level of family income for eligibility as well as the cash benefit should 
have been adjusted with the increasing inflation but from 1950 to 1959 it 
remained unchanged (31).
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Institutional Children*s Protection
There were four types of national institution for children: the National 
Orphanages and Boarding Schools, the National Children Centres, the National 
Agricultural Kindergartens and Agricultural Household Schools. After the war all 
these institutions were refurbished and reorganized, financed by the national 
budget.
The legislation of 1954 defined the criteria and the procedures for taking 
children into the national institutions and securing their personal care as far as 
possible (32). Additionally the establishment of technical professional institutions 
was envisaged. The reorganization of the institutions consisted of a general 
modernization, abolishing old-fashioned regulations such as the compulsory 
wearing of uniforms, improvements in nutrition, relationships of children with the 
community, technical education, etc.
In 1958 the operating institutions in the country were 30 National 
Orphanages and Boarding Schools having a capacity for 3.850 children. National 
Children Centres for 4.500 infants, 36 National Agricultural Kindergartens for 
2.500 infants, and 44 Agricultural Schools for 1.750 female children (33).
Child and Maternity Protection by Private and Voluntary Organizations
The existing private and voluntary organizations were of the following 
kind - Infant Centres, Day Children Centres, orphanages. Children’s Camps, 
Institutions for the Blind and Disabled, Deaf-and-dumb children and PIKPA, the 
National Rehabilitation Centre of Handicapped Children (34). Infant Centres 
aimed to protect illegitimate and abandoned infants and most of them were 
administered at the municipality level. For these infants several legal acts 
determined the adoption regulations since adoption was considered to be the 
most humane and effective solution (35).
In 1950, the existing 13 Children Centres run by private voluntary
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organizations, operated during the day for 1.350 children of destitute working 
mothers. By 1955 private voluntary orphanages operated all over the country with 
2.800 orphans and destitute children. The Ministry of Social Assistance subsidized 
these institutions which provided shelter, nutrition, clothing and education.
"Preventoria", were children’s institutions providing mainly preventive 
care. Destitute children of fragile health (usually vulnerable due to TB) were 
accepted in these institutions and were provided with full nutrition, a fresh 
atmosphere, physical training, etc. In 1958, there were 9 preventoria operating in 
areas with a good climate and much greenery.
Children’s camps were operating from 1948 in order to give the 
opportunity to children of low income families in urban areas to live close to 
nature for their summer holidays, as members of a group, far away from the 
unhealthy environment of the industrialized cities. The camps were administered 
either by the Ministry of Social Assistance or of Education, the Children received 
annually by the former were around 50.000.
Several associations were operating for the protection of working young 
people. There was the National Institution for the Protection of the Working 
Child, administered by the Social Assistance Ministry and providing shelter, 
nutrition, entertainment, night school education for youngsters 13 to 18 years of 
age. Another similar institution was the Working Girls’ Association which were 
receiving only females for similar activities.
Children's Health Protection
All sectors, public, private or voluntary, have always given priority to 
children’s mental and physical health care. Institutions such as PIKPA, the Greek 
Red Cross, the Disabled Services, the Royal Institution, the Royal Welfare, 
contributed to preventive and curative health care for children, provided care 
from pregnancy to youth by Consultancy Mothers’ Centres in the Health Centres 
and in PIKPA’s maternity hospitals, gynaecological Departments of hospitals,
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Agricultural and Community Surgeries, Consultancy Infant Centres administered 
by PIKPA, Children Houses (36).
The National Rehabilitation Centre o f Handicapped Children (PIKPA).
This was the most significant semi-public organization for children's 
health and social protection, established in 1915 by Queen Sofia. In 1939, it 
defined its objectives and activities as the protection of maternity and children, 
the provision of nutrition and any kind of care for destitute children or mothers. 
In 1945 and 1949 PIKPA was given considerable resources - 70 per cent of the net 
profits of the State lottery (37).
PIKPA survived during this difficult period using advanced methods, 
especially in the preventive field. It provided services by special units such as the 
Special Services for Pregnant Women and Infants, Consultant Centres for 
Pregnant Women and Healthy Infants, Special Children’s Surgeries, Special 
Infant X-ray Services, Foster Family Services, Special help for Children Services, 
Children Multi Clinics, Special Children Camp Services, Disabled Children’s 
Services, Maternity Services in the rural areas, etc.
Foreign organizations for Children Protection in Greece
Many foreign organizations contributing to children’s protection in 
Greece were established mainly after World War II such as the Foster Parent’s 
Plan in 1948, the Greek War Welfare, the Middle East American Institution, the 
Save the Children Federation, the Save the Children Fund, the American 
Association C.A.R.B., Swedish and Swiss Organizations, the World Church 
Council, the Students Service Institution, etc.
Some of them provided considerable help. For example, the Foster 
Parents Plan gave benefits in cash and in kind to more than 3.500 children every 
year while C.A.R.B. gave mainly food. UNICEF enhanced any attempt for the 
establishment of such institutions and concentrated its efforts against
121
malnutrition.
The Protection of the Disabled
The disabled, those having diminished physical or mental capabilities 
due to sickness, accident or relevant afflictions, were provided with several 
services in order to overcome their disadvantages by both medical and mental 
care. Special treatment was given to disabled children, especially those bom 
disabled, aiming to provide them with all the necessary means to live a normal life 
within the Community. Both institutional and non-institutional care were 
provided irrespective of the particular needs of the disabled.
In 1958, the number of disabled children (0-18 years of age) in the 
country was around 70.000, the physically handicapped were 30.000 and the 
mentally ill were 40.000 (38). The total number of disabled in the countiy was
120.000 with 16.000 of them needing artificial limbs since most of them became 
disabled during the war.
The main problem was the lack of an effective mechanism for the 
occupational training of the disabled in order to become self-supporting. The 
existing relevant services were inadequate but American imported know-how 
improved the situation. The Ministry of Social Assistance prepared the lists of 
disabled and, according to a priority number, the disabled were provided with 
artificial limbs, physiotherapy, operations, etc. (39) Appendix C includes all 
services provided for physically and mentally ill disabled people.
The Protection of people hit by calamities
Calamities and hazards were defined as minor, local but extended and 
general ones. This categorization was made after the 1953 earthquake in the 
Ionian Islands and aimed at an urgent coordinated plan of activities during such 
disasters. The Ministry of Social Assistance aimed to provide shelter and food to 
people in need mainly in the case of general calamities.
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Old Age Protection
After World War II the methods of protection for elderly people 
changed considerably. The number of them increased due to the greater 
expectation of life . In 1880 the proportion of persons over 60 years if age was 5,5 
per cent, in 1920 it was 8,7 per cent and in 1940 it was 9,6 per cent (40). The 
methods of care were modernised in the post-war era as old forms such as Old- 
Age Asylums or Poorhouses were gradually abolished in line with trends 
elsewhere.
Not surprisingly, the social protection of the elderly however remained 
limited and inappropriate. The private sector led the field with old-fashioned 
asylums and poorhouses, covering only a small part of the old-age protection 
problem. In the late 1950s, the institutional care for the elderly in Greece was 
complemented by private or voluntary institutions. "The increase in the aged 
population led to the need of increased social protection measures. The families 
of the poorest classes have usually more children with the chance of reaching old- 
age, but they do not have many possibilities of escaping the poverty of their 
predecessors in an underdeveloped country..." (41).
The existing old-age institutions of the country in 1959 were 28, providing 
food and shelter to not more than 2.000 people, 23 of them were financed by the 
Ministry of Social Assistance and were receiving around 1.000 elderly; the 
remaining five old-age houses were receiving another 950 people and were self- 
financed. The largest one was the Old-House of the Athens Charity Association 
with 750 beds, a massive old-fashioned institution.
The quantity and quality of old-age protection was far from meeting 
existing needs; the institutional services were covering only the basic needs for 
shelter and nutrition under old-fashioned, and sometimes humiliating conditions. 
Most respectable families did not even think of leaving their aged members to the 
care of these institutions. In this respect, the Ministry of Social Assistance,
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recognizing the urgency and importance of the problem, appointed a "Committee 
for Old-age protection" which submitted its Report in March of 1959 suggesting 
several reforms (42). The Report’s main conclusions were:
the need for coordinated activities of the State and the supervision of 
public and private old-age institutions, 
the upgrading of old-age protection since, due to demographic 
developments, an increasing part of the population was becoming aged, 
abolishing the Poorhouses for the elderly with an emphasis on the dignity 
of the elderly.
problems such as the health of the elderly people, shelter, nutrition, 
financial condition, employment opportunities, should be a national 
obligation of the State.
encouragement of families to keep their old members at home, 
the development of foster families for elderly people with respective 
financial help. This measure was introduced in 1951 by a Social Assistance 
circular providing for cash benefits to families with old people (60 for 
women and 65 for men) incapable for work. Additionally, the programme 
envisaged the support of social workers for these families. Unfortunately, 
this programme was implemented only for a month due to budgetary 
problems.
old-age institutions were characterized as "a necessary evil" needing 
reorganization and modernization but receiving only those having no 
chance for family accommodation; the institutions’ atmosphere should be 
warm and human. Large institutions should be abolished, replaced by 
"apartments for the elderly", i.e. groups of small houses with care by social 
workers, providing recreational facilities and opportunities for social 
relations.
The Report described the current situation: "The social and financial 
background has rapidly changed in recent years due to well known reasons as the
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huge transfers of the rural population to the urban areas and industrialization 
which have undennined the ties of families. Old people either remain in their 
villages abandoned and helpless, or are removed to the "strange" cities becoming 
financially dependent on their family or relatives since employment opportunities 
are rare in a period of strong competition and of large unemployment" (43).
In conclusion, the unplanned, inappropriate and restricted services for 
the protection of old-age needed considerable improvement. Basic issues dealing 
with the social, financial and psychological stage of the elderly attained increasing 
interest and acute measures should have been introduced.
Health Care Protection
One of the top priorities of the post war period in Greece was the 
improvement of public health (44). According to WHO: "It is a basic human right 
of all people to ensure the highest possible level of health care, irrespective of 
race, religion and political belief, financial and social conditions". A huge effort 
was undertaken by the respective Greek services, with the support offered by the 
American mission after 1947, for the reorganization of the health sector, aiming 
at the improvement of low living and sanitary standards.
Official American reports described a desperate situation in public health 
in 1944, after the liberation; the war catastrophe had abolished most health 
facilities of the State and disorganized the existing provision of services. In some 
areas of the country, patients had to pay substantially for the provision of 
medicines, while the public stores in other areas were full of medicines. The lack 
of basic medicines led to the spread of diseases already eliminated in the 
developed Western European countries.
Medical schools were poorly functioning due to the lack of appropriate 
facilities and personnel and the inpatient services were limited and ineffective. 
Many were not completed or destroyed because of the war, many general 
hospitals were ruined and empty in a country with overwhelming health needs.
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The conditions in Athens and Piraeus had been exacerbated because the 
population there, increased - once again - by 50 per cent between 1945 and 1950.
According to the American mission’s statistical information; with the 
cooperation of the Social Assistance Ministry, in 1948, 161 hospitals were 
operating all over the country (of which 136 were general ones) with a capacity of 
21.108 beds. Almost half of the available beds (9.551) were not up to an 
acceptable standard. By 1955, the number of available acceptable hospital beds 
rose to 14.985. The mission said that according to international standards five 
beds were needed for 1.000 inhabitants. Thus the required number was 38.900 and 
the existing deficit of beds was almost 24.000.
In 1948, the Ministry of Social Assistance estimated that 20.000 people 
died of tuberculosis; the existing number of sanatorium beds was 5.790 of which 
only 4.000 were acceptable by US. standards. It was estimated that another 11.500 
sanatorium beds were needed. In 1951 the Ministry estimated that 0.79 per cent 
of the population died of TB; by 1955 the number of sanatorium beds was 
increased to 8.000, but this was still considered as inadequate, though IKA 
enlarged considerably respective provisions.
The Department of Public Health of the American mission in Greece 
gave massive provisions covering the main part of expenses to solve existing 
curative and preventive health problems. It extended construction, fought against 
infectious, diseases, developed medical personnel and gave medical supplies. The 
attempt to reduce infectious diseases was given a significant priority both at the 
curative and preventive level. Activity was directed to the provision of pure water 
and the organization of sanitation.
In the Marshal Plan, provisions for the establishment of water facilities 
were included (45). In the rural areas, people offered voluntary work and many 
new aqueducts were built. WHO enhanced the fight against malaria the "Anti- 
malaria Struggle", which was a very extended disease in Greece. Aerial spraying 
with D.D.T. and the extension of curative and preventive measures obliterated
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malaria in the late 1950s. In 1957, only 2.910 people were suffering from malaria 
while between 1930 and 1938 the number of cases was around one million.
The Anti-malaria struggle was led by a group of 260 specially trained staff 
coming from the Malaria Administration of the Ministry of Social Assistance. 
There were 3 malaria expert doctors ,52 private doctors, 20 special laboratories 
cooperating with the teaching hospitals and public hospitals. Additionally, 
diseases were contained by extensive immunisation, new medicines (mainly 
antibiotics) and by the establishment of some infectious disease hospitals.
The already mentioned chaotic situation in the provision of medicines 
led to massive orders from abroad after the war. Gradually it was found that 
supplies were dispersed all over the country and were finally concentrated in a 
central supply unit with provisions for medical and hospital use. All hospitals were 
provided with the necessary quantities and private companies started importing 
medicines and equipment. In 1950, a central store for medical provisions was 
established in Athens with the administrative and financial support of the Marshal 
Plan which reorganized this sector (46).
In 1951, the Minister of Social Assistance made a public petition to the 
Prime-Minister on the subject of the organization of health services. He 
emphasized that the situation was "chaotic", especially in public health, and 
proposed a radical health reform administered by a new semi-public scheme. This 
scheme would include all the existing health services - public, local, social 
insurance, semi-voluntary - aiming at a unified medical and hospital care by a 
rational allocation of resources and an efficient organization of hospital 
institutions (47). This petition attracted public interest and several supporters in 
the medical profession (48). However, the dominant political instability frustrated 
any further development up to 1953.
Administration o f health services
The public medical services were the responsibility of the Social
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Assistance Ministiy which aimed to reorganize the health services in the country 
after the war. This reorganization covered both the medical services and the 
education, training and retraining of doctors and other health staff.
As already noted, traditionally the number of doctors in Greece has been 
sufficient; in 1948 this was 7.500 (49) and in 1953 increased to 8.834 (50). The 
main problem, however, still was their Concentration to the urban areas. In 1950, a 
law passed obliging doctors to work for three years in communities with less than
10.000 people (51); within a year, doctors achieved the withdrawal of this 
adjustment.
The quality of trained staff played the most significant role in the medical 
services. In this respect medical education was given priority and provided free of 
charge to secondary school graduates, and special programmes were introduced, 
including training in Greece and abroad. Specialists undertook retraining 
programmes and contributed to the reorganization of the services provided.
The education of nurses was officially established in 1948 (52) which 
introduced the systematic training of nurses and laid down their rights and 
obligations. The "Association of Greek Graduated Nurses" was upgraded and the 
status of the nursing profession was improved. Following an adjustment of 1950 
practical nurses and doctors of 45 institutions were retrained, in courses of 6-8 
weeks (53).
Furthermore, educational nursing institutions were established with 
foreign specialists acting as teachers. For the three institutions originally 
operating, two in Athens and one in Thessaloniki, supplies were sent from abroad. 
In 1951 the Athens Red Cross Hospital introduced a Nursing School which 
admitted 50 students a year. Visiting nurses in patients’ own homes, were specially 
trained to cover the needs of Health Centres; a "Public Nursing School for 
Visiting Nurses" was established in Athens. In general, 11 nursing schools were 
operating in 1957 (54).
More than 1.500 nurses were attending of whom 470 were visiting nurses
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(55). It was reported that, in 1957 there were 9.600 doctors, 2.400 dentists, 2.000 
pharmacists of whom 1.360 had private shops and 110 worked in the hospital 
pharmacies . From 1953 onwards, social workers started to be involved in hospital 
services providing moral support and consultancy to the patients.
Health centres and hy^ene services
The contribution of "The Greek War Provisions" (EPPA), an 
organization financed by the US. government during and after the war was 
considerable, in the reorganization of the medical services. During World War II, 
and 5 months after the German occupation EPPA established centres providing 
nutrition, medicines and other provisions (56).
After the liberation, EPPA spent more than 15 million US. dollars on the 
implementation of a programme of additional public health services. EPPA had 
undertaken to find the necessary medical provisions with the American mission’s 
financial help. Additionally, EPPA was operating as the coordinator of donated 
funds by several Greek-American Organizations (AHEPA-Panarkadian, 
Panhellenic and Pankretian Associations).
The relevant programme for the establishment of health provisions was 
introduced in September 1948 and mobile health services started their activities in 
1950, providing curative and preventive medical services to the rural population. 
These services which were fully equipped, were even undertaking minor 
operations and were providing free care to 42.000 people on average per month. 
The mobile health services were abolished as soon as the Health Centres were 
introduced in the country.
EPPA contributed to the completion of new hospitals (Evangelismos in 
Athens, Venizelion sanatorium in Pangration in Athens, in Rethimnon, Heraklion 
and Agrinion) and financed these institutions for the first years of their operation 
until 1950. Other hospitals providing services especially for refugees were 
financed, in addition.
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Hospitals
The reorganization of public hospital services was directed by the Social 
Assistance Ministry with advice from the American Mission (57) and several 
international organizations. At the first stage, an assessment of the situation led 
to specific conclusions on priorities, and a Health Construction Plan was 
prepared. The implementation of this plan was mainly undertaken by the Special 
Technical Department of the Social Assistance Ministry, was partly financed by 
money from the Marshal Plan, and started in 1948. According to the Health 
Construction Plan’s directives significant works were executed and a large amount 
of money was spent (58).
Essential legislation determining hospital and medical policy was 
introduced in the period of 1952-1953 (59). Hospitals were divided into public, 
private, semi-public and private; in terms of speciality, hospitals were defined as 
general, maternity, children’s, tuberculosis, sanatoria and venereal disease 
hospitals. Additionally, Law No 2592 of 1953 enhanced the decentralization of 
health services to peripheral councils and medical committees.
In 1957, the existing general hospitals were 95 with 10.149 available beds, 
7 maternity hospitals with 834 beds and 90 community health centres with 546 
beds. Hospital care was provided free of charge to those included in social 
insurance schemes and to those entitled to social assistance provisions. The 
number of beds in patients’ rooms depended on their wage class.
Social hygiene - social diseases
As already mentioned, TB had been one of the most extended health 
problems of the country before, during and after World War II. In this respect the 
organized "Anti-TB struggle" was a national health campaign aiming to reduce 
and abolish TB by preventive health care measures, by the spreading of new 
medicines and the improvement of the sanatorium services. The construction or 
renovation of sanatoria was based on the American Mission’s financial support
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and in 1958 with an overall population of 6.2 million people the situation was 
reported under control (60).
The Ministry of Social Assistance introduced in 1950 a TB 
Administration which coordinated all the measures against the disease. The 
preventive measures taken against TB’s spread played a significant role. The 
existing Health Centres, with the cooperation of the Chest Institution of Greece, 
executed extended X-ray examinations (61). The improvement of nutrition and of 
general living conditions after the war contributed to diminishing incidence. The 
anti-TB struggle was a considerable success; in 1938, 8,230 persons died of TB; by 
1957 the number had fallen to 1.704 (62). The preventive measures had 
considerable impact on the health indicators of the population; the morbidity 
rates remained relatively high but the mortality rates were significantly reduced.
Finally, the use of the new medicines and therapies diminished venereal 
disease and leprosy. The old forms of institutional care were abolished and the 
sufferers were cured in general hospitals; additional legislation (63), ensured the 
provision of the necessary medical care to those suffering from these diseases 
presently or in the past.
Services for the mentally ill
During the post war period it was internationally realized that the 
number of mentally ill increased considerably. WHO estimated that in 1959 more 
than 2 million people were receiving relevant institutional care in Europe. Greece 
was found unprepared to face this situation, although the problem was considered 
respectively smaller. However, the rising number of mentally ill people led to 
concern about conditions in the limited and old fashioned institutions. Special 
attention was given to this matter only in the mid 1950s and a Report of the 
Ministry of Social Assistance of 1956 concluded that the whole problem should be 
reconsidered on the basis of modem ideas in both the community and institutional 
provision for the mentally ill. Preventive measures (tests, examinations of children
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and youngsters), radical changes in institutional treatment abolishing inhuman 
methods, open clinics, were some of the measures proposed. Moreover, the 
increase of psychiatrists was a crucial point which had to be faced by the doctors’ 
associations; however, this problem was not successfully tackled. In the late 1950s 
the Ministry of Social Assistance appointed a committee to examine the existing 
situation and to provide guidelines for the establishment of relevant legislation for 
services for the mentally ill (64).
According to G. Alivizatos, the relevant statistical information in Greece 
was extremely limited (65). In 1958, from research undertaken in the rural areas, 
4.252 mentally ill children, 5.087 non institutional mentally ill people, 179 drug 
users and 2.492 alcoholics were found. These figures would obviously be much 
higher if the cities had been included in the research. On the other hand, the 
existing public and private 5.617 beds were inadequate to cover the 
needs”...unfortunately and to our shame in some cases two patients are in the 
same bed, since in Athens 6.454 patients are treated in 4.480 beds; at least 15-
20.000 mentally ill need institutional treatment provided for in 7.269 beds which is 
the overall capacity of all relevant institutions. This is an acute problem which has 
to be faced immediately with emphasis on preventive care and on curing less 
serious cases in a short time" (66).
The limited number of the social workers available was struggling to 
provide psychological care, especially in the children’s institutions, and in the 
social services department of public hospitals. However, the provision of 
psychological consultation in open institutions was almost non-existent.
Blood donation
The Ministry of Social Assistance started in 1955 (67) the "National 
Blood Service" (NBS) aiming to organize blood donation, following international 
practice, in order to meet the pressing needs arising in the population. NBS 
undertook the coordinated responsibilities and included a central department and
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peripheral services(68); in addition a Blood Donation Committee was appointed 
with a consultive role. The legislation was improved in 1959 by encouraging blood 
donation (69). Blood should be given freely and only in the case of lack of it, was 
blood-giving for money allowed. The Social Assistance Ministry would determine 
the blood-giving rate according to the cost of provision, preparation and 
preservation. The Blood Services were public, private, semi-public and were 
divided into three categories (70); blood was being received from persons between 
18 and 59 years of age after a medical examination. Persons giving blood for 
money had a special card issued by the NBS.
The Greek Red Cross
The Greek Red Cross (GRC) contributed remarkably to the alleviation 
of health and social assistance problems in the post-war period. Between 1945 and 
1954 it provided medical and health care to 3.340.000 destitute people all over the 
country using 120 mobile Medical Services with the cooperation of the Social 
Assistance Ministry and the International Red Cross (71). Considerable help was 
given to people hit by several calamities such as the Ionian earthquakes. In 
addition, rural hospitals and rural schools were established with the cooperation 
of foreign Red Cross organizations. A special word should be devoted to the GRC 
Nurses’ Association consisting of 7.343 trained nurses in 1958 (72). The GRC also 
ran a general hospital in Athens with 350 beds, built in 1930. Additionally, from 
1939 a Red Cross Urgent Station was operating in Athens; the Asklipion of Voula 
and of Leros provided general sanatorial services. Finally, the GRC extended its 
services in blood donations in 1935 and gradually it ran 26 Blood-giving services 
(73).
Conclusion
The rapid socio-economic development of Greece after the World War 
II was mainly expressed by national income growth rates and the improvement in
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the distribution of income. This rapid expansion did not improve equally the 
standard of living of all people and neglected especially those out of the working 
population. The impact of the unplanned development was negative in many 
social and cultural aspects as well as in the natural environment.
On the other hand, as will be analyzed in the following chapter, the 
inequities in social insurance provisions were enhanced by several improvements 
in pensions, still achieved only by the influential occupational pressure groups, 
while the vast majority of the blue and white collar workers remained low 
beneficiaries. In this respect, the public assistance service had to play a decisive 
and effective role, in order to fill in the gaps in social provisions.
Social assistance in Greece gradually rejected its charity role and was 
recognized as an obligation and a right of society. As the ultimate net of social 
protection, it has always been the last defender of human dignity and social 
justice. Its decisive role was, however, limited because of the very basic needs it 
was struggling to cover and of the restricted part of the population with which it 
was dealing. Social assistance, as the exclusively universal and uniform part of 
social protection should theoretically fulfil three major objectives: a minimum 
standard of income level for everyone, employment for everyone in a position to 
work, and health organization to secure the right for health services.
A leading problem in the development of social assistance in Greece has 
always been the lack of universal coverage, mainly because of the lack of 
coordination and the implementation of non uniform programmes by numerous 
institutions and organizations, without any form of planning, belonging to the 
jurisdiction of almost all the Ministries (74). In this respect, the implementation 
of a specific and effective social policy was impossible and in the existing 
confusion and disorder, the inadequate resources were poorly distributed. 
Moreover, the lack of trained personnel - especially of social workers - provoked 
gaps and malpractices in the provision of services. The protection provided rather 
exacerbated the existing inequalities caused by the differentiated social assistance
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services which complemented the social insurance mosaic.
The lack of available resources was the significant obstacle in the 
development of social assistance policies, especially in the effectiveness of income 
maintenance measures. The historical evolution of the country traditionally 
defined the national budget’s priorities in favour of defence and "productive 
investments". In this sense the piece of the cake devoted to social protection was a 
small one, especially in the early post war period. Considering that around 90 per 
cent of the social protection budget was committed to social insurance, it is not 
difficult to realize the degree of priority given to social assistance.
The ultimate objectives of a minimum standard of living for everybody 
and the coverage of people in need were not achievable. In this respect, the 
uncoordinated, unplanned and consequently uneconomic social assistance scheme 
needed at least a radical change of direction for the full exploitation of the 
available restricted resources. This inadequacy provoked acute social problems 
due to high unemployment among the working population and the concentration 
of the population in large cities - mainly in Athens. There was a steadily increasing 
part of the society called "poor people". This situation shook social stability; the 
existing inequalities and ineffective protective policies enforced tendencies 
towards social conflict, expressed during and after the civil war.
The need for reorganization of the scheme became evident in 1958; a 
universal and explicit plan based on international trends and experience adjusted 
to the circumstances in Greece needed to be put into action. The Social 
Assistance Ministry appointed a Planning Committee which proposed a general 
reconstruction based on the following elements:
a. The development of universal - in terms of geographical extension -
programmes and establishment of universal eligibility rules testified by 
common objective procedures.
b. An emphasis on general family protection measures by cash benefits. By this
policy the pressure for more costly institutional care would be reduced with
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special attention on better and healthier housing.
c. An emphasis on children’s protection by the expansion of the existing policies,
aiming to keep children in their families or in foster families; institutional 
care was to be improved in cases where it was needed.
d. The need for more and better qualified personnel (social workers - nurses -
visiting nurses - special doctors etc.) to be met by the reorganization of their 
training, retraining courses and the general upgrading of education of this 
sector.
e. The improvement of institutional provisions for special categories of patients
with an emphasis on psychological care and on the use of modem methods 
and facilities.
f. The improvement and enlargement of the existing network of health
organizations with priority to preventive care and the decentralization of 
health services putting special emphasis on TB, cancer and mental illness, 
h. The reinforcement of private voluntary initiatives and cooperation and 
coordination between private and public sectors preventing overlapping. 
Encouragement of voluntarism and of feelings of social mutuality.
However, as Titmuss emphasized, the real question is not about the 
choice between universalist and selective services, but "what particular 
infrastmcture of universalist services is needed in order to provide a framework of 
values and opportunity basis within and around which can be developed 
acceptable selective services provided, as social rights, on criteria of the needs of 
specific categories, groups and territorial areas and not dependent on individual 
tests of means ?" (75)
In brief, social assistance in Greece, was never properly financed and 
organised, and consequently never managed to overcome a marginal role nor to 
provide an acceptable level of services. The problems of poverty, public health, 
housing, children’s protection or of the mentally handicapped for example, are far 
from being coped with even some extent of competence. However, this field
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undertook the arduous task of providing extended basic services during the 1940s 
and early 1950s, in the absence of sufficient health insurance services and welfare 
benefits.
137
ENDNOTES
(1) Ministry of Social Welfare, The Refugee Problem in Greece, (in Greek and 
English), July, 1949, p. 23.
(2) German occupation in Greece: 1941, April-1944, October.
(3) 10 per cent of the total population.
(4) Ministry of Welfare, op.cit., pp. 9-10.
(5) Number of refugees supported by the State:
December 1946:15.000 persons
July 1947:125.000 persons
January 1948: 463.264 persons 
July 1948: 645.375 persons
January 1949: 666.374 persons 
May 1949: 684.607 persons
Source: op.cit., p. 10.
(6) Karadimas, D., (coordinator). Destroyed cities and villages during the 1940- 
War. Ministry of Social Assistance, Athens, 1946.
(7) Popolanos, G.D., Study of the acute nutritional and sanitarian aid and for 
the Rehabilitation of Greece, Alexandria, 1944, p. 52.
(8) 2.076.000,000 new drachmas out of 4.550.000,000
(9) The Marshal Plan in Greece, 1948-9, p. 16.
(10) Law No 836 of 1944.
(11) Raphael, M., Sociology & Social Administration, Athens, 1978.
(12) Schools of social workers: the "Higher School of Social Work of HEN", the 
"Social assistance school of American College", the "Social assistance school 
of Royal National Institution" and the "Social assistance school" run by the 
church.
(13) Law No 4018 of 1959.
(14) Titmuss, R.M., Commitment to Welfare, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
London, 1976, pp. 46-47.
138
(15) Psarras, A., (former General Director of the Ministry), Social Assistance, 
Athens, 1950, p. 13.
(16) op.cit., p. 14.
(17) Mastroyannis, J., Social assistance throughout the centuries, Athens, 1958, 
p.257.
(18) op.cit., p. 261.
(19) op.cit.
(20) Psarras, A., op.cit., p. 28.
(21) Law No 2063 of 1951.
(22) Royal decree of 30 October 1952.
(23) Less than 5 square meters person.
(24) Law No 2936 of 1954.
(25) Royal decree No 6 of 22 August 1957.
(26) Law No 2963 of 1954.
(27) All the statistics’ source here is the Ministry of Social Assistance, 1948-1958.
(28) Kallergis, S., (General Director of Housing in Ministry of Social Assistance 
lecture for Social Assistance personnel’s training). The housing problem of 
Greece, Athens 1958, p. 14.
(29) Saroglou, K., Social protection of the Child, Greek Studies Company, 
Athens 1958 and General and Children’s Protection in U.S.A. and Greece, 
Athens, 1948.
(30) Ministry of Social Assistance, op.cit.
(31) On average the rate of inflation was 25 per cent annually.
(32) Law No 3045 of 1954.
(33) Ministry of Social Assistance, op.cit.
(34) op.cit.
(35) The infants Centre "Mother" operating in Athens from 1953 is the model of 
an adaptation centre. It had qualified personnel (1 social worker for 3 
babies), who interviewed adopting families in order to secure the future of
139
the infant in the new family. Additionally it operated the infants-carer 
institution "Princess Sofia", and the Centre for Unmarried Mothers.
(36) Voutsis, G., (Director of National Orphanages and Children’s’ 
Centres),Report of Planning and Research of Social Assistance. Athens, 
1958, pp. 17-42.
(37) Ministry of Social Assistance, Athens, 1949..
(38) Hesselvik, L., (UNICEF’s district doctor for mothers’ and children’s care). 
Report, 24 January, 1959.
(39) Theologos, S., (Director of Disabled Centre in Psychiko-Athens), Report, 
Athens, 1959.
(40) Empiricos, S., Medical and Educational Centre, Athens, 1950, p. 46.
(41) Ministry of Social Assistance, Report of Old-age Study, March, 1959, p. 11.
(42) Pilarinos, P., The effects of the old population growth, Athens, 1959.
(43) op.cit., p. 38.
(44) Mastroyannis, J., Social Assistance, Athens, 1969., p. 197.
(45) 2.2 million US. dollars.
(46) 2 million US. dollars.
(47) Zaimis, P., Minister of Social Assistance, Petition to the Prime Minister 
concerning the health organization of the country. Medical Academics, 
(journal), 1951, pp. 365-7.
(48) Discussion for the Zaimis plan for the organization of medical care. Bulletin 
of the Athens Medical-Operation Society, Athens, 1951, pp. 133-172.
(49) US. Mission of Financial Cooperation, Four years plan of Reconstruction, 
Athens, 1948, p. 284.
(50) Ministry of Hygiene, Records of Medical Sciences, 1954, p. 350.
(51) Law No 1429 of 1950.
(52) Law No 683 of 1948.
(53) Law No 293 of 1950.
(54) Nursing schools operating in 1957: (Mastroyannis, op.cit., pp. 215-221)
140
a.Five Nursing Schools offering 3 year courses (Red Cross, Evangelismos, 
Visiting Nurses School, Thessaloniki Nursing School, Military Nursing 
School) with 737 students in total, in 1957.
b.Three Schools of Assistant Nurses (Sotiras, Laikon, PIKPA) with 273 
students in total, in 1957.
c.Three Midwives Schools (of public nursing hospitals of Athens, of 
Thessaloniki, Marika Iliadis) with 647 students in total, in 1957.
(55) Mavroulidis, B., Public Health Report for 1957, General Director of Public 
Health in the Social Assistance Ministry, Hygiene Records January-March, 
1959, p. 89.
(56) Around 20 million US. dollars.
(57) Consulting Group for Public Health, 1948.
(58) Works executed by the 1948-1953 Health Construction Plan:
-Hospital construction: 7 new general hospitals were built all over the 
country.
-Hospital and clinic extensions.
-Hospital renovation.
-Hospital equipment and additional facilities.
-Hospitals’ technicians wages were improved.
Official estimates of the Ministry of Coordination (1948-1953) calculated 
that the amount spent on the above plan was 49.415,000 drachmas and
2.305,000 US. dollars.
(59) Legislation for hospital and medical services:
-Law No 2592 of 1953 "for the organization of medical care".
-Law No 2107 of 1952, No 2774 of 1954, No 3039 of 1954 "for the 
organization of public hospitals".
-Royal decree 27-2 of 31 March 1954 "for the operation of the Central 
Medical Council".
-Royal decree 27-3 of 22 April 1954 "for the introduction and
141
establishment f community Health Centres".
-Royal decree 16-3 of 30 April 1954 "for the administration and Board 
of Directors of public hospitals".
(60) Sanatorial Hospital Services in 1958:
Public Sanatoria 4.981 beds
Semi-private Sanatoria 830 beds
Private Sanatoria 1.161 beds
6.972 beds
Hospitals for TB: 850 beds
Clinics for TB: 144 beds
TOTAL: 7.966 beds
Source: Mavroulidis, E., op.cit., p. 55.
(61) Between July 1951 and December 1955, more than a million people had 
been examined and 675.000 vaccinated (B.C.G.).
(62) In 1957 the Health Centres examined 10.447 persons for TB and 3.719 of 
them were suffering from TB. The two institutions of Chest Research in 
Athens and Thessaloniki examined 114.652 persons and only 426 of them 
were suffering from active TB and 3.728 had signs of old TB, i.e. 0.4 per 
cent of the examined were suffering from TB.
(63) Law No 3310 of 1955 "for the diminishing of venereal diseases" and Law No 
3369 of 1955 "on legacy".
(64) The existing institutional care in 1958, for the mentally ill was:
- the Athens Psychiatric Hospital (2.500 beds).
- the Thessaloniki Public Psychiatric Hospital (1.000 beds).
- the Corfu Public Psychiatric Hospital (490 beds).
- the Public Psychiatric Hospital of Chania (Crete), (270 beds).
- the Leros Psychiatric Settlement for chronic psychiatric patients (650
142
beds).
- 3 private psychiatric clinics (1.142 beds) From the above capacity ,765 
beds were provided for destitute mentally ill people.
(65) Alevizatos, G., The psychological health and disease all over the world. 
Hygiene Record, April-June, 1959.
(66) op.cit., pp. 33-35.
(67) Law No 3340 of 1955.
(68) NBS responsibilities:
a) to develop a programme for a national network of blood-giving and
blood-receiving stations.
b) to control the relevant private and voluntary services.
c) to inform the population of its services and to motivate voluntary
blood giving.
d) to follow international developments in the organization of blood
services.
(69) Law No 4026 of 1959.
(70) Blood services categories:
a) Blood donation Centres (of all the procedures).
b) Blood donation Stations (blood taking services)
c) Hospital blood services (mainly for the needs of the hospital).
(71) Vaccinations were given to 1.650.000 persons. Huge quantities of food and 
clothes were distributed. Health care to 44.750 destitute patients in 18 small 
GRC Hospitals and medical examinations to 482.900 ones were provided 
and special services were given to refugees from Eastern Europe.
(72) As mentioned earlier, the Red Cross Nursing School was educating for 3 
years, young ladies interested in devoting their lives to the service of 
suffering people. Between 40 and 60 nurses graduated from the school 
every year and in 1958, 664 nurses were working in the GRC services.
(73) In 1957 about 3.650 volunteers gave blood in GRC services.
143
(74) Ministries of Social Assistance, of Employment, of Education, of Finance of 
Defence, of Justice, of Agriculture.
(75) Titmuss, R.M., op.cit., p. 122.
144
V
THE 1950s RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL 
INSURANCE
Paths to the Beveridge reforms
The socio-political drama of the post-war period in Greece provoked 
grievous repercussions in the social security field. The State was forced to 
intervene by reorganizing IKA, the main institution of social insurance in Greece 
which operated so far as the leading means of the social policies pursued. Greek 
and foreign experts of the American mission and the I.L.O., as well as the leading 
representatives of employers and employees were involved in this crucial 
operation. In 1947, the I.L.O. mission in Greece appreciated that the social 
insurance system in Greece was "in a state of alarming complexity" (1). The 
international trends after the war resulted in the introduction of unified social 
insurance systems, breaking away from many of the traditions established by 
Bismarck and coming closer to the Beveridge model.
In 1948 the American mission established in Greece, invited two 
American experts - Mitchel and Murray - who examined the existing situation. An 
invitation to Oscar Powell, an American social security specialist, was based on 
their recommendations. Powell undertook the arduous task of reorganizing IKA; 
he became IKA’s General Manager from December 1948 to July 1950. In October 
1948, Law No 852 stated that..."The Greek government, caring for the best 
possible administration of social insurance, asked the American government to 
arrange for a specialist, with a wide experience in the administration of social 
security and insurance to undertake the reorganization of the system in Greece 
and IKA’s management...".
The American government appointed Powell and three other American
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experts as his assistants who started the examination of the problems. Their main 
recommendations were the amalgamation of several relevant funds at the first 
stage, and afterwards the foundation of a uniform insurance institution - the 
National Organization of Social Insurance. Their plans provoked strong reactions, 
particularly from the influential occupational groups who saw that their insurance 
interests were at stake, because their special funds would be incorporated, loosing 
accordingly their privileges. Organized pressures obliged Powell to resign and all 
his amalgamation plans were abandoned. The American plan - unfamiliar to the 
socio-political and psychological peculiarities of the Greek people - had provoked 
general opposition.
As in the past, many discussions were held about the problems of social 
insurance finance, steadily increasing since 1946 (2). There was a wide consensus 
that the system "was lame" and that radical solutions should be implemented for 
its entire reorganization. The problem still was the power of the interested 
pressure groups and the traditional lack of strong political will in the everlasting 
unstable socio-political and economic arenas.
The period 1950-1951 was - once again - one of unstable coalition 
governments. The April 1950 elections, held under a system of proportional 
representation and with the participation of 44 parties, gave no majority power. In 
a 250 seats house, Tsaldaris’ right wing Populists won the largest share with 62 
seats, but the three centre parties - Sophocles Venizelos’ Liberals (3), Plastiras’ 
National Progressive Centre Union and the George Papandreou party - 
accumulated 136 seats and formed a coalition government under Plastiras. After a 
while, this coalition collapsed and Venizelos became prime minister with Populist 
support. In November 1950, the Populists withdrew their support but Venizelos 
formed a new coalition government with Papandreou as vice-president. This 
coalition survived until September 1951 and brought to Parliament the most 
essential social insurance legislation, which continued to form the basis of the 
system for the coming forty years.
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The cooperation of the Ministry of Labour under Minister G. Bakatselos 
- a strong advocate of the Beveridge reforms - the powerful American mission, 
and the G.C.G.L., resulted in the new Bill which came to Parliament in June 
1951. The new legislation was faced in Parliament with a memorable consensus 
though this issue, still attracting relatively minor political attention, was submitted 
and discussed in a Parliamentary holiday period. It was said that the Bill 
attempted to correct the deficiencies experienced with the existing Law No 6298 
by the introduction of several new adjustments or "innovations” as repeatedly 
called in the Bill. This was clearly an attempt at the reorientation of the Greek 
social insurance system according to the recent European developments, aiming at 
"....a more complete and drastic protection of the country’s employees" (4), a 
more universal coverage.
It was argued that the Bill was brief, once again, in order to be flexible, 
determining only the general directions and leaving the detailed adjustments to 
special decrees. The main insurance sectors covered were sickness, maternity, 
disability, old-age, death; moreover, unemployment coverage was widely 
introduced since the existing volatile unemployment fund would be incorporated 
with IKA. In addition, by granting eligibility to several minor categories of self- 
employed, such as pedlars and hawkers, a decisive step towards a concept of 
uniform coverage of the urban working population was made.
The Bill provided for a radical adaptation of the existing funds and 
prohibited, once again, the establishment of further insurance funds, allowing only 
the foundation of supplementary ones. Any special fund should provide coverage 
equal to IKA’s, otherwise it would be amalgamated with it; in this respect the 
uncontrolled expansion of funds in the undisciplined Greek social insurance 
system was expected to stop.
The fundamental purpose of the Bill was, as already said, the 
reconstruction of IKA, which covered 3/4 of private employees and "deserved 
unlimited state support" (5), in order to alleviate the existing gaps in protection. A
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rational mode for the whole social security institution in Greece was promised to 
be applied by gradual further reconstruction.
The legislation was "saturated" by the solidarity principle, a potential of 
social insurance not fulfilled so far within the scheme. As the law emphasized, 
"social insurance is the practical demonstration of national solidarity", sharing 
Beveridge’s view. The recent reforms in social insurance determined a universal 
coverage of all working people, providing insurance coverage against sickness 
disability, old-age, death, maternity and unemployment, and providing minimum 
living standards. It is fascinating to note that a considerable part of the 
Introductory Report covered in detail the Beveridge Report conclusions, 
accepting them as guidelines for the concept of the new legislation.
Emphasis was given as well to health care, describing that in some 
countries, such as Great Britain or Australia, this was separated from the social 
insurance schemes and became a free state universal provision. The level of the 
health services provided at that time in Greece was unacceptable. In 1951, the 
Minister of Social Assistance made a special public petition for this issue discussed 
in the previous chapter.
Additionally, it was underlined that the recognized insurance gaps ought 
to be gradually narrowed by social assistance. As explained in the previous chapter 
the reorganization of the social assistance system in Greece was defined as 
another immediate task of the State. The harmonization of the upgraded social 
insurance and social assistance policies was expected to result in a substantial 
improvement in the level of social protection in Greece.
The Minister of Labour however, accepted in Parliament at the end of 
the day that "... the Bill does not include all recent developments in the social 
insurance field. Under the present economic circumstances, such a jump would be 
extremely dangerous. We simply correct whatever is correctable, we make a step 
further and we prepare the field for a future overall harmonization of social 
security" (6).However, this harmonization never took place.
148
The Bill of 1951
Range of coverage 
Insured risks
The new Bill provided coverage against sickness, disability, old-age, death 
and maternity. In addition, after the amalgamation of the unemployment fund 
with IKA, unemployment insurance coverage would be widely provided by the 
scheme.
In particular sickness protection was substantially extended by full 
coverage of dependants. Dependants were defined as spouses and children and 
additionally financially dependent parents, sisters or brothers. Work accidents and 
occupational diseases remained divided according to their consequences either in 
the sickness or in the pension sector. No contribution conditions would be 
required for provisions for working accidents or occupational diseases, according 
to the relevant French and Checkoslovakian legislation, as already successfully 
implemented by Law No 6298 of 1934. The occupational diseases list was as 
extended according to I.L.O.’s recommendations.
Insured people
The Bill substantially widened IKA’s range of coverage including new 
occupational categories such as domestic servants, Greek erhployees of foreign 
companies or working in the diplomatic corps. The Bill provided, in addition, 
eligibility for several neglected categories of poor dependent employees such as 
roving small salesmen and pedlars, aiming at the uniform full coverage of the 
working population of the urban areas.
The Minister of Labour stated that "...this extension of coverage will 
probably provoke administrative difficulties, but it would be a paradox that social 
insurance covered the relatively financially stronger occupations, while some self­
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employed persons with actual needs for insurance coverage remained totally 
unprotected..." (7). The existing funds TEVE and TAE, which should normally 
cover these people, were not providing sickness coverage, the indispensable 
protection for them. Finally, the Bill did not anticipate any restriction due to sex, 
nationality, citizenship or level of income.
The existing specialfunds
The Bill introduced a firm policy regarding the existing social insurance 
funds. As has been pointed out earlier, the main negative characteristic of the 
Greek social security system has always been the carving up of social protection 
into numerous funds, lacking any actuarial study and any harmonization in the 
level of provision. This situation resulted in the disproportionate burdening of the 
Greek Economy, through direct or indirect state subsidies, and the creation of 
privileges for some advantaged insured person. The Bill anticipated some new 
adjustments in order to settle this anarchy, something which the former Law No 
6298 had failed to achieve.
The new regulations provided that from the existing funds would be 
maintained only those in a position to grant benefits equal to IKA’s. Funds unable 
to provide such a level of protection would be amalgamated with IKA’ "their 
maintenance is contrary to the common sense" the Minister argued (8). In other 
words, IKA’s welfare benefits were established as the minimum acceptable 
protection for all working insured from January 1952. In this respect, funds 
providing health benefits should make them equal to IKA’s health provisions.
The Bill did not anticipate specific criteria for the comparison between 
IKA’s and each funds’ provisions in kind. The final judgement for amalgamation 
would be made by a Special Committee consisting of the Minister of Labour, 
IKA’s General Director, a member of the High Administrative Court, academics, 
experts, technical and administrative officers and employees’ representatives.
The existing funds’ personnel would be absorbed by IKA with limited
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exceptions. The normal retirement of this extra personnel would result in the mid­
term in a significant saving of administrative costs by reducing administrative 
personnel. Employees not keen on this transformation would have the right to 
compensation and an early retirement pension provided from the fund for 
employees in social security organizations. Doctors of the amalgamated funds, 
either general practitioners, specialists, or dentists, would be employed by IKA 
under the same employment status, on salary or on capitation, on the condition of 
two years minimum service. The same adjustment applied for medical personnel 
as well. In general, IKA would respectively recognize all the insureds’ working 
days recognized by the amalgamated funds.
The line concerning the amalgamated funds’ pensioners was that they 
would be eligible for pensions from IKA and their pensions would be in no case 
lower than before. In this respect, pensioners having fulfilled IKA’s contributory 
conditions would continue receiving their pension, as high as this might be. Those 
failing to attain eligibility due to IKA’s stricter conditions - persons with less than 
60 per cent disability or with an age less than 60 for men and 55 for women, or 
survivors not included in the new regulations - would continue receiving their 
pension, even if this was lower than IKA’s standards. The philosophy stated in the 
Introductory Report was that the rest of the working people should not be 
burdened by such young pensioners as long as they still were in a state to be 
productive (9). Health services would be the same for all. In addition, an 
adjustment defined that the TB - Organization would be incorporated into IKA in 
order to provide better coverage and to rationalize its financial and administrative 
system.
The amalgamation of the unemployment fund with IKA was a crucial 
amendment introduced by the new legislation, but not without opposition. Several 
arguments were developed against inclusion of this coverage, claiming that the 
unemployment risk was not predictable and accordingly the precise premium 
could not be estimated or that there was a danger in the case of bankruptcy of the
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unemployment account and that the pension fund might be used to cover 
unemployment benefits, as happened in the tobacco workers’ fund (10); or that 
the unemployment fund should pursue in general the State’s employment policy - 
a task which ought to be organized on a special separate basis. However, the 
Government decided on incorporation for administrative reasons and introduced 
some new adjustments, aiming at the reconstruction of unemployment protection, 
and the revival of its finances.
Furthermore, the Bill banned the foundation of further special funds but 
allowed the establishment of supplementary insurance schemes which would 
provide coverage on top of IKA’s provision. This regulation had been included in 
Law No 6298 but never implemented due to political pressures and the prevailing 
upheaval. Any new supplementary fund would have to include a minimum of
1.000 members in order to become financially viable. The possibility of several 
relevant funds’ unification into one main insurance organization was encouraged 
by the Bill as well.
Finally, special funds’ pensioners would retain eligibility for IKA’s health 
care coverage, provided that they were insured in IKA’s health insurance sector. 
Until then, these people remained unprotected for health care as soon as they 
retired, "exactly when they became more vulnerable to health problems" (11). In 
fact, many employees - nobody knew the exact figure - were already insured by 
IKA on top of their special funds coverage, aiming to increase their pensions and 
indeed to secure health insurance, still not provided by most special funds.
Range of benefits
Pensions
Old-age
The age for full pensions (65 for men and 60 for women) in the case of 
arduous employment was reduced to 60 and 55 accordingly. The list of arduous 
occupations was to be defined by a forthcoming circular. The Bill introduced a
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voluntary early retirement scheme for men from the age of 60 and for women of 
55. Early retirement pensions would be reduced by 0.5 per thousand or 1/200 of 
normal monthly pension for every month less than the normal retirement age of 
65 or 60 provided that contributory conditions had been fulfilled. Practically, 
retirement at the age of 60 would grant a pension 33.8 per cent lower than the full 
one and at the age of 64 a pension reduced by 10 per cent. This adjustment was 
based on optimistic demographic and employment assumptions. In 1950, life 
expectancy at birth for males was 63.4 and for females 66.7 (12).
Additionally, the Bill abandoned the regulation according to which a 
pensioner was not allowed to earn more than 1/2 of the remuneration of a 
physically and mentally healthy employee in relevant employment in the same 
area. However, a pensioner would not be allowed to earn more than 25 times a 
half of daily pay of the insurance class to which he/she belonged when becoming 
entitled to a pension. The Bill did not determine the way these regulations would 
be actually enforced.
Disability
The Bill maintained the system of "relative disability", considered as 
successfully implemented over the previous 15 years. According to the philosophy 
of the relative disability system, a disabled person capable of employment should 
remain in work with a new occupation, not substantially different than the one 
before disability occurred.
An insured person would be eligible for a disability pension by becoming 
physically or mentally incapable of gaining more than 1/3 of the usual 
remuneration of a healthy employee with the same educational background in the 
same area. This relative disability definition - having German origins - was 
enlarged by post-war legislation. In the Cjfeckoslovakian Law for example, the 
disability percentage was reduced from 66.3 per cent to 50 per cent. These trends 
influenced the new Bill which introduced an "adaptation allowance" payable for
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up to a 2 year maximum period, irrespective of any employment or other income, 
for insured persons with a disability degree of less than 2/3 but minimum 1/3 or 
over. This allowance would give to partially disabled insured persons an 
adaptation period for return to their normal occupation or to find new relevant 
employment. However, this kind of temporary pensioner would be obliged to 
accept IKA’s suggested occupational adaptation, otherwise eligibility would be 
lost. IKA had to organize the relevant professional schools, according to the 
Government’s announcements. The introduction of the adaptation, allowance - 
based on the French longue maladie system - was aimed at the return of the 
partially disabled, especially those recovered from TB, to the workforce.
Death Pension
This was provided to dependant survivors - family members of the 
insured, as well as in the case of imprisonment or disappearance of the insured 
person. As dependant survivors were considered widows, orphans - either children 
or grand-children - destitute and disabled widowers and destitute parents. The war 
disabled would retain their death pensions in any case, on top of the inadequate 
state pension and although this was not, of course, an insured risk.
Work accidents and occupational diseases
The Bill retained the successful innovation of Law No 6298 of 1934 which 
divided work accidents and occupational diseases according to their effects, as 
sickness, disability or death benefits, provided by the relevant insurance sector.
Contributory conditions
The Bill united the contribution conditions for all kinds of pensions 
requiring a minimum of 2.500 days of pay and at least 100 days of pay for each of 
the last five years before receipt of pension at the retirement age. There were no 
contributory conditions for work accidents and occupational diseases; in the case
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of accidents out of work half the normal conditions were required. In general the 
Bill established favourable regulations, so that almost every insured person, 
definitely lacking remuneration from work, would receive a pension. Finally, 
stricter conditions were introduced for people entitled to more than two pensions 
from different organizations since many insured received two or even more 
different pensions. In that case, the Bill put on top an extra condition of at least
1.500 working days during the last five years before retirement age. The Bill did 
not clarify how IKA would administer these cases and provided no penalties for 
those not declaring a second pension.
Level of pension
The level of pensions would be based on two main principles: Firstly, the 
solidarity principle in favour of the lower paid insured was attempted to be 
introduced in line with the respective principle of the Beveridge Report. In 1947, 
it was estimated that the pension of those belonging to the highest wage class, 
after 35 years of contributions was equal to 75.2 per cent of their wages. The 
respective average pension of those in the three bottom classes was equal to 62.4 
per cent of their wages (13). In this respect, the new Bill introduced a minimum 
pension equal to 80 per cent of the remuneration of the first insurance class. This 
would provide pensioners’ with a minimum income level and enhance the 
redistributive role of the scheme. Secondly, the insurance principle defining that:
a. the pension level would be based on a scale according to insurance duration, in
order to keep insured persons in the workforce and to maintain the 
indispensable relationship between the level of pension and insurance 
duration.
b. The pension level would be relative to the level of the insured’s remuneration,
in other words depend upon the contributions paid. The calculation of the 
supplementary increases on top of the minimum pension would be based on 
the wage or insurance class of the insured person, during the last 2 years
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before retirement, subsidizing in this way the level of total pension. In 
addition, pensions would be increased according to the family circumstances 
of the insured for wife, children, etc.
In general, pensions calculation would be based on the 80 per cent of the 
lowest insurance class of remuneration and the following increases: 10 per cent of 
the difference between the first insurance class and the class in which the insured 
belonged; 4 per cent of the above total amount for every 500 days of pay after the 
first 1.000 days and up to 2999 days, 3 per cent for eveiy 500 days over 3.000 up to 
5.999 days, and 2 per cent for every 500 days over 6.000; on top, there were 
increases due to family dependants up to 50 per cent of the total amount of 
pension for the spouse, 20 per cent for the first child, 15 per cent for the second 
and 10 per cent for the third. Total pension could not exceed working 
remuneration in any case. Those wishing higher pensions were directed to private 
insurance.
Several examples of pension calculations in the Introductory Report of 
the Bill showed that the lower the daily rate of pay the higher the proportion of it 
would be paid in pension. In cases of complete disability pensions would be 
increased by 50 per cent; work accident and occupational disease pensions would 
not be less than 60 per cent of the insured’s remuneration, instead of 40 per cent 
provided for in the earlier law.
The death pensions level would be a percentage of the disability pension 
to which the insured would be entitled on the day of death. These percentages 
would be 80 per cent for widows, 60 per cent for orphans and 40 per cent for an 
insured person’s widowed mother; in case of complete disability of a family 
member, pension would be increased by 50 per cent. The disability, old-age, and 
death pensions might be adjustable by considerable increases of the price-index 
following the decision of IKA’s Board of Directors, having the approval of the 
Minister of Labour. The rationale behind this decision was that contribution 
amounts and wage classes would be respectively increased by the same procedure
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and for the same reasons.
Sickness benefits
In kind benefits
The Bill introduced the extension of full health care coverage to the 
members of the insured person’s family, thus coming closer to a universal health 
care insurance scheme. This adjustment allowed the dependants access to 
inpatient care not provided until then. IKA had to issue the relevant special 
circulars within the following 18 months.
Furthermore, IKA gave tuberculosis patients full coverage not only for 
institutional but for home care as well. Health care would be provided as long as 
sickness existed with no time limitations. In the case of maternity, IKA would 
provide institutional care if possible, otherwise a maternity allowance in cash to 
the insured or dependent woman, since until then institutional maternity care was 
not provided by IKA.
The health insurance system
The Bill did not lay down a particular health care insurance system 
disregarding, in a sense, the existing system of organized free choice of doctors in 
line with the preceding law and the organization of services which followed. All 
alternatives should again be examined: doctors who were IKA’s employees, free 
choice of doctor in private surgeries or organized free choice in polyclinics, and/or, 
a system of "condottas" with family doctors. IKA was given the possibility to test a 
new system - as for example the "successful" British model with family doctors 
giving insured persons a wide range of choice of doctor. It was of course 
emphasized that the cooperation of doctors would be indispensable in order to 
reorient the organization of health care. Everything should be defined by 
forthcoming respective circulars, including the details of a regulation of patients’ 
charges up to 25 per cent, anticipated in the Bill.
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The Minister underlined in Parliament that the inadequate level of 
health care was not the result of gaps in the existing legislation, but of the 
inadequate IKA’s health care facilities and equipment and the lack of any 
preventive care, explained by the historical problems of the last decade. 
Moreover, IKA’s health insurance sector was to pay a high price for some absurd 
decisions made during this period, such as the provision of health care to public 
servants without contributions or the decrease of health contributions of those 
contracted public servants covered by IKA (14). On this occasion, the high infant 
and children mortality rates, the low expectation of life and the high morbidity 
were mentioned. A health care construction programme was promised to be given 
top priority and to absorb most of IKA’s investments. Furthermore, special 
circulars would determine priorities for preventive care, issued after the 
cooperation of the relevant public, private, national and international 
organizations.
Cash benefits
Sickness allowance was granted after the third day equal to 50 per cent of 
the daily pay of the insured class, increased by 10 per cent for each member of the 
family up to a 70 per cent maximum or 35.000 drachmas daily. The allowance was 
payable 7 days per week for up to 180 days constantly or periodically; for 
tuberculosis cases it was payable up to 360 days.
The Bill abolished the 3 day waiting period, before receiving the sickness 
allowance for work accidents or occupational disease, and reduced the waiting 
period for all the other cases from 5 to 3 days; only one waiting period would exist 
annually. A forthcoming circular would define the waiting period for the self- 
employed and voluntarily insured employees.
Maternity benefits  ^ pregnancy and confinement allowance - would be 
equal to sickness allowance and its increases with no maximum, payable 42 days 
before and 42 after confinement, as long as the mother stayed out of work for all
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the above period. The minimum allowance would be equal to the daily pay of the 
first insurance class. Eligibility was provided for working women with 200 days of 
contribution in the last 2 years before the possible confinement day. Indirectly 
insured women were entitled only to a confinement allowance, a lump sum not 
less than 5 times the daily pay of the highest insurance class, in case IKA could not 
provide institutional maternity care.
In general, the time conditions for benefits in kind, were a minimum of 
50 days of contribution and for cash benefits of 100 days in the last year of work, 
or in the last 15 months, excluding the final 3 months. Temporary employees 
might be granted cash benefits after 75 days. Finally, pensioners were not eligible 
for cash sickness benefits.
Unemployment
Greece introduced unemployment insurance in 1945 - 34 years later than 
the first unemployment insurance scheme was introduced in England. This was 
mainly because Greece was a poor country with little industry and such a provision 
might be proved dangerous in several ways. Law No 118 of 1945 established an 
unemployment fund for the protection of dependent industrial employees. Some 
years later, in 1949, unemployment coverage was extended to all dependent 
employees by Law No 1255. From 1949 onwards however, the fund started having 
deficits (15).
The Bill of 1951 improved the existing unemployment legislation. The 
contributory conditions for unemployment benefit were reduced from 180 to 150 
days of contribution in the last year or in the last 15 months excluding the last 
three. It would be equal to sickness allowance - 50 per cent of the daily pay of 
insurance class with family increases up to 70 per cent - payable after the 15th day 
since registration, for non-working days as well, up to a maximum of 180 days 
constantly or periodically.
IKA would be responsible for finding the insured suitable employment;
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until then, the benefit would be granted but the insured should be available for 
employment or attending IKA’s training schools, registered in one of IKA’s 
Employment Offices and appearing there regularly. The criteria of suitability for 
new employment would be the unemployed’s mental and physical abilities, 
occupational background and skills, duration of unemployment, and the distance 
between home and the work place. Unemployed were not obliged to accept new 
employment in cases of vacancies due to a strike or lock-out or if a regular 
position and payment were much better.
Furthermore, IKA would stop providing the benefit if the unemployed 
refused to follow its instructions without good cause, or received any cash benefit 
except maternity allowance. The Introductory Report concluded that "...the Greek 
unemployment insurance coverage is so perfect, that it is comparable with only less 
than five foreign relevant laws, constituting a pride for a country as poor as 
Greece!" (16)
Finance
The general framework
The Minister characterized as favourable the economic policy pursued by 
the Bill for social security "without disregarding the general interests of the Greek 
Economy" (17). According to the usual philosophy of all governments the main 
direction was the avoidance of an excessive burden on the national economy in 
the short run. On this principle, were based adjustments such as the establishment 
of a pure Pay-As-You-Go system in the pension sector of IKA, the prohibition of 
the establishment of financially non-viable supplementary funds with less than
1.000 insured persons and the restriction that the maximum insurance 
contribution of the several insurance funds would not surpass the relevant IKA’s 
percentages.
In addition, a possible decrease in existing social security expenditure was 
expected due to the amalgamation with IKA of several insurance funds
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(Unemployment Fund, TB-Organization, etc.), which should result in significant 
administrative savings. The main effort was not taking huge funds out of the 
economy by determining the lowest possible insurance premia. The support to 
industries in rural areas by the possibility provided to the Cabinet of reducing 
contributions there by up to 10 per cent for a maximum 5 year period, was a 
regulation open to political bribes.Finally, the redistributional regulations 
according to the solidarity principle was said to be a major guideline for the 
allocation of the financial burdens of the scheme.
IKA s^ finance
The Bill introduced the principle of tripartite finance coming from 
employers’ and employees’ contributions, and, at last, state finance which was 
scheduled to start two years later, in 1953. It was expected that state subsidies - 
based on the concept of the Philadelphia Declaration - would play a decisive 
redistributional role under a rational income tax system.
Contributions
As we have seen, the Bill was aiming at the containment of insurance 
costs. However, the rate of contribution actually increased by 5 percentage units, 
though the Introductory Report was claiming that no increase was anticipated. In 
Athens and Piraeus employers’ contribution would be raised to the level expected 
after 1951, according to the periodically increasing formula of Law No 6298. The 
current rate was 14 per cent on remuneration: 11 per cent for IKA, 2 per cent for 
unemployment insurance and 1 per cent for the TB-Organization. The total 
percentage would be increased in the rural areas by 3 per cent: 2.5 per cent for 
IKA and 0.5 per cent for unemployment insurance although the law intended to 
support these areas, by another adjustment. In addition, health insurance would 
be financed by patients’ charges up to 25 per cent of expenses, while the existing 
participation was 20 per cent according to the previous law.
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Furthermore, the Bill anticipated a ceiling of daily pay entitled to 
contributions (18). Additionally, the pension increases were expected to 
deteriorate the need and the role of the numerous supplementary funds, possibly 
decreasing in the long run the resources devoted to them.
With reference to the distribution of the contribution rate, the Bill 
anticipated that in the unemployment insurance sector, employers would remain 
the only contributors with a 2 per cent rate. In the health insurance and pension 
sectors the overall contribution would be 17 per cent of remuneration from which: 
12 per cent - or 70.6 per cent - would be the employers’; and 5 per cent of 
remuneration - or 29.4 per cent - would be the employees’ part of the 
contribution. The allocation of the total contribution rate of 19 per cent of 
remuneration for employees and employers would be: for cash benefits for 
sickness and maternity 2 per cent (0,75 + 1,25); for benefits in kind for sickness 
and maternity 7.5 per cent (2.5 + 5); for pensions 7.5 per cent (1.75 + 5.75); and 
for unemployment 2 per cent (0+2).
The previous law’s distribution of the contribution rate was 60 per cent 
for employers and 40 per cent for employees. This 10 per cent difference in favour 
of employees was a development of strategic importance in the social insurance 
field in Greece. The Introductory Report explained this adjustment as the result 
of the undervaluation of remuneration, after the war and of the a-priori 
acceptance that contributions were a part of remuneration. Contributions would 
be calculated on the basis of insurance classes; each class would determine an 
average notional daily pay. The law retained the existing adjustments but 
simplified several calculations.
IKA should theoretically collect insurance contributions as soon as 
employees received their remuneration. It was said that the Bill anticipated firm 
penalties for employers delaying in paying them (19). In practice, on the contrary, 
by the new regulations the maximum period of delay was extended from 15 days to 
a month after payment from relevant remuneration and the so far anticipated
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interest rates for contributions due was abolished. Finally, the existing stamp 
collection system was maintained.
Capital investments
A large construction plan was said to be given priority aiming to build 
modem properties for the establishment of IKA’s administration and, especially 
for its health care services. The establishment of modem hospitals and surgeries 
was recognized as an indispensable urgent task to improve the low level of health 
and medical care protection (20). Additionally, IKA could invest - according to 
I.L.O.’s Conventions, part of its capital in the purchase of welfare organizations’ 
shares.
Financial perspectives
According to the new adjustments, the number of IKA’s pensioners 
would be progressively raised to 53.000 -10.000 pensioners more than those under 
the existing regulations. The main reasons for this increase would be the 5 years 
decrease of the arduous employment age limits valid from January 1953, the early 
retirement scheme, and the newly introduced "adaptation allowance" which would 
increase disability pensioners.
The Introductory Report anticipated that a substantial increase in 
pensions’ insurance premia would be necessary within the next decade, unless a 
full employment situation was achieved. Otherwise, the scheme was expected to 
have deficits from 1962 onwards, and a contributions’ increase was suggested from 
1956 (21).Of course, this was a theoretical projection since nobody knew the 
financial impact of the forthcoming amalgamations of several insurance funds. In 
this respect, the Bill introduced the State as the third party contributing to the 
scheme. The State’s annual financial "subsidy" was to start from 1953, so that 
IKA’s financial viability would be guaranteed.
In reference to health insurance, the present annual expenditure of 209
163
billion drachmas was expected to increase to 244 billion drachmas; 10 billion 
drachmas more would be absorbed by cash benefits and 25 billion drachmas more 
- an increase of 80 per cent of this account - for hospital care. However, this sector 
was anticipated to have a surplus of 46 billion drachmas annually, which could be 
directed to the health services reconstruction plan. The unemployment sector was 
expected to be self-sufficient according to the new regulations and the existing 
unemployment figures; further projections were not feasible for this sector.
Aiming to facilitate efficient financial management, the Bill mainly relied 
on special circulars according to the major principle of financial independence of 
each insurance sector, thus prohibiting any possible transfer of funds' between the 
relevant accounts to cover future deficits. Fears had been expressed, as we have 
seen, about the financing of the unemployment sector. Additionally, IKA’s urgent 
provisions worth less than 20 million drachmas could be decided without putting it 
out to tender. Several tax deductions in favour of IKA would be maintained.
A Central Supervising Board and a number of independent High-Court 
judges would exercise financial control. Members of the Board would be special 
controllers and employers’ and employees’ representatives. Local control 
committees could be appointed for the geographically remote offices of IKA.
Economic system covering insurance expenditure
The Bill introduced a pure "Pay As You Go" system concerning the 
pension sector, abandoning the previous "mixed system". Up to 1944, the latter 
had cost more than 1.5 million golden pounds to IKA, due to the drachma’s 
devaluation. This system required stable money values which, as seen, were an 
unusual phenomenon for Greece. Additionally, the system used so far had led to 
the creation of a huge capital sum, "painfully deducted from the economy" (21), 
which was difficult to invest. The distributional "Pay-As-You-Go" system, 
implemented after the war in the United Kingdom, France, Austria and 
Chechoslovakia, would require lower insurance premia in the short run due to the
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small number of existing pensioners, while the pensions provided could be higher 
than before.
As far as the sickness and the unemployment sectors were concerned, the 
distributional system was widely accepted as the proper one for the short-run 
risks. Furthermore, it was promised that insurance premia would not be annually 
determined and the pension premia for example, were scheduled to cover the 
gradually rising cost of the scheme for the next decade (22).
Administration
The administrative status
It was said that IKA would retain its financial and administrative 
independence. In principle the concept had been that the State would be able to 
control policies of the scheme but not to interfere in its financial and 
administrative function. The Bill laid down the general directions of 
administration and planning for every sector. Special circulars and decrees would 
determine the means for the realization of general state policies, issued after the 
"cooperation" of the Minister of Labour and IKA’s Board of Directors (23). The 
Minister however, could drop suggested circulars from the IKA administration 
and the final judgement would be made by the Cabinet. Special circulars could not 
amend regulations of the existing social legislation.
The managerial status
The Board of Directors would be IKA’s highest administrative managing 
body, consisting again of a President and 11 members, from which an equal 
number would be employers’ and employees’ representatives and experts 
appointed by the government, including necessarily a doctor. The Board would be 
appointed for a six year period but its members would be partially replaced every 
two years in order to achieve continuity. The Board would deal with the most 
serious problems, having the authorization to instruct and supervise several
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committees appointed to study several special areas. Furthermore, in the case of 
serious breaches, the Minister of Labour would be able to ask the High National 
Board for the dissolution of the Board.
The administrative leader of IKA would be again the General Director 
having the necessary scientific and administrative qualifications, appointed by the 
Government with a "wide range of independence". The Bill attempted to 
"depoliticize" this important position, stating simultaneously that the person 
appointed should harmonize IKA's independence and constructive state control. 
The position of a Deputy for the General Director was introduced to lighten his 
burden and leave him to concentrate on the major issues.
As we have seen, since IKA’s establishment, a powerful Government 
Trustee had been the most important feature of state control. The Trustee had 
the discretion to overrule the Board’s "illegal" decisions, according to world-wide 
common legal practice", as in France or Belgium (24). It was emphasized that this 
position should express the "maximum state tolerance": overseas relevant 
regulations were much more restrictive for the social insurance institutions (25).
Local administrative offices-services
IKA’s administration at the district and regional level would be 
supervised by committees established in local offices, consisting of one employers’ 
and one employees’ representative and one IKA official. The committee’s 
authority was restricted in comparison with the earlier legislation for local offices.
General management and branches would be maintained as the main 
distinction of services. Administrative decentralization, especially for health care 
services would be reinforced according to recent trends and the successful 15 years 
of implementation. The Bill anticipated an experiment according to the French 
system in which an insurance branch would be segmented in local units with 
varying degrees of independence. Another adjustment abolished the financial 
independence of the district branches as being opposed to the solidarity principle.
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Details were left for future special circulars in order to adapt sufficiently to 
changing needs and circumstances.
Finally, the Bill introduced the establishment of insurance administrative 
courts to resolve disputes. It was intended that solutions to disputes with the 
insured would be found, under prompt and efficient procedures, thus resolving 
what had so far been reported as a considerable problem. On 21 June 1951, the 
Bill passed in Parliament and became the Compulsory Law No 1846 "about social 
insurance". This Law was to determine the social insurance legacy for the main 
part of the working population covered by IKA, for the next 40 years.
Reflections: Social Insurance meets Social Security
The period of unstable coalitions - 16 different governments between 
1946 and 1952 - led to the September 1951 elections, less than three months after 
the easy passage of the social insurance legislative reform in Parliament. The 
winner, former Field-Marshal Papagos’ Greek rally, copying de Gaulle’s model in 
France, won 114 seats and was not in position to form a viable government. 
Papagos asked immediately for new elections and refused participation in a 
coalition. A new centre coalition government under Plastiras was formed having 
to face a significant reduction in the annual American aid, from 225 to 182 million 
US. dollars. The Americans made it clear that this was due to the unbearable 
political instability and demanded a change in the electoral system from 
proportional representation to a simple majority.
At the end of 1951 and after long discussions, a new relatively liberal 
Constitution was passed in Parliament. It did guarantee basic democratic 
freedoms but the repressive emergency legislation, active since the civil war 
period, was not removed. Among others, this legislation provided the wide use of 
a certificate of "healthy social views", indispensable for a passport, for a driver’s 
license, for state employment and occasionally for university entrance. The Prime- 
Minister Plastiras, an advocate of reconciliation between the left and the right.
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finally achieved the withdrawal of this odd legacy in April 1952.
Under these circumstances, Law No 1846 was sanctioned on 7 May 1952 
by Law No 2113, introducing remarkable reforms in the social insurance 
legislation, and particularly in social protection, summarized as following:
a. Uniform employees’ coverage and the possibility of extension mainly to self-
employed poor persons.
b. Enlargement of IKA’s provisions and uprating of benefits, in general.
c. Establishment of a uniform minimum level of protection by the requirement
that all special insurance funds should adjust their provisions to IKA’s 
standards or to be compulsorily amalgamated with IKA.
d. Full extension of sickness in kind benefits to dependants, so the scheme came
closer to a universal health care system; accordingly a construction plan for 
health services was decided.
e. Calculation of cash benefits on a more "social" redistributional basis.
f. Introduction of stricter conditions for employees being members of more than
one main insurance scheme.
g. Introduction of an adaptation allowance, for partial disability and enlargement
of the "subjective definition of disability".
h. Unemployment fund’s and TB-organization’s incorporation with IKA,
increasing their credibility.
i. Rational management with more emphasis on IKA’s administrative
independence, with detailed regulations, 
j. Introduction of state’s participation in financing the scheme, 
k. Reinforcement of the amalgamation procedures of special funds with IKA, with 
conditions in favour of these funds but not securing IKA’s financial future.
1. Readjustment of the procedure for the transfer of insured persons between 
insurance institutions, granting insurance continuity, 
m. Introduction of regulations providing reduced early pensions, 
n. Special treatment for arduous employment provided by full early pensions, and
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higher contributions, 
o. Increase of employers’ share in the rate of contributions.
The extent to which the law was harmonized with modem social security 
trends is a matter of discussion. Some argued that it "did not deeply entrench the 
social security system into Greece" (26),but in general this issue was faced with 
considerable consent. This was a significant step towards social progress since 
important aspects of social protection, since minimum level of provisions and a 
kind of health insurance for all system, were introduced.
The law was as concise as its predecessor, but it was inferior in simplicity 
and terminological unity. The General Meeting of A.I.S.S. in 1951 in Vienna has 
given special emphasis to the way in which social legislation is stated, but the 
Greek legislation failed to be adjusted.
The concept of the initially designed scheme, however, was altered. IKA 
could up to an extent not be considered anymore as pure social insurance for a 
number of reasons. Pensions were provided after only 2.500 days or a little more 
than 8 full years of work, irrespective of any further employment of the pensioner. 
It was reported that in cases of people having completed the age of 65 before 
1951, pensions were again provided after just 750 days of work (27). Sickness in 
kind benefits were provided even if employment was abandoned. The prerequisite 
of "main occupation" i.e. full permanent employment, in order to become an IKA 
member was abandoned, and the insurance coverage of financially weak 
independent employees was introduced. A very significant increase in widows 
pension, almost doubled, tended to create a "housewife insurance". The 
establishment of a low minimum pension and the overall pension adjustments put 
social insurance near to being a social assistance scheme. Moreover, as will be 
seen, the "window" opened for a reduced retirement age due to arduous 
employment was to cause chronic financial problems, leaving space for absurd 
decisions and political bribes. The same happened after the extension of the 
definition of disability and the procedure of determining it, an adjustment which
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resulted in heavy abuses. In addition, the regulations providing control and 
penalties for employers not following the law, were in fact enforcing abuses.
As mentioned earlier, the normal retirement age was kept at 65 years for 
males and 60 for females, while in 1950 life expectancy at birth was 63.4 and 66.7 
years respectively. In this respect the insurance risk basically undertaken by the 
scheme was moderate and the number of normal old-age pensioners would be 
kept low as well as the financial burden for IKA. In 1951, the population of 
Greece was 7.633.000 and those over 65 years of age were 511.000, i.e. 6.7 per 
cent of the population.
Nine days after the establishment of the Law No 1846, the S. Venizelos’ 
Government brought and passed immediately in Parliament the Law No 1854 of 
23 June 1951 concerning thec&vard of pensions to public servants and to the armed 
forces. This was the first general piece of legislation concerning this scheme since 
1935, aiming at the resettlement of the existing ..."pensions’ anarchy, ... providing 
unfairly pensions to a large amount of people ... against any notion of insurance 
principles,... nullifying the State’s honour and credibility" (28). The law restricted 
contributory conditions for pensions: increased to 15 - from the existing 10 - the 
years of minimum service for pension at the retirement age, or in case of invalidity 
out of work; abolished married women’s early pensions after 15 years and 
increased the qualifying period to 20 years. All the other privileges, as described in 
chapter III, including private or contracted doctors invalidity pensions for doctors 
who became invalid while "combating contagious diseases", were in fact retained. 
Moreover, the average pension was increased, since all pensions would by this law 
be equal to 80 per cent of earnings of the last year of service, and several 
supplementary allowances were raised.
Law No 1854 introduced - once again - contributions on salaries and 
pensions. The contribution rates established in 1935 were in the meantime 
abolished: immediately after the beginning of the war for pensioners and in 1945 
after the beginning of the civil war for those in service (29). The 1951 legislation
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provided an eamings-related contribution of 2,3, 4 or 5 per cent depending on the 
amount of salary, and contributions of 6, 8 or 10 per cent depending on the 
amount of pension (30). This was made inevitable since, as the Under-Minister 
Mitsotakis said in Parliament, "... the State became fully incapable in paying the 
real pensioners"(31). A few months earlier. Law No 1811 provided complex 
regulations for public servants’ retirement age limits, which were now linked to 
the ranking of the position held. A maximum limit was put at age 65. The State 
attempt of 1951 aiming at a curtail of some of the public servants’ privileges was a 
relatively sound political intervention, in the context of the general policies 
pursued at this period to reorganize the social security system.
The 1951 reform in practice
The first year of the law’s implementation reflected immediate 
complications. The law was in some issues unspecific or undetailed, and in other 
very detailed. This left much space for abuses and omissions, or enforced 
complexities and bureaucracy. However, IKA had to implement the new 
regulations and to define the details by circulars, which were eventually achieved 
after long and hard preparations. Several special circulars were issued, regulating 
such problems as the extension of hospital care for dependants, maternity care 
services, procedures to get into asylums and orphanages, bath-therapy provisions, 
an extension of the number of occupational diseases, simplification in the 
provisions and implementation of wide decentralization in favour of local 
insurance branches. Emphasis was actually given to IKA’s construction 
programme (hospitals, polyclinics etc.) which would improve medical care; by the 
end of 1953,18 buildings in several cities were completed.
Additionally, some basic subjects were still at a primitive level of 
research. For example, the implementation of a new way for insurance premia 
collection was under examination because the existing stamp system had proved 
inefficient. The amendment of the medical care system was a major issue, since
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the existing system with the few doctors employed by IKA did not give patients a 
wide range of choice, and doctors an adequate level of remuneration. Priority was 
given to the reorganization of IKA’s administrative structure in order to fulfil its 
new expanded responsibilities and to the reorganization of IKA’s employment 
offices. Finally, the extension of the scheme to universal insurance coverage of all 
employees was under consideration.
During 1952, Law No 2054 included conscripts in IKA’s insurance. 
According to the law a special conscription insurance account had been created to 
which employers contributed, in order to provide cash benefits for employees 
going into the armed forces. In the same year and because of the high inflation 
rates, pensions were increased by 30 per cent and a minimum pension of 400.000 
drachmas was established for the insured and 300.000 drachmas for dependent 
adults. Additionally, some preventive care action was undertaken such as lectures 
and films in factories or miniature X-rays. Moreover, six problematic insurance 
funds were amalgamated with IKA, in the following three years after the 
establishment of the 1951 legislation (32).
The general economic depression affected significantly IKA’s financial 
condition in 1952; outstanding revenue rose to 23.48 per cent of the amount due 
from the usual 9 per cent; unemployment increased to 9 per cent of the working 
force instead of 6 per cent of the previous year, the number of IKA’s pensioners 
increased to 43.800 in 1953 from 26.540 in 1951 (33).
According to the National Statistical Service, the number of insured 
amounted to 415.000 of which 67 per cent were male and 33 per cent female. 
Since anyway the existing data are contradictory, it is possible that the number of 
directly insured was half a million, so that the total number of IKA’s covered 
persons was estimated to be around 900.000. IKA’s coverage extended to 23 new 
areas and the insurance territory of 13 other cities was enlarged.
Insurance revenues were 18 per cent of remuneration on average and 
19.2 per cent after August 1952; total revenues were 678.288 million drachmas of
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which 70.830 million drachmas came from the sickness cash benefits sector, 
271.034 million drachmas from the sickness in kind provisions sector, 245.972 
million drachmas from the pension sector, 79.169 million drachmas from the 
unemployment sector and 11.282 million drachmas from the new conscription 
one. Insurance expenditure amounted to 738.439 million drachmas resulting in an 
immediate 70.439 million drachmas deficit for the financial year 1952. The main 
explanation for this deficit was a 140.000 million drachmas contribution debt, 
which would have resulted in a surplus in IKA’s budget if it had been regularly 
collected. IKA provided on the other hand, in 1952 a considerable number of 
services (34).
By the end of 1952, IKA was facing a perplexing situation and was left to 
solve all the problems alone since the political instability still prevailed. The 
leading issue was the poor level of benefits and services provided. Governments 
were delaying in ratifying IKA’s decisions for pensions’ increases. Moreover, 
health insurance services were inadequate; "We continuously listen to complaints 
about the way it (health care) is provided, complaints which are justified" (35). 
IKA was still providing health services in polyclinics by doctor specialists paid on 
salaries, and in private surgeries by contracted pathologists making home visits as 
well (36). The services provided in polyclinics ", b u t,... especially those of the large 
cities, Athens, Thessalonica, Piraeus and Patras, are run under very arduous 
conditions,... large crowds of strained insured waiting for hours to be examined,... 
doctors very depressed and obliged to examine during their working hours more 
patients than allowed by medical regulations, ... the polyclinics are in miserable 
condition inadequate for health services, .... doctors of different specialities 
examining different patients in the same room ,.. bureaucracy beyond imagination 
stressing both doctors and insured" (37). Hospital services were provided by 
hospitals and private clinics contracted with IKA but the scheme confronted 
major difficulties. "In terms of hospital and sanatorial care the situation provokes 
numerous hardships, .. this problem can be solved only by establishing new
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hospitals in order to secure the necessary hospital beds, ... the Athens hospital 
which is to be build, is expected to provide 600 beds while IKA’s Medical 
Department reports that the scheme needs in Athens 2.000 beds" (38). In 
addition, it was emphasized that the expenses of pharmaceutical care increased 
"amazingly" and a circular was prepared to control the situation.
It is clear that health insurance was provided so far only in the urban 
areas at a rather elementary level. IKA’s primary health care services were 
provided - according to the original adjustments discussed in chapter III - in 
"polyclinics" with salaried doctors and up to a limited extent in private surgeries by 
contracted pathologists (39). Most people were entitled to this kind of provision 
and it was only some privileged small groups - such as the bank employees - who 
were eligible for private doctors and private hospitals. On the other hand, IKA 
was forced at the moment to provide health services to the public servants’ 
scheme but with very low respective finance. Private medicine attracted of course, 
all those willing to pay in excess.
The health construction plan was implemented very slowly, though IKA 
has given it urgent priority. "It is urgent to emphasize to the government and the 
Ministry of Labour the importance of the realization of the construction plan of 
the scheme without interfering problems, for the success of social insurance in our 
country" (40). IKA was the only scheme providing organized health insurance to 
the Greek working population; many of the members of the other minor schemes 
were insured by IKA’s health sector (41). In view of this, IKA played in fact an 
enlarged role of national health provider.
The administration of the scheme was in close cooperation with the 
Panhellenic Medical Association with reference to the organization and provision 
of health services. The Association insisted on a system of free doctors’ choice 
"composing the best way of medical care". A special committee was appointed in 
order to discuss the issue with members coming from IKA and from several 
medical organizations. Finally, IKA’s General Director and the President of the
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Athens Medical Association undertook in 1953 to study and propose the way for 
the introduction of the system of "organized free choice" for pathologists and its 
financial consequences for the scheme.
In the meantime, a decision made by the High National Board partly 
modified the pensions’ contributory conditions of the Law No 1846: those having 
completed the age of 65 before 1951, and after 750 days of work, were awarded 
pensions irrespective of other conditions. This adaptation provided pensions with 
favourable conditions to a significant number of elderly people and increased 
IKA’s unpredictable financial burdens.
The unemployment fund’s amalgamation with IKA and especially the 
favourable contributory conditions for eligibility - increase in the level of cash 
benefits, equalization of benefits between blue and white collar workers, resulted 
in a considerable deficit in the relevant account and created general financial 
problems in the scheme. Since the unemployment benefit defined by Law No 1846 
was equal to 50 per cent of remuneration, the scheme could provide benefits up to 
4 per cent of the number of its insured members. But in 1952, the number of 
unemployed beneficiaries was equal to 9 per cent of total insured members and in 
1953 equal to 13 per cent (42). Notably the Minister of Labour decided in 10 April 
of 1952 to decrease the benefit only for the blue collar workers to 40 per cent of 
remuneration and was accused of political favouritism (43).
The 1953 alterations
Soon after the implementation of Law No 1846, IKA was confronted 
with an administrative crisis leading to state intervention and an oppressive 
centralized bureaucratic organization. Successful medium level managers were 
not willing to be appointed and qualified personnel left. The whole administrative 
system seemed powerless to follow national and international developments and 
changing social needs. Moreover, the drachma was drastically devalued in 1953 for 
the needs of the rising Greek Economy; this absorbed much of IKA’s cash benefits
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not covered by the increases later provided.
Law No 1846 did in practice not effectively change the basic 
administrative structure of IKA but it provided more complicated procedures. In 
the 2 years of its implementation the situation was aggravated so that the Law No 
2698 was introduced in 1953 providing mainly administrative simplifications. The 
law was aiming, again at the administrative reorganization of IKA; according to 
the Introductory Report "...IKA was under a deep administrative crisis ... Law No 
1846 adjustments mainly introduced collective administrative procedures and 
created a chaotic administrative situation... only the general management’s
committees amounted to 19.......  IKA was directed to incidental, unplanned
solutions aiming to serve the interests of the classes represented in the Board of 
Directors...." (44).
This law however, embraced some absurd insurance generosities: pension 
was awarded to those having just 1.000 working days during the last five years 
(45), pension after only 750 working days at the age of 55 was granted to "trade 
unionists having provided distinguished national services" (46), harbour workers 
were given pensions after 1.500 working days at the age of 55 (47). In this respect, 
political opportunism provoked insurance privileges within IKA and burdened its 
financial situation.
On the administrative issue, according to the new Law of 1953, IKA’s 
Board of Directors would have 13 members; a General Director, 4 employers’ and 
4 employees’ representatives and 4 scientists of which one would be a doctor and 
three social or economic experts. Additionally, two General Executive Managers 
would be under the General Director, in order to administer and coordinate the 
several services. It was believed that these modifications would alleviate the 
existing inflexible decision-making and that control, planning and coordination 
would become feasible.
Additionally, this law provided for several insurance modifications. The 
sickness waiting period for any case and the decrease of allowances for insured
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persons in hospital became valid again. Contribution rates for insured up to 18 
years of age were to be counted as 1/4 of the respective wage class. Simultaneous 
payment of unemployment and sickness allowance was abandoned. Explanatory 
regulations for multi-insured people and for the identification of the age of 
insured persons were introduced. Several adjustments were made for tuberculosis 
patients, apprentices, and the temporarily unemployed. Finally, regulations 
extended insurance coverage to further professional categories.
The law gave authoiization to the Minister of Labour to abandon several 
of IKA’s financial burdens at his discretion. Ironically, it was emphasized (48) 
that IKA was burdened by 13 billion drachmas due to several "gratuitous" state 
adjustments, and by a 2 per cent contribution of its revenues for the national 
hospital programme, but still lacked any state financial aid. Law No 2698 was 
another fragmentary unwise attempt which exacerbated the deep-rooted problems 
of the social insurance anarchy in Greece. Moreover, in 1954, Law Act No 3083 
introduced another absurdity, donating a 750 working days bonus for IKA’s 
pension eligibility "to the trade unionists employed in Macedonia and Thrace 
during the war occupation (49).
In terms of unemployment coverage, the problematic implementation of 
these services resulted again in this sector’s separation from IKA. Law No 2961 of 
1954 introduced the establishment of the employment and unemployment 
insurance organization (O.A.A.A.), based on IKA’s infrastructure (50). In order 
to balance deficits, the contributory conditions were made stricter and the 
unemployment insurance premium raised from 2 per cent to 4 per cent of 
remuneration. The additional 2 per cent would be shared by employers and - for 
the first time - employees. The new conditions were: 125 working days in the last 
14 months for benefits paid for 60 days; 150 working days would increase the 
benefits’ payment period to 90 days and 180 working days to payment for 150 
days.
The new organization was responsible for employment offices and
177
conscription insurance as well. This legislation counterbalanced the financial 
deficits and the scheme resulted in surpluses from 1955 onwards; moreover, it 
established a solid basis for the development of competent unemployment 
services in Greece (51).
The painful amalgamations
As expected and following the law of 1951, several financially 
problematic special insurance funds amalgamated with IKA. Surprisingly, the law 
forced IKA to maintain the absurdly high provisions of most of these funds (52), 
aiming most probably to control reactions of their privileged insured members. 
The amalgamation regulations provided pensions’ transferability but did not 
increase lower pensions to become equal to IKA’s minimum ones, but on the 
contrary secured higher pensions; in other words the adjustment made the rich 
richer and the poor poorer.
We have already discussed in detail the Greek phenomenon of the 
numerous insurance funds, its roots and development. Lacking an actuarial basis 
and organization, these schemes survived during their first period, since 
pensioners in the beginning were few and the required contribution rates low. 
After the first period - ten years on average - most of these schemes were 
experiencing financial deadlock and could not maintain their operation without 
external support from the State, provided for political reasons. The only exception 
has always been most of the Bank employees insurance funds, where the Bank- 
employer was covering the financial burdens.
Between 1952 and 1957, twelve insurance funds were amalgamated with 
IKA (53), including traditionally strong schemes such as the tobacco workers’ fund 
and the miners’ fund. This procedure resulted in 15.000 new pensioners for IKA 
without any contribution to the scheme. What was only introduced was a special 
account for tobacco workers fund pensioners financed by "social taxes", mainly 
charges on the tobacco exports until 1958 (54). This adjustment was indispensable
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since the burdens of the tobacco workers’ fund for IKA were very significant -
10.500 pensioners, out of whom 5.500 young pensioners had been awarded a 
pension at the age of 50 and 40.000 insured persons working the maximum 5 
months a year and contributing respectively less than normal (55).
The amalgamation policy of 1951 was initially seen as an indispensable 
step towards the reducing the fragmentation of the system with hundreds of 
schemes. As this policy developed, it became an instrument of political nepotism, 
or at best, an inevitable solution for the maintenance of welfare benefits to 
specific groups. This practice gave a boost to IKA’s serious financial imbalances. 
Up to the end of 1960,15 bankrupted insurance funds with 21.050 pensioners, had
been incorporated in IKA. As IKA’s General Director put it " IKA became the
protector not just of sick insured, but of sick insurance schemes" (56).
Another malpractice exercised following the concept of the 1951 law was 
the decrease in the rate of contributions for industries in rural areas: these were 
decreased by 20 per cent for small enterprises, industries and tourist enterprises 
based on islands and by 10 per cent in all other rural centres in 1955; for any kind 
of exports, employer’s contribution decreased from 12 to 5 per cent in 1954 (57), 
for rural newspapers contribution rates decreased by half in 1956 (58); the same 
applied for construction works in earthquake areas (59). These favoured 
adjustments were estimated to cost IKA an amount equal to the monthly cost of 
all pensions paid (60).
IKA was providing its personnel with considerable extra coverage by the 
supplementary fund for employees in social insurance funds (61). IKA’s 
contributions as employer were 2 per cent of earnings but on top 0.5 per cent of 
total IKA’s receipts were paid into this scheme. However, several other employees 
managed to become beneficiaries of this scheme: personnel of all insurance funds 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour, of several other minor 
organizations of the Ministry, and finally the whole personnel of the Ministry. The 
fund provided pension supplements of up to 60 per cent of earnings during the
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last month of employment; this resulted in a total amount of pensions received 
much higher than work earnings. But, of course, this was considered a normal 
provision burdening IKA, with a vested right for the administrators of the system, 
who could paralyze it whenever they felt dissatisfied.
Furthermore, the mixed distributional economic system - pursued world 
wide in the unstable post-war monetary period - played a major role in IKA’s 
economic problems. Additionally and following the inadequate fines, a large 
amount of "frozen debts", namely contributions due, were accumulated. The 
grace regulations allowed many employers to invest IKA’s and employees’ money 
within their enterprise. Notably, employees’ contributions were deducted from 
salaries every single month. As IKA’s General Director bitterly emphasized in 
1957 "if this system continues, those paying regular contributions will be crazy"
(62).
IKA’s grave problem was certainly the outcome of several political but 
unwise - at least from the social insurance principles point of view - adjustments 
fostered by most of the post-war Greek governments. IKA’s financial course was 
predicted by the Introductory Report of Law No 1846 but the above state 
interference exhausted IKA’s reserves 2 years before it was anticipated, in 1960. 
The very important regulation - provided by Law No 1846 (63), concerning the 
State’s legal obligation to contribute to IKA, remained inactive. If IKA had been 
financed from 1953 onwards as was anticipated, it would have remained 
financially vigorous. As IKA was mixed with the State’s policies, this financial 
commitment should definitely have been fulfilled. IKA has always been the 
national social policy instrument but lacked any external financial aid. As the 
years passed, IKA’s initial social insurance framework was falsified. The scheme 
was repeatedly forced to follow social assistance policies by loosening eligibility 
requirements, especially the pension ones. It was reported in 1958 that 36 per cent 
of IKA’s pensions were provided after less than 1.200 days of work, or after just 
four full years of contributions (64).This shifting undoubtedly increased the
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importance of IKA’s social role and covered some of the urgent social needs but 
this was not its purpose.
In this respect, IKA’s national social action was not accompanied by the 
analogous adaptations in its economic structure. The measures implemented left 
no space for the indispensable improvement of its provisions for those regularly 
contributing. In fact, pensions were retained at a very low level so that the further 
expansion of supplementary funds was inevitable.
The general social insurance environment
IKA was covering only a part of Greek employees - more than 200 other 
social insurance institutions still existed, covering 550.000 insured including public 
servants. Of these, only 35.000 were covered for sickness and pension and 515.000 
only for pension. The main features of these funds were: firstly, differences in the 
level of insurance contributions; brick workers for example, paid 15 per cent of 
remuneration, Athenian news papers’ employees paid 25.6 per cent, mill and 
macaroni workers paid 31.4 per cent, Salonica’s Railway Employees paid 50 per 
cent. Independent Tobacco Organizations paid 19.3 per cent. This remarkable 
dissimilarity was enforced by the continuing unequal distribution of the State’s 
finance, characterized now as "social contributions", and actually being clear 
political privileges (65). For each insured person the State contributed annually 
1.100 drachmas for Athens Gas Employees, 397.200 drachmas for Thessaly Rail 
Employees and 1.750.600 drachmas for mill and macaroni workers, while IKA and 
other funds still lacked any state subsidy. Secondly, due to legal and administrative 
deficiencies, there were important revenue leakages in some funds, such as the 
Professionals’ and Handicraftsmen’s fund (TEVE) and the Fund of the Staff of 
the Public Health Offices. Thirdly, the inequalities in provisions exacerbated the 
pension differences; for Emery-workers the average pension was 58.000 per 
month, for mill-workers 395.000 drachmas, for Rail Employees 543.000 drachmas, 
for Electricity Rail Employees 2.056.000 drachmas. Fourthly, there was the high
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expenditure level on health care provisions accompanied by the poor quality of 
them. The annual per head coverage cost of the Bakers' Fund was 1.366.000 
drachmas, and of National Insurance Co Fund 2.518.380 drachmas (66).
In addition, high financial and administrative burdens were created, 
because of the total lack of coordination among the existing social insurance 
institutions. In supplementary funds 340.125 people were insured, including public 
servants (67). Finally, the bulk of funds were characterized by relatively high levels 
of benefits. This in combination with the fact that several insured were entitled to 
pensions from 2, 3, 4 or even 5 funds, provoked huge insurance inequalities, and 
enhanced the discrimination between privileged and under privileged insured 
people. Moreover, this situation perpetuated the existing solid "legacy" of an elite 
segment of social insurance funds, made up of powerful socio-professional groups.
The developments in the public servants scheme
In 1953, the Law No 2500 changed the several retirement ages of public 
servants defined in 1951, and complicated readjustments provided retirement age 
limits, according to the ranking of the position held, of 65 or 62 or 60 or 58 years 
of age. But this, of course, was not to be maintained for long.
In October 1957, the Karamanlis’ Government passed in Parliament the 
Law No 3768 concerning new adjustments for the contributory conditions of 
public servants; surprisingly the qualifying period for pension for married women 
decreased again to 15 years (68), ".... since the reasons for the introduction of this 
favourable regulation in 1935 exist even today" (69); pension would again become 
related to earnings of the last month in service; the conscription service of public 
servants would be recognized as a period of public service for reasons of equality 
since "... the same applies for officers of the armed forces"(70); survivors’ pension 
was increased without a maximum percentage in case of a family with more than 3 
children; the long- existing high degree of pensions’ transferability - even to 
divorced daughters or "destitute" unmarried sisters - and survivors’ rights were
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further enlarged since orphans of a wife insured would be now granted half a 
death pension even if the father was alive and capable for work; death pension 
would be increased from 3/10 to 5/10 of the insured’s pension where male child 
over 18 years existed. This remarkable piece of legislation gave this group back 
privileges curtailed in 1951 and on top, introduced further absurd regulations.
On top of this, one year later, public servants’ contributions were 
abolished and the State fully undertook this responsibility (71) .Notably, in 1957 
the pension funds of the self-employed absorbed 25.8 per cent of their total 
revenues from the well-known "social taxes", at the moment when the employees’ 
funds received a marginal 6.4 per cent.
The development of IKA*s primary care health services
In 1960 and following long discussion of years, IKA introduced a model 
of family medicine provisions based on some of the principles of the British 
National Health Service. According to an IKA circular, a new institution of part- 
time family doctors would be introduced. This would create a personal 
relationship of mutual confidence between doctor and patients, would secure 
continuity of care, would prevent unnecessary visits to specialists since this should 
be prescribed by the family doctor, and would enhance preventive care and 
improve health care conditions (72). In this respect, the family doctor would be 
transferred from IKA’s polyclinics to his private surgery in the patient’s 
neighbourhood and make home visits if necessary, working with a specific list of 
patients and paid on capitation (73). The new system was based on an experiment 
in Crete from 1960, in the Chania polyclinic, and within two years it was extended 
to five other IKA branches covering almost 250.000 insured (74).
The speciality of general medicine was not officially introduced in Greece 
before 1964; in this respect IKA had to cover the lack of general practitioners by 
appointing either pathologists, or doctors without a speciality (75). According to 
this framework, IKA developed its family doctors services in the 1960s at a snail’s
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pace since doctors were reluctant to join the system. It should be noted here that 
it was only during 1972, during the Colonels’ dictatorship, when a law act ratified 
this way of providing services, including the obligation of regular preventive 
examinations and the system of payment on a capitation basis (76). Family doctors 
achieved a year later an improvement in their working conditions and to define 
the working hours for IKA patients to 3.5 hours daily, not allowing them anymore 
to come during private patients’ hours (77). In 1976, after the restoration of 
democracy, capitation payment was abolished and family doctors once again 
became IKA’s employees, paid on salaries plus extra allowances for expenses and 
overtime due to more than 75-80 home visits per month (78).
The bare bones of IKA’s health services developed under these 
conditions, and in fact never achieved to efficient protection and failed to 
alleviate public dissatisfaction. Primary care services remained based on 
polyclinics with part-time, salaried, specialist doctors and dentists; the conditions 
of treatment slightly improved compared with those depicted by IKA’s President 
back in 1952 and noted earlier in this chapter. Family medicine continued to be 
under-developed with all the consequences this might generate. Hospital services, 
mainly in the urban areas, provided low standards of care. It seems that health 
providers of all kinds neglected to give priority to the social dimensions of their 
profession and remained attached to their professional vested interests.
Conclusion
In 1960, following the dangerous development in IKA’s financial 
situation during the 1950s the State was compelled to intervene. The Karamanlis’ 
Government introduced Law No 4104 which restricted pension contributory 
conditions. The 2.500 working days minimum qualifying period for an old-age 
pension was to be gradually increased to 4.050 working days (79); this started from 
1 January 1962 onwards providing that the minimum period would be raised by 
175 days annually until reaching the new limit of 4.050 days (80). This law was
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another classical example of absurd state policies concerning IKA: the deficits 
generated by political decisions (81) were to be counterbalanced by the regular 
contributors, who were bound to contribute longer not to improve their benefits 
but to finance political bribes and the vested interests of socio-professional 
influential lobbies. ( # 2 ) .
In brief, the social insurance legislation introduced and implemented in 
the 1950s modified the scheme towards a more Beveridgean universal social 
security system providing at last real health insurance services "for all". This was 
done without any relative adjustment in IKA’s financial basis, since the State still 
refused participation, though IKA was and would be the means to the above end. 
Moreover, the scheme became another element of social injustice and of 
insurance inequalities, providing low pensions to the long contributing majority 
while - forced by the State - allocating pensions in favour of minor groups of 
people having worked for a minimum period. The prophetic words of IKA’s 
General Director in 1958 were proved not to be alarming enough"...If the 
Government does not radically confront IKA’s problems, in a 2-3 years’ period 
IKA will go bankrupt...." (83). This radical confrontation was never achieved, since 
decision-making remained always highly politicized and lacked any kind of strong 
determination. But of course, governments were mainly concerned with their 
extremely short-run political ambitions and not with the long-run social benefits, 
reflecting much of the individualistic character of their voters.
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VI
THE INTRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL 
SOCIAL INSURANCE, 1961
The changes in the socio-political arena
In October 1955 there was once again a political crisis. After the death of 
Marshal and prime-minister Papagos, the leader of the Greek Rally party, King 
Paul passed over the normally expected candidates for the succession and asked 
Constantine Karamanlis to form a government. Karamanlis, the son of a 
Macedonian schoolmaster, was at that time a low profile Minister of Public 
Works, "an energetic and efficient administrator, and a firm believer in Greece’s 
Western orientation" (1). The last was probably the main reason for his 
unexpected elevation by the King in order to ensure a settlement of Greece’s 
main issues according to NATO’s wishes.
Karamanlis changed the name of the Greek Rally to the National 
Radical Union (ERE), and went twice to elections in February 1956 and 1958 
winning a share of 47 and 41 per cent of the vote respectively. In the February 
1956 elections women had the right to vote for the first time. The disunity of the 
centre parties, in part a result of growing disenchantment with the attitude of 
Greece’s NATO allies over the major national issue of Cyprus, provoked a 
dramatic rise in the far left vote. EDA, the left party, advocated neutralism which 
was more attractive to the Greek electorate. Due to the agreement between 
Greece and Turkey on the Cyprus issue, Karamanlis was denounced in 1959 by the 
opposition for betraying the cause of Hellenism in the interests of NATO and the 
Americans.
However, during the Karamanlis administration, significant steps were 
taken to consolidate Greece’s new-found economic stability. Average per capita
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income rose from $112 in 1951 to $270 in 1956 and was to reach $500 by 1964. The 
overwhelming inflation of the 1940s, were succeeded by orthodox fiscal policies 
which resulted in significant price stability. The two other decisive factors of the 
economy, which improved Greece’s "chronic imbalance of payments", were 
tourism and the contributions of Greek migrant workers, who were moving in 
increasing numbers to the countries of Western Europe and particularly to West 
Germany, in search of often menial work. The number of Greeks engaged in the 
industrial and service sectors rose considerably and almost matched those 
employed in agriculture. In 1961 the urban and rural populations were balanced at 
43 per cent, with 13 per cent living in a semi-urban environment.
Most of the population was concentrated in the Athens region, about 2 
million people, when the total population was eight million four hundred 
thousand. The unplanned and unhealthy development of Athens exacerbated the 
bureaucratic centralisation "which had always been the bane of Greek 
government, The consumer boom period of the 1960s was concentrated in 
Athens as well, and although overall living standards were steadily rising, 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income continued to grow''(Z),
Under these circumstances Karamanlis negotiated an agreement with 
EEC, which came into force in November 1962, and an associate status for 
Greece within the Community was introduced. Association with the EEC was 
seen, however, as an additional way of binding Greece to her NATO allies, and 
was strongly opposed by the left parties. Before the term of the 1958 Parliament 
had ended, Karamanlis held an election in October 1961 which he won by a 
majority of 51 per cent of the electorate. The results of the elections were heavily 
disputed by the opposition parties as falsified by several electoral malpractices. 
Particular pressures were exercised on the people of the agricultural border 
regions, which had been under virtual martial law since the civil war.
These electoral manipulations - which however "do not appear to have 
been on a large enough scale to affect the overall result" (3) - gave to the inspired
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leader of the Centre Union, G. Papandreou, a strong argument and created a 
huge movement in favour of the centre. Moreover, as Papandreou pursued his 
campaign against both Karamanlis and King Paul for refusing to hold new 
elections, there were increasing signs of a loss of confidence on the part of the 
right. People started to realise that, whatever their initial rationale in the 
immediate aftermath of a bitterly fought civil war, the "repressive mechanisms" 
used by the right to contain the left were no longer justified.
After the assassination of a left wing deputy and a stormy dispute with 
King Paul and Queen Frederica, Karamanlis resigned and called for immediate 
elections. These were held on 3 November 1963 and Papandreou’s Centre Union 
achieved a narrow victory with 42 per cent of the vote leaving Karamanlis’ ERE 
with 39 per cent. Karamanlis departed for Paris for a self-imposed exile that was 
to last for eleven years. His eight-year administration between 1955 and 1963 had 
been the longest one in Greece’s history after the 1821 independence.
However, Papandreou who was the man to challenge the twelve-year 
monopoly of the right, did not enjoy an overall majority in Parliament. Instead of 
governing with the support of the left party EDA, he preferred a two front battle 
against both left and right. Papandreou showed his reform orientations by 
releasing political prisoners, legislating for educational reform, raising wages and 
salaries and then went for a new election, which he won by an impressive 53 per 
cent of the vote in February 1964. The results clearly showed that he had attracted 
votes from both the right and the left and additionally he enjoyed "the 
benevolence of both the Palace and the American Embassy which saw in a strong 
centre the best guarantee against a resurgence of support for EDA, the left party" 
(4).
In fact, Papandreou’s expectations for an untroubled period of 
moderately reformist government were to prove optimistic since in a 15 month 
period the country was to face probably the most serious political crisis of the 
post-war period. During this period Papandreou attempted to implement his
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reformist programme; he passed a new Education Act which raised the school- 
leaving age from twelve to fifteen and he introduced spoken demotic Greek as a 
means of instruction throughout the primary schools. Civil service salaries were 
raised, restraints on credit were abandoned, income tax was introduced and 
peasants were given higher prices for their wheat.
Throughout the 150 eventful years of Greek independence, through all 
the stages from disintegration to reconstruction and from reconstruction to 
development and growth, the Greek economy has always been based on 
agricultural production as the statistics clearly show. Nevertheless, in 1960 per 
capita income among the rural population was still very low in comparison with 
that of the urban sector. In fact it could hardly be otherwise, considering that the 
average land-holding in Greece was less than 5 hectares as against the 30 hectares 
laid down by the EEC as the minimum area required for an economically viable 
farm.
Even in the post-war period by which time social insurance - especially 
IKA - was a firmly established institution covering almost all employees in the 
urban areas, reactions, hesitations, and lack of organized pressure hindered any 
attempt to bring the farmers within the framework of the social insurance system. 
The agricultural population which comprised around half of the country's 
population, was considered to be adequately provided by the price support 
policies for certain main crops. In this respect, the State guaranteed to farmers an 
income higher than they would earn if the market mechanism was left to work 
unhindered. The absence of an employer to contribute, the low average level of 
agricultural income - as a result of the land fragmentation which followed the 
break up of large estates into small holdings - the dispersion of the agricultural 
population which posed a vast problem of organization, were some of the reasons 
for the late establishment of an agricultural social insurance scheme.
Greece was in a stage of continuous economic development in the late 
1950s. In 1955, GNP amounted 54,5 billion drachmas which within the following 5
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years rose to 75,5 billion drachmas. The average working class income increased 
by 53,2 per cent during that period (5), while the social security expenditure was 
10 per cent of GNP in 1959 (6), a rate comparable to that of some advanced 
countries of Western Europe.
The wider participation of the working classes in the growing national 
wealth would sooner or later influence the political agenda, as a reward for 
sacrifices in order to achieve a higher level of productivity, and as a 
counterbalance to any revolutionary trends. A juster income distribution could 
have been achieved through both economic and social policy. As usual, the 
prevailing concept was that the necessary resources for economic development 
should not be diverted for any other purpose, "...a permanent response to social 
problems would necessarily be based on an increased national income" (7).
During this period, the number of working people was increasing 
annually by 40.000 but the unemployment level remained stable, despite 
immigration (8). This early evidence of unsuccessful economic policies was 
underestimated and the creation of a balanced economic infrastructure never 
actually took place. The growth of national income within the framework of 
monetary stability of the 1950s led to a gradual expansion of social insurance 
benefits which made more apparent the discriminatory treatment of the 
agricultural population. It was this apparent injustice which attracted the 
attention of the political world and provided the main argument against those who 
still considered the extension of social insurance to the agricultural population as 
premature.
The credit for bringing this subject consistently into the light of the 
political arena belonged to G. Papandreou, who as leader of the opposition 
introduced a bill into Parliament in January 1960. The Bill, which of course failed 
to pass, envisaged a pension scheme for farmers and involved an annual 
expenditure of 500 million drachmas. The concept of the Papandreou proposal 
was that this sum was equal to the contribution - through taxation - of the State to
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social welfare agencies in the urban centres of the country. For reasons of equal 
treatment, Papandreou argued that the State should make available at least an 
equivalent sum for the benefit of the agricultural population.
The situation of the agricultural population had been steadily improving 
during these years. Between 1955 and 1959 agricultural income increased by 35.5 
per cent (9). The State directed more resources to agricultural economic 
investments which were increased from 297 million drachmas in 1955 to 2.5 
billion drachmas in 1960, agricultural loans were increased from 155 million 
drachmas to 1 billion drachmas respectively. All this aimed to modernise 
agricultural production.
The Agricultural Bank played an important role, although criticized as 
supporting conservative political interests, and the means of agricultural 
production improved substantially as well as the appropriate personnel (10). In 
addition, factors such as the improvement of the rural road network, several 
public construction programmes, the development of tourism and the 
decentralization of industry, had a favourable effect on the agricultural 
population. Moreover, farmers always enjoyed significant income tax deductions.
A series of agricultural insurance attempts
The introduction of social insurance coverage for people living in the 
rural areas had always been accompanied by hesitations and reservations. In 1936, 
Professor H. Evelpidis supported the idea of establishing a social insurance 
scheme for farmers.In 1937, a committee under S. Stefanopoulos, a Doctor of 
Economics and prominent politician, made a study of farmers’ insurance coverage 
mainly concerned with sickness insurance (11). This work was never completed 
"because of the doctor’s opposition and for other reasons", a member of the 
committee, said some years later (12). A year later, C. Alivizatos had already 
developed the idea of the expansion of social security to the rural areas as he 
considered there was no justification for this gap in protection (13).
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The establishment of IKA in 1934 excluding agricultural insurance 
provoked reactions. The Populist government drafted a special bill to provide 
"peasants insurance", but its intentions were questioned by an Agrarian Deputy, 
who asked: "Why has the government not yet presented the bill for peasants' 
social insurance, since as everybody knows, it has been prepared months ago? I 
have doubts as to whether these promises will be honoured or remain promises to 
be repeated in pre-election periods" (14). The turbulent years afterwards 
restrained any respective initiative.
In 1950 Professor D. Kalitsunakis reverted to the issue by accusing the 
State of excluding farmers from social security protection, when other financially 
stronger occupational classes had been covered a long time ago (15). Political 
interests forced politicians to consider the problem further and in 1951, the year 
of IKA’s reorganization, the Ministry of Labour under G. Bakatselos prepared a 
bill which came to Parliament but was laid aside, exactly as happened in 1934. The 
same year a committee under the Minister of Agriculture Lambropoulos prepared 
another draft of a law which remained on the shelves as well. In 1953, the Minister 
of Social Associations, K. Adamopoulos, made a long presentation to the Cabinet 
about agricultural social insurance. Another committee was appointed to re­
examine the subject, which submitted a Report about "the health and social 
security coverage of the rural population" (16).
The Karamanlis Government decided after all to introduce a significant 
law in December 1955 about "farmers’ social security" which introduced a 
dispensary network for the rural areas financed by the national budget (17). In 
1957, this law was amended to introduce the health care coverage of the rural 
areas under the social security umbrella.
These adjustments improved considerably the health care network in the 
rural areas which consisted of 1.137 community and rural surgeries in which 1.141 
doctors and 850 other medical staff provided health care. Simultaneously, 
institutional social assistance coverage for destitute peasants was enhanced. The
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law of 1955 contributed to the gradual increase in the number of surgeries and 
medical staff, and the health care protection of the people living in the country 
radically improved.
In June 1958, the Prime-Minister Karamanlis, coming from a neglected 
rural area himself, stated in Parliament that "....the Government will make the 
necessary improvements for social security health care. Furthermore, the 
establishment of a complete social security scheme for farmers will be examined in 
order to find out the feasibility, extent and proper time for its realization. The 
Government does not intend to provoke expectations which, after a financial 
study, might be proved mistaken" (18). G. Papandreou, the most significant leader 
of the liberal opposition, claimed that the whole subject ought to be fully 
examined and emphasized the lack of accurate statistical data. He himself 
included in his last electoral campaign the promise to introduce a pension for 
farmers.
The Prime-Minister Karamanlis ordered by decree (19) a social insurance 
committee to be appointed in order to investigate the general problems of social 
insurance in Greece, and the introduction of a social insurance scheme for the 
working people of the rural areas. Additionally, the committee was asked to 
examine a possible reform in the social security system. This committee consisted 
of distinguished experts of the social security field (20). The subjects examined by 
the committee were the financial resources of social insurance schemes, old-age 
and death insurance, disability insurance for the employees of the urban areas, 
agricultural social insurance, medical and maternity care’s extension to the whole 
population and supplementary insurance.
The conclusions of the committee a year later, favoured a universal 
scheme providing social insurance coverage to the whole population. An analytical 
financial report showed that this was feasible according to the conditions of the 
national economy and that in the long-run this would be a cost-effective solution 
and the provisions would be substantially improved. Moreover, the existing
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inequalities would be removed (21). The immediate suggestion of the committee, 
was the introduction of an agricultural pension scheme. Simultaneously, the 
Karamanlis Government, urged by the submission of the Papandreou Agricultural 
Insurance Bill of January, called the German specialist Dr. John Krohn, a former 
minister, to examine the existing situation and to make his recommendations. He 
submitted his Report in July 1960. Krohn noted that agricultural income 
constituted 1/3 of GNP and average agricultural income formed only 40 per cent 
of the respective income of the urban population. He suggested that the State 
should subsidize the agricultural population which was living under very difficult 
conditions, and estimated that there were about 23.000 disabled farmers, who 
ought to be definitely protected.
In Germany, sickness insurance had started 80 years earlier, while 
agricultural insurance had only started in 1957. The Krohn Report was completed 
in a relatively short period and he himself accepted in advance possible mistakes, 
especially on figures. On top of that, the report had been so badly translated that 
the Greek reader could not understand several of its points.
Eventually it became an urgent political issue that the social security 
system should be extended to cover the agricultural population, in order to redress 
the imbalance of income distribution to some extent at least. When the measure 
was first proposed, as we have seen, the opposition it provoked was mainly based 
on arguments of fiscal expediency and administrative peculiarities. Priority should 
be given to productive investment, so the argument ran, and social policy would 
have to keep second place.
OGA, the Agricultural Social Insurance Organization, was to be 
established at the stage of the country’s development when the policy of investing 
in urgently needed infrastructure projects and in projects yielding quick returns on 
capital, was already beginning to pay off. As we have seen per capital income had 
risen considerably and industry, growing steadily to maturity behind protective 
tariff barriers, was bringing in enough revenue to allow the Government to take a
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further step, a very decisive one, in the process of extending its social services.
There were more reasons than one to support the idea of pursuing a 
broader social security policy. This move was not only dictated by considerations 
of moral duty towards the most numerous and the most vulnerable section of the 
population, but it was also prudent for purely economic reasons. From an 
economic point of view, it was necessary to narrow the gap that always existed 
between the rural and urban areas.
There were certain regions of Greece which economically were 
considered as problem areas. They included most of Epiros, central and part of 
Western Sterea Hellas, the centre and south of Peloponnesos and some other 
districts. In 1961, these regions which amounted to 51 per cent of the entire land 
area contained 21 per cent of the country’s population. None of them was ever 
going to benefit from the public investment projects that had been carried out, nor 
from the various subsidies and support price policies, traditionally guaranteed to 
farmers by the State so as to build up stocks of agricultural commodities out of the 
seasonal surpluses. This was because the problem areas, with their relatively small 
amount of farmland and their low overall population density, were not in direct 
touch with any of Greece’s 55 major cities and towns, which meant they were 
denied the slightest taste of the fruits of technological development, nor did they 
have any surplus agricultural produce which they could sell to the State and thus 
obtain indirect assistance by means of the official support prices. Consequently 
the only way the State could help these areas was by direct aid. But even in rural 
areas with greater development potential, the inequality between the agricultural 
and the urban standard of living was still quite apparent.
Virtually all concerned with the problem, whether politicians or 
economists, had by then fully accepted the idea of providing social insurance for 
farmers, which would be an enormous step forward towards bridging the income 
gap and raising their standard of living. The reservations they still had were almost 
exclusively concerned with the question of priorities. Some of them felt that fixed
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investment projects were of more fundamental importance and should therefore 
take precedence. It was emphasized that the number of employees of labour in 
the agricultural sector amounted to only 5 per cent of the total farming population 
and therefore, the entire costs of the welfare provisions would have to be 
generated by society as a whole.
On the other hand, the majority of those who supported the introduction 
of agricultural social insurance, said that "social insurance will make a positive 
contribution to our country’s economic development. Redistribution of the 
national income will tend to raise the general standard of living. Certain classes of 
people now living in poverty will acquire new purchasing power and the increased 
propensity to consume, which would support industrial production in Greece" 
(22).
Finally, the Agricultural Bill was introduced in Parliament on 18 
November 1960 and was discussed for a long period. The Bill provided for the 
establishment of the Agricultural Social Insurance Organization (O.G.A.) and was 
in principle supported by all political parties. However, as will be described in the 
next chapter, the Bill was criticised in Parliament for most of its detailed 
adjustments.
In brief, the establishment of the agricultural scheme was the outcome of 
long discussions reaching a wide socio-political recognition that the agricultural 
population was in need not only of price support measures but also of a 
comprehensive scheme of social protection. This was a "carefully planned" and 
deeply contemplated political decision which opened up a new era in the 
economic and social life of rural Greece.
The agricultural Bill of 1960 
Range of coverage
Insured people
The new scheme covered de jure every person living from agricultural
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activities i.e. having agriculture as their main profession. Pensions would have a 
retrospective effect in order to cover all the existing elderly farmers. Specifically 
the scheme included:
a) Land-owners using their land for agricultural purposes (supervisors).
b) Land-owners working themselves on their land.
c) Cattle-owners and cattle-breeders,
d) Workers in all the three above activities.
e) Owners or workers of agricultural machinery.
f) The adults of the families of all the above categories , provided they have
agriculture as their main profession.
Women land-owners were excluded from the scheme as soon as they 
married a man insured by the agricultural scheme .A special decree was left for the 
future in order to include in the scheme fishermen, forest wardens, and people 
living in towns with less than 5.000 population working indirectly for agricultural 
production. Finally, inclusion in agricultural insurance would be irrespective of 
possible voluntary participation in a self-employe d’s insurance scheme (23), 
provided that this would be the result of a secondary occupation.
Conditions for old-age pension
a. 65 years of age;
b. 25 years of agricultural work, the last 10 of which should be consecutive. Any
insured person becoming incapable of work would be considered as a
normally working insured person as long as he remained in the place of his 
work and he lived from agricultural income;
c. regular payment of direct contributions, i.e. 2 per cent of gross income resulting
from agricultural produce;
d. lack of any other state pension except war pension;
e. completion of application forms for pension eligibility;
f. the prerequisites for a widow’s pension were the age of 65, the completion of
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the insurance conditions of her husband according to the law’s regulations, 
and that the marriage had taken place at least 3 years before the 65th year 
of the husband.
The regulations excluded in fact married women from pension’s 
eligibility; it was considered that spouses had "a common insurance relationship 
with OGA" and in this respect husbands, of course, were granted a pension. 
Divorced women regained pension eligibility.
Range of benefits
Old-age pension
The level of pension depended on the family status of the entitled 
insured person. The Bill provided three categories of pensioners:
a. Basic pension of 180 drachmas a month for people without a family; possible
changes occurring in the family status of pensioners would affect their 
pensions after January of the coming year.
b. Married pensioners with a spouse younger than 65 years of age who received
220 drachmas a month.
c. Pensioners either with wives over 65 years of age or with children younger than
14 years old who received 300 drachmas a month.
The above basic pension would be increased by 10 drachmas for every 4 
years in excess of the 25 years of "contribution".
Health care coverage
The insured persons and their families were covered for medical and 
dental care, maternity care, medical examinations, pharmaceutical care. 
Institutional care was initially provided according to the income level of the 
insured person; people with high incomes were not eligible for free care.
Health care would be administered by the Minister of Social Assistance 
according to the Law No 3487 of December 1955 "about farmer’s social
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insurance". OGA would be financed by the National Budget for the cost of health 
provided, which could not be more than 140 million drachmas for 1962, 180 
million drachmas for 1963 and 225 million drachmas for 1964.
Insurance o f Agricultural produce
Agricultural damage because of frost or hail would be indemnified: where 
less than 20 per cent of production was damaged there would be no title to 
compensation, which could not exceed 75 per cent of the total damage. OGA was 
provided with the ability to reinsure with private insurance organizations after a 
decision of its Board of Directors.
Finance
OGA would be financed by three sources: insurance contributions, 
taxation called "social contribution" and several other revenues. OGA’s revenues 
would be collected by ATE (24), which would undertake to control the accounts 
of the organization.
Insurance contributions
The Bill anticipated a direct contribution of 2 per cent of gross income 
from agricultural occupations. A tripartite committee consisting of the president 
of the rural community, a public agricultural expert and a farmers’ representative 
would value that income, based on the following criteria: kind of plantation, the 
extent of the field, kind of cultivation(irrigated or not), kind and number of 
animals fed. Direct contribution could become a 3 per cent levy on the value of 
rates by a special ministerial decree with the agreement of OGA’s Board of 
Directors.
Social contribution and other revenues
a. A contribution of 10 per cent of income tax.
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b. A contribution of 15 per cent of companies taxation.
c. A stamp tax.
d. A special contribution on consumed cigarettes.
e. A special contribution on coffee, beer and on several luxury products
(silk, caviar, electrical appliances, velvet, whisky, beer, cosmetics, cars, etc.)
(Table 6).
Article 17 set out the way in which OGA’s finances were to be managed 
and audited. Three separate accounts were introduced, each one corresponding to 
one of the three insurance branches old age insurance account, health insurance 
account and crop insurance account (Table 7). The accounting system provided 
was a "double entry" one.
A regulation anticipated that OGA could withhold full payment of 
benefits due, when they exceeded the funds available for that purpose, in order to 
guarantee a greater measure of the organization’s financial stability. In case one 
account had a deficit and another a surplus, funds could be transferred from the 
second to the first account. If no surplus existed in order to cover the deficits, 
there would be a proportionate deduction on the benefits of the respective 
account, or of all the organization’s benefits if no deposits existed in all three 
accounts. This distributional system with the deposits did not provide any chance 
for an increase but only for a decrease of the benefits. This system was supported 
by the opposition leader G. Papandreou as well, who characterized it as 
"reasonable" (25) considering the way the scheme was financed. Chartered 
accountants finally, would annually conduct investigations and audit the 
management of OGA’s finances.
Administration
The Bill introduced the Agricultural Insurance Organization (OGA) to 
implement the new agricultural social policy. OGA would be administered by a 
Chairman and a Board of Directors, appointed every 3 years by the Prime-
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Minister, and a General Manager. The Board of Directors would consist of:
a. The Chairman of the Board appointed by royal decree every 5 ears.
b. The Governor of the Agricultural Bank.
c. Six representatives of the insured farmers.
d. The following public servants: General Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture,
General Director of the State Accounting Department, General Director of 
the Ministry of Labour responsible for Social Security, one Director of the 
Ministry of Social Assistance, one Director of Agriculture.
e. Two experts on social insurance.
Under the Board of Directors’ jurisdiction would be every decision for 
the running of OGA. The administrative staff of OGA would be up to a maximum 
of 200 people and could consist of prominent public servants of the Agricultural 
Bank. Administrative costs could be up to a maximum of 3 per cent of OGA’s 
revenues.
The enactment of the agricultural insurance Law No 4169 of 1961
The Karamanlis Agricultural Bill of November 1960 passed in Parliament 
and became Law No 4169 of 18 May 1961 "about agricultural social insurance". As 
described, the law would cover 4.300.000 farmers, the majority of the Greek 
population (26) .As the Minister of National Economy concluded in the 
Introductory Report, the expansion of the Greek Economy and the sacrifices of 
the whole community according to the solidaristic principle made the 
establishment of the agricultural scheme feasible (27).
The scheme, based on the Beveridgean model of health insurance, 
provided basic insurance coverage to 53 per cent of the population aiming to 
improve the living standards of farmers and to " to refresh the economic life of the 
rural areas... by increasing the demand of consumption... leading to the prosperity 
of all Greek people" (28). The impact of the agricultural social insurance 
adjustments will be discussed in the following chapter.
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VII
THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL SOCIAL 
PROTECTION
The socio-political environment: from Papandreou to the Colonels
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the February 1964 elections 
gave to Papandreou’s Centre Union an overwhelming majority, a result achieved 
with the contribution of all wings of the political spectrum. This fact gave initially 
the impression that it would enable him to proceed with the implementation of his 
programme of reform. However, the turbulent developments showed that this 
would remain a dream.
On the international front the Cyprus deadlock was the prevailing issue 
provoking bad relations with Turkey as well as confrontation between the Greek 
and Turkish communities on the island. Within the country, the reformist 
government attempted to carry out new economic policies inspired by 
Papandreou’s son Andreas, an economist long educated in the United States, 
holding the Ministry of Coordination. Andreas’ measures stimulated reactions in 
the conservative business circles, but resulted in addition to problems in the 
balance of payments and a rise of inflation. Moreover, the traditional right-wing 
lobbies never forgave G. Papandreou for releasing most of those imprisoned who 
had been accused of crimes during the civil war.
In May 1965 a conspiracy started in the army, intended to seem to be led 
by a small left wing group of officers, known as "Aspida” (1), with Andreas 
Papandreou suspected of being behind it. A vast right wing group known as IDEA
(2), coming from wartime, was the leading force in the army. In the same month 
an effort to sabotage a military vehicle on the Bulgarian/Turkish border was made
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to seem like a communist plot. It was later found that the source of the conspiracy 
was a Colonel called George Papadopoulos.
The Prime-Minister Papandreou decided after all to put forth measures 
to control the army and the Greek Intelligence Service (KYP) both of which were 
traditional conservative castles hostile to his government. He attempted to 
undertake personally the Ministry of Defence but the young King Constantine II 
refused, justifying this on the grounds of the Aspida conspiracy and the 
investigation in progress on the possible involvement of Andreas.
On 15 July 1965 Papandreou resigned and Greece was to enter the most 
disastrous political crisis after the Second World War. The massive 
demonstrations against the King did not stop him from trying to split the Centre 
Union. At the end of the day, 45 MPs of the Centre Union gave in September a 
vote of confidence to a conservative coalition government. Their leader, a right 
wing member of the Centre Union called S. Stephanopoulos, became Prime- 
Minister. This political betrayal, followed by insistent "rumours of bribery on the 
part of the Palace and the American Embassy" (3), was called "apostasia". 
Moreover, some of these "memorable" MPs were appointed to the new Cabinet, 
in reward.
The country entered a two-year period of large demonstrations and 
repeated strikes, but surprisingly there was little political violence. Finally, in 
December 1966 Papandreou and Kanellopoulos, who had succeeded Karamanlis 
in ERE’s leadership, achieved an agreement for elections to be held on May 1967. 
In March 1967, fifteen officers accused of the Aspida conspiracy were condemned 
and the public prosecutor asked Parliament to withdraw Andreas’ parliamentary 
immunity, aiming to charge him for the inspiration of the conspiracy.
At this particular moment, a leading group of generals with the King’s 
cooperation prepared a plan of intervention in the case of disorder, after the 
expected large victory of the Centre Union in the May elections. Simultaneously, 
a group of low ranking officers decided to enforce their independent plan. On 21
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April at the crack of dawn, they put into action a NATO contingency plan called 
"Prometheus", prepared for major internal disorders and captured the King and 
the politicians. A decree, supposed to be signed by the King and the Government, 
was issued proclaiming martial law, suspending various articles of the constitution 
and dismissing political parties.
The coup of April 1967 which established a military junta, was 
instrumented by Colonels G. Papadopoulos and N. Makarezos and Brigadier S. 
Pattakos. It was executed with remarkable efficiency and n ^particu lar violence: 
bloodshed was avoided. The conspirators were confronted with very little 
resistance in the first place. Their rationale was that the forthcoming Papandreou 
victory would have been followed by radical adjustments in the army, directed 
against well known right wing officers. They claimed that they should preserve the 
traditional values of Greek society against Western influences. The "Colonels" 
based their intervention on the urgent need to prevent a communist take-over of 
the country and blamed politicians for their impotency in leading the country.
After suppressing a King’s amateurish counter-coup in December 1967, 
the Colonels made it clear that they were planning a long stay in office. 
Papadopoulos became Prime-Minister and took five other ministries for himself 
and appeared as the strong man of the regime in 1968. Underlining their social 
origins, the Colonels attempted to establish a populist profile and gave particular 
emphasis to workers and peasants in the rural areas. In this respect, they 
immediately ameliorated OGA’s provisions and put priority on several social 
policy, anti-revolutionary, measures.
The spectrum of the agricultural insurance law
The Agricultural Insurance Law introduced in 1961, proposed to cover 
more than half of the Greek population, and was supported by a political 
consensus for the intent but not for the detailed provisions. It was heavily 
criticised in Parliament for most of the regulations, proposed. The opposition
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parties accused the Government of bringing a draft of a law which was 
superficially made, in order to compete with the opposition’s proposed scheme, 
some months earlier.
The Law introduced a 2 per cent contribution on agricultural gross 
income which was characterized as an unacceptable burden on poor farmers but 
was actually a very low contribution in terms of social insurance. The effectiveness 
of the redistributive purpose of the Law was challenged although, because some 
believed that contributions plus indirect taxation composed a heavy burden for 
farmers. Moreover, the new scheme excluded sickness, accident and disability 
benefits, pensions to married women and death pensions in many cases, leaving 
huge gaps in the protection of the rural population. The health care already 
provided was inadequate and the Bill promised its expansion, especially in the 
medical care area. Some figures were quoted: IKA spent annually 600 million 
drachmas for the health care of 1 million insured people while OGA would spend 
only 225 million drachmas for 4 million insured people. (Table 7).
Farmers’ pensions would be extremely low, averaging 260 drachmas 
monthly, almost 1/3 of the IKA pension which was on average 720 drachmas a 
month. Of course, OGA’s pensions were considered as "supplementary to farmers’ 
income", restricting a-priori the social insurance concept of the scheme. OGA’s 
pension was a lump-sum, irrespective of contributions or the cost of living. 
Fishermen, about 25.000 people, were initially excluded by the new scheme.
On the other hand, the agricultural production insurance which was 
introduced, provoked criticisms as being a non social insurance service, and as a 
service providing limited compensation and leaving many gaps. However, farming 
is directly dependent on the whims of nature: farmers are always uncertain of the 
outcome they will get from their efforts because of the constant threat of natural 
hazards, diseases or plagues of insects. In some of them where precautions cannot 
be effectively taken, their consequences remain more or less harmless.
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The instigators of the agricultural insurance law attempted to make a 
comparison between "the farmer’s risk of being struck by an act of God and the 
urban employee’s risk of \Sluntary unemployment" (4). This was the philosophy of 
this protection. An employed person who loses his job ceases to have pay, he 
needs to support himself. In the same way, if a farmer’s crop is ruined by a natural 
disaster he loses the income he was relying on to maintain himself and his family.
The point is that if an employee finds himself out of work, he is 
adequately provided for by his unemployment benefit while a farmer is not 
entitled to such provision to maintain the income lost by the destruction of his 
crop and to enable him to overcome the difficulty. Crop insurance in other words, 
is compared to the unemployment benefit of the employees of urban areas 
received from their social security institutions. The legislator considered frost and 
hail as the worst and most common disasters from the farmer’s point of view. This 
was heavily criticized as arbitrary, lacking a strong scientific or statistical basis.
Other advanced countries have adopted a variety of different methods of 
assistance in their efforts to help farmers survive the set back of crops being 
damaged, by act of God and to stabilize their income. It was said, that experience 
showed that one of the best methods was crop insurance in one form or another, 
because it provided the fundamental advantage of giving farmers the right to 
claim compensation if their crops were damaged, instead of leaving them to 
depend on special state aid (5).
In Greece, before the foundation of OGA, there had been a number of 
private insurance companies, official organisations and banks, that provided 
insurance against crop damage. They covered the insured mainly against damage 
by hail, though there was some coverage against frost damage. The first crop 
insurance scheme was started in 1928 by the Farmer’s Insurance Foundation. It 
covered hail damage and not frost damage except in certain circumstances. 
Though its premium rates were high, the Foundation eventually had to close down 
in 1954, when its hail damage business was taken over by the insurance
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department of the Agricultural Bank. Another scheme that existed before the 
foundation of OGA, provided for the compulsory insurance of current crops 
against hail and frost risks. After being operated for many years by the 
Independent Current and Raisin Board, this scheme was absorbed by OGA’s 
comprehensive insurance scheme.
Thus until 1962 crop insurance was mainly in the hands of the 
Agricultural Bank and one or two independent insurance companies providing, 
almost in all cases, coverage against hail risks. The number of such insurance 
policies was very low mainly because the premiums were high and subsequently 
the vast majority of the rural population was not covered, especially the poorer 
farmers who could not afford the premium. The impact of the adjustments 
provided by the new agricultural scheme as well as the way it appeared in practice 
will be analyzed in the rest of this chapter.
Old-age pensions
The vital contribution of OGA to the working people of the rural areas 
has definitely been the provision of old-age pensions (6). All rural workers over 
the age of 65, both men and unmarried women, were entitled to an old age 
pension provided that they had worked in agriculture for at least 25 years, from 
which the last 10 should be consecutive, as owners-farmers, tenant farmers, 
stockbreeders or poultry breeders, or as farm workers employed in agriculture, 
stock breeding or poultry-breeding and provided that they lived in rural districts 
outside IKA’s jurisdiction. The level of pension depended on the number of 
dependants, classified in three categories. Surprisingly, the regulations excluded in 
fact married women, and were criticized as discriminatory and old-fashioned (7).
Legislative Decree No 4435 of 1964 extended the range of coverage of 
OGA to inshore fishermen and traders and artisans working in villages and towns 
with a population of less then 2.000. Subsequently, further gaps were filled in 
covering Greeks from Egypt and Albania who had been employed in the
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agricultural sector in those countries before coming back as refugees, farm 
workers who were insured by IKA but did not qualify for an IKA pension because 
they had not completed the required number of days at work, and certain other 
rural dwellers falling into special categories.
All the above people were automatically entitled to OGA’s old-age 
pensions guaranteed by law. It is important to make it clear that, unlike those 
receiving pensions from other social insurance schemes, they were not obliged to 
stop their work. This reflected the philosophy of the law by which an OGA 
pension was not a substitute for one’s income from farming but a supplement to it. 
This should not be ignored in any appraisal of the level of OGA’s pensions, which 
were clearly thought of as supplementary income to support the earnings of old 
people, when they decreased as a result of reduced physical capacity.
However, at least a voluntary supplementary insurance account should 
have been established, in order to grant pensions of a higher level to those 
farmers who would voluntarily contribute to this scheme. The amount of the 
supplementary pension should have been analogous to the amount of the 
insured’s contributions. The number of OGA’s pensioners rose from 305.000 in 
1962 to over 430.000 in 1971 and pension expenditure increased year by year (8), 
though pensions themselves were not indexed to prices.
OGA was characterized as "unique", operating in a country where such a 
high percentage of the population was engaged in farming (9), and also in that it 
was the only such organization, or certainly the only one in Europe, that - after a 
very short introductory period - did not rely, for at least part of its revenue, on 
direct contributions from the beneficiaries. The first ever OGA’s pensions were 
handed out on 9 July 1962. The Prime-Minister Karamanlis himself furnished the 
cheques for pensions to 50 beneficiaries, in a heavily promoted special ceremony 
held in Zappion Congress Hall in Athens.
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Health care protection
Until 1955, farmers were the only major group of working people 
contributing to the State’s economy, not receiving any corresponding health 
benefits in return, unlike the working people of the urban areas. Law No 3487 put 
an end to this injustice, granting the right to free medical care for the working 
people of the rural areas.
Universal health care insurance, according to the principles of Beveridge, 
was compulsorily provided by OGA to the agricultural population living in villages 
with a maximum population of 3.000 inhabitants; possible cooperation with other 
schemes to those living in villages with 3.000 to 7.000 people was anticipated. All 
these people had equal rights to health care, receiving benefits in kind including 
medical health care by general practitioners and specialists; maternity care by 
midwives in dispensaries and at home, dental care, pharmaceutical care, income 
tested hospital care and other medical care.
It must be clarified in the first place, that in the beginning, medical care 
was only provided by pathologists and mainly doctors without speciality and 
maternity care by midwives, due to the lack of doctors willing to work in the 
remote areas. It was expected that the provisions would be gradually extended, 
provided that financial incentives to recruit medical personnel were introduced. 
This problem was partly tackled in 1968 after the passing of the legislation 
providing one year of compulsory service, the first after graduation, of doctors in 
the rural surgeries (10).
Medical Health Care
Farmers could go to the nearest rural dispensary where they would be 
examined free of charge and receive primary treatment; in case of emergency 
they could call the doctor to their home. But the problem was how long it would 
take for a doctor to come, and how near to the house the dispensary was located. 
Rural dispensaries played the decisive role in farmers’ health. Thanks to them.
217
hundreds of thousands of peasants stopped putting their faith in traditional herbal 
remedies and made their first contacts with medical science. Rural dispensaries 
were planned to cover a population from 1.500 to 3.500, depending on the terrain 
and demographic conditions of each dispensary’s territory.
In a 1.500 to 2.000 population’s dispensary a doctor was appointed and a 
midwife for two dispensaries; in a 2.500 to 3.500 population’s dispensary a doctor 
and a midwife were appointed and in an over 3.000 population’s dispensary a 
nurse was additionally appointed. In all dispensaries a visiting nurse could also be 
employed. All the provisions were given free of charge, any time, day or night. A 
minimum charge was anticipated in the case of a doctor’s visit at home (11), a 
night visit (12) and a doctor’s visit outside his territory (13). Charging was 
established in order to restrict aimless calls to doctors, but it was unfair for people 
living in small villages lacking their own dispensaries.
Doctors were paid by a capitation fee, increased according to factors such 
as the geographical conditions, the number of villages in their territory, the 
conditions of transportation, the distances between the villages of their territory, 
and the dispensary’s distance from the nearest urban centre. The whole system 
aimed at the establishment of a relationship "between doctor and client in order 
to secure the mutual benefit and the quality of the services provided" (14).
In 1963 the number of doctors was reported to be 1.200, while that of 
nurses was almost equal. Evidently, there was a shortage of doctors in the rural 
areas, because of the unattractive living and payment conditions. What usually 
happened was that young and inexperienced doctors covered the posts in rural 
dispensaries. Midwives and nurses were low paid as well, while only a minority of 
them had adequate experience and training. Some of the sanitary centres (15) 
would be upgraded to maternity centres, especially those in the very remote areas.
Patients could only see a specialist after a rural doctor’s recommendation 
except in special urgent cases. Specialists were found mainly in out-patient 
departments of public or private hospitals, or in private clinics, or in doctors’
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surgeries contracted with OGA. Specialists were paid both by a capitation fee and 
a fee for each service, depending on the agreement between the doctor and OGA. 
The scheme was expected to pay annually on average 80 drachmas for every 
insured person after 1964, a low figure even for the first stages of the 
establishment of health insurance in the rural areas. Until then, the existing 
coverage and structure were restricted within the social assistance scheme.
OGA’s health network amounted in the late 1960s to 1341 rural 
dispensaries and 101 health stations (16). Since 1964 the scheme spent annually 
225 million drachmas on this network. The total number of rural people who were 
entitled to this type of free medical treatment was around 42 per cent of the 
country’s total population, in 1965.
Hospital Care
Hospital care for people of the rural areas had always been problematic, 
mainly because all the main hospitals or even private clinics were concentrated in 
the urban areas and especially Athens. In 1963, OGA provided an annual total of
4.000.000 days of hospital treatment of which 2.500.000 days were accounted for 
by patients treated in hospitals and clinics in the Athens area. The few hospitals in 
the rural areas were lacking the necessary equipment and personnel to deal with 
difficult cases. On the other hand, the "stigmatized" procedure for a pauper’s 
certificate in order to obtain free hospital care, kept most of the farmers in their 
homes even when intensive hospital care was required.
However, the system included both general and specialized hospitals, 
either public or private, contracted with OGA. Patients were treated in hospital 
for as long as needed. Hospitals required a rural doctor’s prescription 
recommending hospital care, except in urgent cases when OGA had to be 
informed of the patient’s direct entry to hospital within the first 24 hours. For 
every patient’s hospital admission, the insured had to pay to OGA a charge of 200 
drachmas, which was a quite significant amount considering that the basic pension
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was only 180 drachmas per month. However, patients holding a pauper’s 
certificate were excluded from this payment.
OGA was budgeted to pay only 120 drachmas for hospital care provided 
for each of its members or a total of 300 million drachmas annually. Notably, 
before the establishment of OGA, the State had been already paying about 350 
million drachmas annually through the Ministry of Social Assistance, for the 
hospital care of the destitute. Most of this money was given for the hospital care 
of the agricultural population.
Dental Care
Dental care was provided mainly as a preventive measure for children. 
Basic treatment was provided for adults (17). One dentist was planned for every 
10.000 inhabitants of the rural areas; dentists were paid a sum of only 74 drachmas 
per month, including medicine and transport expenses. Dental provisions were 
given free of charge, and the overall annual cost of OGA for the dental care 
sector would be 32 million drachmas i.e. 7.5 drachmas per insured person.
Pharmaceutical Care
Doctors could prescribe any medicine from OGA’s list, for any kind of 
care. Prescriptions were given for a maximum period of seven days; patients would 
pay 25 per cent of the medicines’ cost.
Medicines were found either in chemist shops, or in the case of small 
villages in OGA’s dispensaries. OGA would pay annually after 1964 a total of 210 
million drachmas for pharmaceutical care, i.e. 50 drachmas per insured person.
Remaining Medical Care
This care included provisions such as blood, glasses, orthopaedic 
machines, bandages, etc. and would cost OGA on annual total of 21 million 
drachmas, i.e. 5 drachmas per insured person.
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Insurance of agricultural produce
A question arose of whether the new comprehensive farmer’s social 
insurance scheme should include some form of crop protection or not, or whether 
this protection should be provided by a separate scheme. The latter would have 
been rather better because in countries with a weak infrastructure and poor 
relationship between state and citizen, the more complicated the organization, the 
greater the inefficiency.
In fact, OGA undertook to cover all crops against hail and frost damage 
although frost was internationally regarded as a non-insurable risk. In this sense, 
OGA was accused inaugurating a new form of universal farmer’s insurance 
beyond accepted practice. The 1961 legislation provided the set of OGA’s 
insurance regulations which had the effect of a blanket insurance policy. Cover 
was automatic, embracing all vegetable produce in the country, regardless of 
ownership.
In the procedure an important role was to be played by the local OGA 
representative in the attempt to decentralize. The procedure aimed at efficiency 
and simplicity but a wide use of computerized special printed forms was 
requested. The procedure started the moment the farmer had to go to the office 
of the Commune, within 9 days in the case of hail and 12 days in the case of frost. 
There, he filled in a special form with the assistance of the OGA representative, 
stating the nature of the damage, the exact position of the land affected and so 
on. Then the representative contacted Head Office immediately reporting the 
nature, extent and location of damage. OGA sent one of its nine appointed 
regional agricultural inspectors, each one responsible for one of the nine regions 
into which the country was divided in the OGA administrative map, to assess the 
damage in good time.
If the district had been so widely ravaged that the scheme’s agricultural 
inspectors could not cope with the job on their own. Head Office would call in 
outsiders to assist them, on payment of an appropriate fee. Such assistance was
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given by the local public services which had an agricultural expert on their staff
(18), or else two independent agriculturists who had special training from OGA in 
assessing damage for insurance purposes. Agricultural experts should carry out an 
on-the-spot assessment of the damage, field by field, usually in the presence of the 
farmer, aiming at an objective, scientific and conscientious approach. They then 
completed their reports, a separate one for each holding, on special computerized 
forms, which were eventually sent in to the appropriate department at Head 
Office.
Finance
As already declared the agricultural scheme was founded on the 
potentially solidaristic principle behind social insurance associated with 
Beveridge. Four-fiftks of the funds which financed OGA, derived from the 
community as a whole, coming out of the income of white and blue collar workers, 
scientists, businessmen, merchants and industrialists, in the form of an income 
taxation surcharge. This part of the national income, a notable burden for the 
urban working population, aimed not only at a juster national distribution of 
income but at an expansion of the domestic consumer market as well. In this 
respect, the concept of the law was that all the working people who contributed to 
OGA would indirectly benefit from industry and commerce.
The three financial resources for OGA were: insurance contributions, 
special levies and miscellaneous receipts. Each of these resources contributed to 
an extent shown in Table 6. Insurance contributions covered less than 17 per cent 
of the overall budget and the remaining 83 per cent was from the national budget. 
The law introduced a 2 per cent contribution on gross agricultural income. This 
system was characterized by the advantages and disadvantages of the direct 
taxation system. The lack of specific information about the public register of 
property provoked insuperable practical difficulties. On top of that, the
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Government considered the political cost of an increase in the direct taxation of 
the agricultural population, especially after the relevant debates in Parliament.
Therefore, the method of calculating the farmer’s direct contribution, 
was abandoned and another amendment passed in Parliament in 1962, by which 
producers were classified for insurance purposes into four categories, according to 
the size of their holdings and the nature of their crops. The system "finally" 
introduced, excluded from contributions persons who were living on agriculture 
but were not land owners or land workers, i.e. other working members of the 
family. Those entitled to contribute were landowners and the land workers 
according to insurance classes. The Aa class contained land workers lacking their 
own land. The division into A, B and C classes for landowners was according to 
the acres of the land, the kind of plantation, the number of animals, etc. The 
insurance classes were classified as following:
Insurance class Annual Contribution
(in drachmas)
Aa 100
A 180
B 240
C 300
A specific factor for each category would give a final figure, according to 
which the insured would be included in one of these classes.
The classification of farmers into the above classes was mainly 
undertaken by the Directors of the Agricultural Bank’s branches, which had the 
monopoly of agricultural credits. More than a million of those farmers required to 
pay contributions, had credit accounts in this state banking organization. OGA’s 
representatives and expert agriculturists or ATE’s agriculturists would classify 
farmers not having dealings with the Bank. It was estimated that by this direct 
contribution system, agricultural income would be burdened by not more than 1 
per cent. ATE would be responsible for collecting these contributions.
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Most of OGA’s tax contributions were payable from 1 January 1961 and 
the collection of direct insurance contribution and products taxation started from 
1 January 1962. OGA started its health care coverage from 1 January 1962, its 
old-age pensions from 1 July 1962 and its crop insurance from 1 January 1963, in 
order to create the necessary deposits in the meantime.
A Report submitted in April 1959, studying the problems of the reform of 
social insurance in Greece and the Introductory Report of the law agreed on the 
point that the establishment of the new scheme would have a positive effect on 
the consumption of the agricultural population, since the demand for products 
would substantially increase. It was calculated that demand in the agricultural 
areas would be four times higher than the expenditure on the benefits paid.
A governmental Confidential Report in November 1960 had estimated 
that the impact of agricultural insurance on the general price indicator (GPI) 
would not exceed 1 - 1,2 per cent. The psychological reaction of the people 
however was stronger than originally expected and the GPI rose by 3 per cent in 
November 1960. This rising trend however was restrained some months later so 
that in October 1961 the GPI fell below the figure of October 1960 (Table 8). In 
general, the effect of the establishment of agricultural insurance on the Greek 
Economy was considered positive. The discussions held involved both Beveridge 
and Keynes arguments, in order to convince critics that the pursuit of social 
policies could favourably affect the national economy of the country.
Farmers’ direct contributions were abolished from 1 January 1964. The 
Prime Minister G. Papandreou - who as we have seen won the November 1963 
elections with a limited 3 per cent victory - included, as he had promised in his 
election campaign, in his reform adjustments abolishing farmer’s direct 
contributions, in order to extract votes from the rural electorate for the shortly 
coming elections. Papandreou, "the father of farmer’s pension" claimed that the 
direct contribution system was conceptually correct "but wrong for Greece", and 
that by this system "the character and the aim of OGA was violated" (19). The
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main objective from his point of view was to diminish immigration. During this 
period poverty forced most of the young rural population to leave their villages 
either for the urban centres or even further for places such as W. Germany or 
U.S.A. Papandreou emphasized that "Social Policy meant National Policy", and as 
we have seen, a couple of months later his Centre Union party won the elections 
with an impressive 53 per cent. In early April 1964, Papandreou’s Minister of 
Agricultural (20) elaborated the Government’s agricultural policy as strictly 
aiming at a wider redistribution of income in favour of the rural population (21).
The loss of OGA’s income due to abolishing direct contributions would 
not be as important as expected when the scheme’s budget appeared. In 1961 and 
1962 it was expected that direct contributions would amount 250 million drachmas 
each year. What actually happened was that in the first year OGA collected just 
50 million drachmas and in the second 170 million drachmas, creating a 280 
million drachmas deficit of contributions. On the other hand, as the Minister said, 
social contributions exceeded the original estimated figures due to the 
considerable increase of GNP and of consumption, and OGA’s total budget "will 
not have a deficit" (22) (Table 9).
During the same month, A. Bemaris, governor of OGA during its crucial 
first year of establishment and later a Minister of Social Services, noted in an 
answering letter to a local Agricultural Federation: "... abolishing farmers’ 250 
million drachmas direct contributions could provoke a 200 million drachmas 
deficit in OGA’s budget...". Some months earlier, K. Mitsotakis the Finance 
Minister when he submitted to Parliament the 1964 General Budget, emphasized 
that: "... by abolishing farmer’s direct contributions, OGA would undertake a 140 - 
145 million drachmas burden annually". These contradictory statements about the 
financial impact of the political decision to abolish farmer’s direct contributions, 
do not give a clear picture of OGA’s financial situation but definitely indicate the 
political atmosphere and the reliability of politicians’ statements during that time.
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Furthermore, the Agriculture Minister claimed that the administrative 
cost for the collection of direct contributions by the Agricultural Bank was 
estimated at around 20 million drachmas. He emphasized that most farmers lived 
in poverty and were not in a position to contribute. Moreover, the whole system 
was unfair since it was related not to the farmers’ income but to the extent of their 
land. The Minister concluded that the rural population gave his party the power to 
implement its progressive social and economic programme and that the Prime- 
Minister was determined to keep it that way (23).
Since the abolishment of direct contributions, OGA’s only source of 
finance deriving from agriculture has been the 3 per cent ad valorem levy, 
imposed by a Ministerial Decision of 1962, on wholesale rates of agricultural 
produce: any person who buys such produce wholesale from the grower was 
required to withhold 3 per cent of the invoice value thereof and pay it to the State 
Revenue Office. Two-thirds of this levy went to OGA and the remaining one third 
to the local authorities (24). The 3 per cent was to be paid by the farmers 
themselves, and not by the purchasers, if they issued proper wholesale invoices. 
On specified categories of produce the rate decreased from 3 per cent to 2, 1.5 or 
1 per cent.
Administration
Three solutions had been proposed for the administrative status of the 
new agricultural insurance. In the first, the well-known social insurance expert A. 
Zakkas led a campaign proposing that IKA should undertake the new scheme in 
order to unify social insurance in Greece by this national social insurance 
institution. In the second, ATE which was a public non-profit organization, was 
willing to undertake the scheme by facilitating in this direction its existing 
infrastructure, the numerous branches all over the country. In the third, a new 
independent organization should be established, with the sole aim of agricultural 
social insurance.
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The opposition parties led by Papandreou claimed that both the first two 
adjustments would be preferable, mainly because of the low administrative cost 
involved. The Karamanlis Government on he other hand, advanced the third one, 
considering that IKA, as a scheme for the working people of the urban areas, 
could not administer the rural areas as well without requiring high, new 
administrative costs for the establishment of new decentralised branches. ATE, as 
a banking organization, belonged to another sector with completely different aims 
and philosophy, lacking any experience and expertise in the social security field. 
However, the new law introduced specific limitations keeping the administrative 
cost low.
In 1961 there were about 11.500 "separate and distinct settlements" in 
Greece, of which only 55 were classified as "urban centres" and the rest were "rural 
settlements". About 3 million people lived in villages with a population of less 
than 1.000, and 720.000 people in villages with less than 200 inhabitants. 
Moreover, 40 per cent of all the "settlements", towns and villages, were in 
mountainous territory; they accounted for 16 per cent of the total population.
This was the ground over which OGA had to activate its mechanism, run 
by its 200 administration staff, employed by its central administration. All the rest 
of the people who worked for OGA were agricultural experts and local council 
employees. By international standards this staff ratio, 4 million insured: 200 
administrative people staff, was very low. The French farmers’ insurance service 
for example, employed a staff of 10.000 to deal with 12.000.000 persons. This 
happened because OGA’s network was based on the local representative system 
and moreover, emphasis had been placed on modem techniques and methods.
OGA had two types of administrative services, central and local 
departments. The central departments were the following: old-age insurance 
directorate, crop-insurance directorate, finance department, supervisory 
department, organization and research department, medical care department, 
public relations department and personnel department. OGA actually started
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operating with a permanent staff of 99. The central administrative personnel were 
employed according to strict regulations. In 1963, from the 99 persons working in 
OGA’s central administration, 50 were University graduates, one had a Ph.D. and 
one was a University Professor. By about 1970, this number had risen to 215.
All the rest of the people who worked for OGA were agricultural experts 
and local council employees. They were paid a fee for doing all the scheme’s 
fieldwork: all the formalities involved for awarding pensions, assessing damages 
and paying compensation. The possibility of creating a huge permanent staff was 
not even considered, because, if the scheme were to employ just one 
representative of its own in each town and village, it would have to employ a staff 
of 11.500 to cover every centre of habitation, in addition to its central 
administrative staff. This would be prohibitively costly and extremely time- 
consuming.
OGA had to cover 4.300.000 persons, widely dispersed over the rural 
areas of the country. The whole country’s surface is 130.918 square kilometres 
with 5.775 parishes and 225 boroughs. According to 1963 statistical information of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, the several categories of insured people amounted to 
the following:
a. Pensioners: 360.000.
b. Persons entitled to the crop-insurance scheme: 1.200.000.
c. Agricultural workers: 100.000 and more.
d. Active agricultural population: 2.000.000.
e. Total number of persons directly or indirectly insured: 4.300.000.
The "unconventional methods" (25) used by OGA combined a minimum 
of expenditure with a maximum of efficiency. OGA ran its mechanism through the 
organization of the communes, by using people such as local government officials
(26) and other prominent representatives of the rural community such as the 
schoolteacher, the priest and the magistrate. Through them OGA managed to
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establish a kind of contact maintaining direct communication with its insured 
members.
OGA’s great opening and crucial campaign lasted from August 1961 to 
July 1962, and resulted in the award of the first 305.000 pensions. OGA’s 
pensions had a retrospective effect and many old people had difficulties to prove 
their age, but the law was designed to protect all the elderly people of the rural 
areas, which practically meant an open ended handling from OGA’s point of view. 
Valuable time was saved by computerizing all data; "OGA can proudly claim to 
have been the first public service in Greece to use up-to-date electronic methods 
as the sole basis of its administrative records system ..., ... (but) it is beyond the 
capacity of machines to exercise human judgement, to make a choice or to review 
a problematical situation. Computers are worth as much as the men who run them 
and set them their problems, and no more" (27). The aim of the whole system was 
complete decentralization, based on the people of the village, appointed as OGA 
representatives, who were the link between the scheme and its millions of insured 
farming people.
In 1970 the total number of OGA’s representatives was about 6.500; they 
were about 4.500 cooperative associations paying out OGA’s pensions, about 150 
magistrates responsible for issuing pension award orders; 500 agricultural experts 
and clerks to the agricultural boards who provided employment statistics 
concerning farmers and farm workers; and 6.500 mayors and commune chairmen 
who provided OGA with particulars concerning the family circumstances and 
financial situation of those living within their jurisdiction. Thanks to the methods 
employed, overheads were steadily kept below the level of 2 per cent.
Finally and very importantly, OGA invited the Agricultural Bank to 
handle its monetary transactions, but in addition it secured the services of another 
organization working in the same field and with similar interests: the agricultural 
cooperative movement. The farmers’ cooperatives undertook to effect payment of 
the pensions, under the supervision of the Agricultural Bank’s extensive network
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with 174 branches, in accordance with computerized payment schedules sent to 
them by OGA. This system cut OGA’s overheads to a minimum and provided 
better services for the farmers.
Press reactions
Most articles mainly described the way OGA’s administration was 
established and were not critical. OGA’s first Chairman was Antonis Bemaris, 
who was an economist, and its first General Manager Loukas Patras, who was a 
lawyer specialized in social insurance and was considered as one of the most 
distinguished experts in the field. OGA was characterized as "the model for a 
social insurance organization world-wide" (28), and emphasized the very low 
administrative costs with 100 people personnel, and 4.5 million insured people.
Comparisons were made with the respective figures of other existing 
social insurance institutions such as the sanitary pensions fund which employed 
170 people for 20.000 insured members; the millworkers’ and bakers’ fund which 
employed 190 people for 18.000 insured and 9.000 pensioners; TEVE which 
employed 500 for 300.00 insured and 45.000 pensioners; and the French 
agricultural social insurance which employed approximately 10.000 people for
12.000.000 insured.
The use of computers, which made OGA’s "administrative miracle" (29) 
feasible and which never until then took place to this extent in Greece, was also 
emphasized. The institution’s "perfect organization" and its competent and 
efficient personnel were in conclusion the two key factors for the success of OGA. 
Moreover, farmers were called upon to support their new organization in its 
historical mission, and to realize that its sole aim was their full coverage against 
the risks of agricultural life.
Finally, farmers were characterized as "the most valuable part of the 
nation" and they shouldn’t become victims of "the propaganda of their enemies 
who are struggling to deteriorate their lives" (30). This comment indicates the
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political bias under which most articles were written and the lack of objectivity in 
remarks and observations. In addition, it reflects the political frustration of the 
country during these stormy years.
Other articles described the conditions under which surgeries and health 
centres operated in the rural areas, and most importantly the doctors’ role in the 
effort to raise the standard of health care. Doctors were expected not only to 
provide curative care but also preventive care and to study each patient’s case; to 
become friends with farmers and to visit patients at home if necessary. Some 
expressed the view that although some doctors successfully fulfilled their mission 
and their experience and knowledge was sufficient, "the overall results were not 
satisfactory" (31). Improvement both in the human and technical aspect was 
considered necessaiy. Training courses for doctors had started in Athens, oriented 
to new methods and techniques. The surgeries’ network ought to be increased, 
equipped with modem medical facilities and well-trained doctors were required, 
so that health centres would become "victorious castles in the battle for the health 
of Greek people" (32).
Some interesting information about the financial status of the existing 
insurance schemes was also published. In 1961, the existing schemes overall 
collected 6.537 billion drachmas of which 740 million drachmas came from social 
resources (33). On the other hand, the overall expenditure was 5.793,9 billion 
drachmas in addition to 2.500 billion drachmas spent by the State for pensions and 
health care of public servants and military officers (34).
Total social security expenditure, shown in Table 10, after the 
establishment of OGA, amounted to more than 10 per cent of GNP, a 
"percentage rather high in comparison with the social impact achieved" (35). It 
was emphasized that, especially in the medical and hospital care sector, much 
ought to be done, and that the dispersion of social insurance institutions 
significantly contributed to this negative situation.
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The 1967 improvements
On 1 March 1967, royal decree No 984 of 1966 came into force at last, by 
which all farmers acquired their long sought right to free hospital care on their 
social insurance. They did not have to obtain a pauper’s certificate any longer or 
make huge sacrifices in order to secure a hospital bed. The farmer or any member 
of his family was entitled to be treated without charge in the nearest public 
hospital to his home.
Moreover, if his case called for special treatment he could be transferred 
to another hospital. Maternity care was also provided from pregnancy to child 
birth and also post-natal care. About 20.000 village women were annually 
admitted into maternity homes and many country children were accommodated in 
rural nurseries. OGA with about 4 million insured persons on its books, could and 
did pay for even the most expensive health care such as heart peace-makers, 
kidney transplants, osteo-plastic materials, etc. A standardized scale of low 
charges between OGA and hospitals themselves was introduced by OGA. The 
procedure devised by OGA for providing farmers with hospital facilities was 
simple: the local representative issued the claimant with a certificate in order to 
be seen by the local doctor and again, if he had to be admitted to hospital.
The military junta established a month later on 21 April - in a general 
attempt to acquire some public support - introduced the Emergency Law No 29 of 
12 June 1967. This law provided some substantial improvements, raising the level 
of farmers’ pensions, paying funeral expenses and OGA was provided with a new 
source of revenue in order to meet these heavier obligations. This derived from 
the 2 per cent ad valorem stamp duty rates.
This law gave an enormous increase of about 70 per cent to OGA’s three 
categories of pensions (36). It should not be forgotten that OGA’s pensions 
remained stable, irrespective of any inflation and could only be raised by a special 
ministerial decree. In addition, the procedure for obtaining a pension became 
simpler and if an applicant was dissatisfied with the magistrate’s decision, he could
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appeal to the president of the local court, though this rarely happened. In 1970, 
for example, out of 48.250 old age and disability pensions given, only 536 appeals 
were referred. The Colonels’ June 1967 intervention, irrespective of the "political" 
benefits aiming at, improved the range of protection of the agricultural population 
and reinforced OGA’s ability to fulfil its objectives.
The establishment of disability pensions
There is no doubt that the exclusion of protection of disability from Law 
No 4169 was a major gap in the social protection of the agricultural population, 
which was immediately realized. However, by Legislative Decree No 4575 of 1966 
which was brought into force by the Colonel’s with the royal decree 504 of 
September 1967, OGA included coverage against disability as well. Every insured 
person was entitled to receive a disability pension if permanent incapability 
occurred through illness or accident, not allowing anymore the exercise of his 
usual occupation or any other of a similar nature, provided that the degree of 
disability was 67 per cent or over, and that the insured person was between 21 and 
60 years of age.
A disabled person would be ineligible for a pension if considered capable 
of doing a job "of a similar nature" to the one he was doing before disability 
occurred. This adjustment would protect the individuals’ social status and self- 
respect. The law provided also a kind of disability allowance for farmers injured in 
the course of their work. The procedure for obtaining a pension was simple. The 
injured person went for a medical examination and, depending on the nature of 
the accident or illness and the degree of disability, was given a pension according 
to a specified scale. These examinations were carried out for OGA by the IKA 
branch health committees on account of their experience of such work. The 
insured person could appeal and the case would be reviewed by a higher 
committee run again by IKA.
233
As with the old age pensions when first introduced, the disability pensions 
were initially given retrospective effect. In these terms, protection was 
automatically granted to about 20.000 disabled people who remained uncovered 
until then. Disability pensions were equal to old-age pensions with the same three 
categories, and the same method of payment through the farmers’ cooperatives.
Conclusion: Minor progress to a major problem
At last, the issue of agricultural insurance, having been discussed for 
more than thirty years, entered the sphere of implementation in 1961. The 
majority of the Greek population gained a minimum level of social protection 
mainly in terms of income maintenance - with low pensions - and secondly in 
terms of health care.
The level of provisions and the lack of actual contributions clearly 
indicates that OGA has to be seen as a social security institution and not as a 
social insurance agency. In this respect, OGA established a network of coverage 
designed to have a place between the social insurance and social assistance 
services. In fact, as we have seen, OGA, made use of the infrastructure of both 
these sectors. This clever adjustment reduced the huge financial needs of the new 
scheme and made the introduction of agricultural insurance feasible. OGA was 
basically a pension scheme but it is astonishing that it neglected married working 
women. This discriminatory and unfair treatment was to last for two decades. 
Notably, many used the scheme as a supplementary fund, having another 
occupation and being members of the respective occupational insurance scheme. 
This kind of abuses enforced insurance inequalities.
As emphasized above, OGA introduced an administrative structure vastly 
different from that of other relevant institutions. This is most probably the only 
part of the scheme which can be considered as efficient. Crop insurance in 
addition, proved to be of significant help to farmers during heavy winter years, but 
to some extent was open to fraud.
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In terms of health care, though OGA contributed to the improvement of 
a rural, mainly primary health care network, the situation remained problematic. 
The major gaps were the lack of hospitals in the rural areas, and the lack of 
incentives to attract medical manpower. On the other hand, the mosaic of social 
insurance schemes acting independently, without any coordination and planning, 
prolonged an irrational allocation of resources and sharp inequalities in health 
provisions (37). The extension of health care insurance to the rural population 
conveyed the clear message that conditions were mature for a national health care 
system to be considered. This seemed the way to ameliorate the standard of 
coverage, to reduce health care costs, and to diminish the existing inequalities.
A vital problem which OGA failed to cope with, was the massive 
migration from rural areas to big cities, especially Athens. Internal migration 
proved to be a short-run solution and a long-run disaster but it is clear that the 
political parties refused to give priority to control the population’s one-way 
mobility. Actually, the scheme was not designed to tackle this dangerous trend. 
What was achieved was a social security scheme which could function with veiy 
modest benefits and with very low administrative costs, and without any direct 
farmers’contribution.
In brief, those living in poverty conditions in the rural areas, the majority 
of the Greek population and the most extended part of the electorate, were 
provided with a uniform social security scheme which in some extent improved 
their standards of living. Those working in the rural areas, were covered with less 
than adequate social insurance protection. OGA represents a typical example of 
a non-contributory scheme providing flat-rate benefits aiming to secure minimum 
standards, according to the Beveridgean principles.
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VIII
"THE CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE"
The fragmented social policies of the 1970s and 1980s
As shown in this thesis, the Greek Governments intervened increasingly 
in socio-economic developments in the post-war period. Unfortunately, this 
intervention lacked planning and co-ordination and resulted in centralized 
decision-making oriented towards short term political expediency. Even in the 
flourishing periods of the 1950s and 1960s, the State was not in a position to 
create jobs for all who wanted them. The ill-developed infrastructure of the 
economy led to extensive emigration and the loss of potential social insurance 
contributors. It was inevitably young adults who emigrated resulting in a distorted 
age distribution with negative growth in most of the rural areas between 1971 and 
1991 (1).
On the other hand, there was a lack of effective social pressures for 
reforms. This enhanced the traditionally unenthusiastic state’s attitude to 
promoting social policies in a systematic and consistent way. Thus, after the 
establishment of OGA, during the 1960s and 1970s no major social policy 
legislation was introduced (2), though a rapid economic growth was achieved (3), 
and the need for reform was widely discussed.
At the end of the 1970s, as noted in Chapter IV, the practice of issuing 
"destitution certificates" was at last abolished, bringing to an end the embarrassing 
role of political criteria in "defining poverty" and thus eligibility for social 
assistance services. Social assistance kept on having a marginal role and a 
neglected share in the National Budget.
In the field of social security, the "system" perpetuated its fragmented 
character: the planning and definition of priorities remained "the forbidden fruits
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of Paradise". In 1963, the various insurance schemes covering employees in the 
public sector were amalgamated and the "public servants health service" was 
introduced. This fund, making use of the privileged status conceded to public 
servants, explained in the earlier chapters, soon became a state financed wealthy 
organization covering doctors’ visits, hospital care, dental care and 
pharmaceuticals. Historically, in Greece the unions of the public sector have 
always been much more powerful than those of the private sector. Union 
pressures proved to be much more effective when the employer was the State 
since governments - ignoring budget deficits - were rarely willing to get involved in 
politically painful disputes.
Until the beginning of the 1970s, the still growing economy allowed many 
Greeks to live in prosperity and thus defused any mass trend of opposition to the 
Colonels’ dictatorship, established from 1967. They managed to clung to office 
until 1974, with NATO and American support and the benevolence of most of the 
Western world. The amateurish economic policies of the Colonels contributed 
immensely to the end of Greece’s economic boom.
It is interesting to mention that the first proposals for a National Health 
Service were introduced during this period (4). The Minister of Health submitted 
to the dictator a Report in 1970 suggesting the establishment of a National Health 
Council which should first coordinate the social insurance schemes and secondly 
organize a system of primary health care, based on a free choice of general 
practitioner providing services in private surgeries(S). This system would be 
financed by the health insurance contributions of harmonised social insurance 
funds. This noteworthy reform was never implemented, mainly due to the political 
cost it might have for the dictatorship.
The rise of inflation to 30 per cent and its repercussions in 1973 and the 
brave movement of Greek students in 197J which was faced with brutal 
suppression and killings, led to the end of the dictatorship in mid-197f[ The very 
well known traditional conservative politician C. Karamanlis undertook the
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arduous task of leading the country back to democracy.
A year after the restoration of democracy, the Centre for Planning and 
Economic Research published a report proposing again the harmonization of the 
social insurance services. The Report pinpointed the following major issues: the 
existence of large geographical inequalities in the provision of services; the 
incredible discrepancies of coverage and finance among the insurance funds; the 
gaps in the provision of services in the rural areas; the problems of hospital care 
and the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Health and other Ministries 
and organizations pursuing social policies.
The Report made these alternative proposals: the creation of a unified 
National Health System, the unification of IKA, OGA and TEVE, the basic 
insurance schemes and any other funds willing to join the unified scheme; and 
finally the coordination and cooperation of existing schemes for health insurance 
coverage. The solution finally proposed was the unification of the main insurance 
schemes, considered as a "transitory period" for the establishment of a National 
Health System. The number of general practitioners should be significantly 
increased and the power of the public health sector should be reinforced. 
Moreover, through the harmonisation of the social insurance funds, the 
establishment of a central scheme would become the major financing organization 
of the forthcoming Greek National Health Service.
These reforms formed a bill which came to Parliament only in 1980, 
submitted by the Minister of Health of the conservative Government of New 
Democracy (6). This legislation met with formidable opposition from the other 
parties, the whole of the medical profession, and even by politicians within the 
ruling party which proposed it. Notably the Bill anticipated only the establishment 
of a Governmental Planning Agency, a central coordinator for health care 
provision having as its main objective the creation of "a network of primary health 
care teams" and the elaboration of relevant projects.
In the Parliamentary discussions it became clear that any kind of reform
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would require "the harmonisation of the existing regulations of the insurance 
funds" - an objective not achieved for more than thirty years. MPs coming from 
the rural areas emphasized the geographical inequalities in health care coverage 
and opposition MPs pressed for a stronger role for the State in the provision of 
health services. It was at this stage that the increasing share of the informal 
economy in health care was first mentioned - payments made to doctors and 
others who were intended to be providing free health care to the insured. 
Moreover, the need for much higher state subsidies to health care was identified, 
since employers’ and employees’ contributions could not be considerably 
increased owing to the conditions of the Greek Economy. In the same year, 
following a decision of the Minister of Health, TEVE, the handicraftsmen and 
self-employed professionals fund covering more than 10 per cent of the insured 
population, uprated its benefits and extended its primary health care services.
After the mid-1970s, the dynamic socio-political environment - 
restoration of parliamentary democracy, the legalization of the communist party, 
the fast democratization of social and political life - led to the mobilization of 
various sectors of the middle and lower classes. Due to the recession, phenomena 
such as multiple employment and a growing informal economy generated fertile 
conditions for the "Black Economy" and tax-evasion.
In general, the coming of the 1980s opened an era when public 
expenditure in Greece developed much faster than public revenues and GNP. 
This resulted in increasing deficits and lack of fiscal control due to the absence of 
effective management in the public sector. Ignoring the declining course of 
economic indicators, a major reform to strengthen the role of the welfare state 
was implemented at the same time as Europe was implementing opposite policies.
In 1981, the social transformation of the 1970s, led the first ever socialist 
party to power - PASOK under A. Papandreou, promising general radical reform 
"in favour of non-privileged Greeks". PASOK reinforced state interventionism 
and devoted major priority to the establishment of a Greek Welfare State, a
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dream which many voted for.
Immediately after its election in 1981, the socialist Government pursued 
Keynesian policies and gave substantial salary increases above the inflation rate 
and - as promised in its pre-electoral campaign - enormous pension increases. 
1982 is probably the year in which the most impressive welfare benefits’ increases 
were ever made in Greece. IKA’s minimum pensions increased by 110 per cent 
within a year (7) but contributions remained stable. OGA’s pension expenses 
became four times higher within four months: married women farmer’s pension 
was introduced, pensions generally increased and OGA started providing pensions 
to uninsured persons over 70 years of age, which soon became 68 (8). Social 
insurance expenditure escalated and other social programmes improved on a 
smaller scale. The introduction of the automatic indexation of wages, salaries and 
pensions in 1982, was presented as a sound redistributional policy.
The social policies implemented until the mid-1980s uprated hugely the 
lowest pensions and extended social insurance coverage in both the rural and 
urban sectors. Once again IKA was forced to provide coverage to groups of 
people such as Greeks repatriated from Eastern Europe, who had never paid any 
contributions to the scheme. In addition, some minor bankrupted insurance funds 
were amalgamated with IKA, bringing their deficits with them. These 
developments matched with unfavourable demographic changes and a legacy 
which allowed the drawing of provisions below the statutory age reduced the ratio 
of employees to pensioners from 2.8 in 1979 to 2 in 1989.
Surprisingly until 1982, the State kept denying any subsidy to the scheme, 
though as we have seen this had been anticipated since the 1951 legislation. Until 
1980 IKA had managed to have a slight surplus but afterwards persistent deficits 
appeared in the scheme’s annual budget, since the huge uprating of benefits was 
not matched with respective contribution rate increases or sufficient state subsidy. 
Even then, IKA was forced to borrow under unfavourable conditions while the 
State invested profitably IKA’s savings, paying back interest rates far below the
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normal bank rates.
In 1983, the socialist Government made a considerable step towards a 
non-contributoiy universal social security scheme, by establishing the Greek 
National Health System (ESY), at the same time as the introduction of such 
systems in most of the southern European countries. Abel-Smith pointed out in 
1985 the following objectives of these schemes: universal entitlement to health 
services for all citizens, a more balanced distribution of services among 
geographical regions and effective control over costs. The 1983 NHS Act (9) 
provided radical adjustments in the structure of hospital management, in the 
working conditions of hospital doctors requiring them to have "exclusive full time" 
status, and in primary health care in the rural areas. Moreover, the major issue in 
terms of financing was the redefinition of the balance between the public and the 
private sectors. The basic principles of the NHS underlined that the State should 
become the main provider of health services; equal distribution of health services; 
competent health care provisions for all, irrespective of age, sex or ability to pay; 
regionalization of services and community participation in decision-making; an 
emphasis on the development of primary health care; better organisation of 
health insurance funds; improvements in the quality of services.
The NHS establishment was not matched with the necessary increases in 
public health expenditure. Though 175 health centres were constructed in rural 
areas, the quality of services provided remained poor. The number of hospital 
beds - around six per 1.000 inhabitants - was kept low and the inadequate hospital 
services led to an army of Greeks looking for hospital care abroad (10). The 
Greek NHS failed to secure the doctors’ acceptance, to define priorities, to 
introduce effective planning and financing and did not fulfil its stated objectives.
Following the long tradition of pre-electoral provisions, the Government 
established Law No 1469 in 1984. According to this adjustment, IKA’s minimum 
pension was awarded to those completing their 65th year of age, having only had 
2.700 days or 9 years of full-time work, a provision similar to that of the 1950s
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(11).
The implementation of expansionary social policies soon became a 
hopeless task due to the deficiencies of the social insurance system which 
prolonged its anarchist operation, the lack of effective public management and 
control, the inefficient and irrational allocation of resources and most of all the 
dreadful economic scenario. As expected, the fast growth of the public sector and 
of the resources distributed through the State in the early 1980s, exceeded 
significantly the capacity of the Greek Economy. Notably, Greece was still far 
behind the OECD average with reference to public expenditure on pensions, 
health, education and unemployment (Graph 3). However, social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP started rapidly increasing since the early 1980s when it was 
half the OECD average in the 1970s (Graph 4).
In 1985 and after its re-election, the socialist Government announced a 
"stabilization programme" of the economy, with restrictions on wage and salary 
increases and a reduction in the automatic indexation rates. Unfortunately, this 
change of policy failed to prevent further adjustments for certain privileged 
working groups in the public sector. During 1986 and 1988 the Government gave 
in to pressures by the hard-core trade unions employees of public utilities and 
bank employees, and granted them salaiy increases higher than those allowed for 
the rest of the workforce, even in the same occupational sector. This was a 
decisive crack down on socialist ideas and provoked a sea change in public opinion 
against the ruling socialist Government. In brief, after 1985, the circle of main 
beneficiaries was restricted again to the traditional one: those who succeeded in 
gaining access to political power and the State machinery, namely state officials, 
intermediaries in both the public and private sectors, small and medium sized 
businessmen and self-employed people, both of whom were in a position to take 
advantage of the accelerating Black Economy (12).
The issue of heavy and unhealthy occupations constituted in Greece, 
after IKA’s legislation of 1951, an opportunity to distort social insurance for
244
political reasons. Eligibility of occupations for this category was granted after 
negotiations and pressures and not after scientific evaluation of work conditions. 
Provision was made for early retirement under the law but the extra contributions 
required - 2.2 per cent of payroll for employees and 1.4 per cent for employers - 
was very low and did not cover the full extra cost for IKA. According to a Report 
submitted to the Ministry of National Economy in 1987 about 650.000 persons - 37 
per cent of IKA’s members - had joined this category, exacerbating IKA’s deficits.
In 1986, the deficit of social insurance funds amounted to 3 per cent of 
GDP or 16.7 per cent of total revenue (13). Not only the expansion of provisions 
but also the evasion of the payment of contributions aggravated the growing 
deficit. Private and also public organisations (14) evaded contributions for IKA at 
a cost of about 50 billion drachmas annually, without any serious penalties. In 
1989, public expenditure amounted to 50 per cent of GDP while the deficit of the 
social insurance organizations maintained since 1984 a major part of the total 
deficit of the public sector (Graph 1).
The socialist Government expanded the absurd tradition of over 
employment in the public sector used as a policy to gain political clientele. The 
quality of the public services was very low, mainly due to ineffective management 
and the existence of the law prohibiting dismissal except in extreme circumstances, 
as already mentioned.
The public servants’ scheme, enlarged through amalgamations in 1963, 
covered, in the late 1980s, 4.5 per cent of the total insured population according 
to the privileged regulations described in the earlier chapters. Of course, between 
1951 and 1990, a total of 141 adjustments were legislated, but in general the 
scheme was still based on the 1951 framework legislation. It did not include all 
those employed by the State since half of public servants are IKA members due to 
their contractual employment status. Since official data do not exist, estimates 
indicate that this peculiar fund covers about 600.000 people, including 
dependants. Notably, still the scheme does not cover disability to a great extent,
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but provides favourable contributory conditions and high benefits for the other 
risks. Members of the armed forces are included in the scheme with even more 
privileged conditions - average retirement age for example is 48 years. Even the 
contracted doctors - paid on a fee-for-service basis - can claim more visits or 
services than they actually provide, and receive in return higher revenue from the 
scheme. The public servants’ scheme, which in fact never collected employees’ 
contributions, constituted a heavy burden on the national budget, a poor example 
of "social insurance" practice but a brilliant example of unshakeable vested rights.
Those employed in banks are traditionally the most privileged insured 
since they enjoy high benefits and high quality health care. Primary care is 
provided by private contracted doctors and the best available hospital care 
including the right of the insured to choose the top private hospitals. The bank 
insurance funds are mainly financed by the employers, and only partly by 
employees and covered in 1990 about 1.1 per cent of the insured population
TEVE, the insurance fund covering handicraftsmen, manufacturers and 
several self-employed professionals since 1934, provides in general benefits lower 
than IKA. Primary care is provided by private doctors of nine specialities, paid on 
a capitation basis; hospital care is provided by contracted private hospitals, but not 
the top ones. This fund is financed exclusively by its members’ contributions 
according to occupation and work remuneration. It covered in 1990 about 14.2 per 
cent of the total insured population.
In 1990, IKA, OGA and TEVE covered almost 75 per cent of the insured 
population. While IKA’s members increase every year as the urban population 
increases, OGA’s members decrease constantly and reached a 20 per cent share 
by the late 1980s. The privileged funds of the public sector, public utilities and 
banks insured about 10 per cent, while the remaining hundreds of funds cover the 
leftovers of the insured population. These mini-schemes’ members cover in each 
case less than 150.000 people including dependants (Graph 2).
In brief, the social policies pursued in the 1970s and the 1980s
246
exacerbated the existing inconsistencies, failed to diminish the extensive 
inequalities and magnified the great inefficiencies of the social security system. 
Moreover, expansionary social policies of the early 1980s, though needed and 
welcomed, greatly enlarged the deficits of the social security sector. Absurd 
political decisions, spread over many decades, brought the system to a major 
"crisis of the welfare state".
The advent of social insurance reform
One of the main priorities of the conservative Government, elected in 
April 1990, was the reorganization and financial restructuring of the social 
insurance funds. As the country was facing a deep fiscal crisis, the deficits of the 
funds aggravated the problem to a dangerous extent. At the end of 1990, the 
deficits of IKA, the public servants’ scheme, OGA and NAT were expected to 
reach 980 billion drachmas i.e. half of the overall public deficit or 9.3 per cent of 
GNP.
In early May 1990, the Minister of National Economy (16) announced 
that the Government was determined to undertake a radical reform of the social 
insurance system. This declaration provoked massive applications for retirement 
especially from employees of the public sector, since the intention to introduce 
stricter conditions - especially in their scheme - was obvious (17).
The Government seemed to accept fully the recommendations of the 
Agelopoulos’ Report. This was a report on the Greek Economy conducted by the 
widely respected Professor Agelopoulos, which included a major part concerning 
the restructuring of the social insurance funds. The Report’s fundamental 
recommendation was the clarification of the existing system’s philosophy, i.e. the 
disengagement of the State, from the operations of the insurance funds which 
should be based on the full correspondence between contributions and benefits. 
As the Minister put it, "high pensions will have to require high contributions" and 
he gave top priority to this principle (18).
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The intention of this "return " to balanced income and expenditure 
provoked the reaction of commentators (19) claiming that this would restrict 
minimum pensions and people would be diverted to private insurance, causing a 
huge loss of contributions to the social insurance funds. Furthermore, the 
establishment of a pure "return system" according to the Bismarckian social 
insurance contributory principles, would reinforce the injustice of the lack of the 
contributory principle in the public servants’ social insurance institution: in other 
words, public servants would have to start paying contributions for their pension 
scheme.
On the other hand, a subject extensively discussed as well at this time, 
was the Beveridgean principle of the establishment of a uniform minimum 
pension with the same contributions for everybody, with state finance as the main 
revenue. This "national pension" would underline the principles of social justice 
and solidarity, "according to the example of many Western European and 
Scandinavian Countries" (20) and should exceed the poverty line, estimated as up 
to 125.000 drachmas per month for a 4 member family (21). Moreover, the 
establishment of unified contributions would be an extremely hard task since, for 
example, employees insured by IKA paid 1/3 and employers 2/3 of contributions, 
while the bank employees’ average contribution ratio was 1 for the employee and 
14 for the employer!
In early June 1990, the Athens University Medical School published the 
findings of a special research of academic experts who had studied in depth the 
necessary changes in the Greek social insurance system. The main conclusion of 
the research was that the existing concept of social insurance should not be 
abandoned but rationalized and modernized according to contemporary widely 
accepted conditions (22). Pensions were considered to be the core of the problem 
covering 75 per cent of social insurance expenses, and the proposed reform 
included the establishment of the following three pension levels:
a. A minimum pension for everybody guaranteed by the State, irrespective of the
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insured person’s employment status and financed by progressive direct 
taxation.
b. A pension on top of the minimum one, given by a compulsory social insurance
system balancing benefits with contributions, financed by employers’ and 
employees’ contributions.
c. A third voluntary pension provided by private insurance or associations based
on the capitalized system.
The research determined that the main causes of the crisis in social 
insurance were firstly, the adverse development of demographic indicators; in 
1950 persons over 65 years constituted 6.76 per cent of the population and were 
expected to become 14.97 per cent by 2.000; the ratio of pensioners to active 
insured persons in IKA was 1 to 3.98 in 1978 and became 1 to 3.05 in 1989. 
Secondly, the world-wide fiscal crisis after the two oil crises (23). Thirdly, the 
extension of social protection, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, 
according to the developing needs of contemporary societies expressed by the 
respective social policies. Fourthly, the "Greek peculiarities" of the social 
insurance system, namely: i) the contradictory and very complicated legislation, ii) 
one of the highest number of social insurance funds - around 360. iii) the 
inequities in contributions and provisions and especially in state finance, iv) the 
huge organizational, administrative and operational problems. The research 
concluded that private insurance could supplement but not replace social 
insurance because it could not undertake the essential social justice and 
redistributive roles and would, at the end of the day, face the same macro- 
economic deadlocks. Unfortunately, in practice the problem was purely seen in 
the context of the enormous deficits. However, scientists insisted that a deep long- 
run, modem and financially viable reform should be at last adopted aiming to 
deteriorate abuses and to establish uniform regulations for the general 
improvement of the institution of social security in the country (24).
In late June 1990 and during the discussion about the National Budget of
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1990, which was delayed owing to the April elections, the Prime-Minister 
Mitsotakis announced that the 1990 state subsidy to social security should be 460 
billion drachmas since "other money doesn’t exist", i.e. 18 per cent more than the 
previous year, when the inflation rate was higher at 20 per cent (25). He 
confirmed that the Government was determined to increase the retirement age 
but to abolish the taxation of pensions and reduce employees’ direct taxation. The 
Minister of Health and Social Insurance stated that "no decisions have been made 
since the problems of the funds are still being identified" and supported the 
implementation of new adjustments for future employees of the public sector. 
Meanwhile the Minister of National Economy was pressing for immediate 
measures, starting with an increase in insurance contributions of 1 to 2 per cent of 
pay-roll and demanding adjustments "here, now and for everybody" (26). Their 
disagreement led to further delays in decisions.
The Medical Association confronted the Minister of National Economy’s 
position, emphasizing that this would exacerbate the problems and expressed full 
support for the Minister of Social Insurance. In May-June 1990 the number of 
retirement applications doubled and the number of IKA pensioners was expected 
to rise by 60.000 (more than 10 per cent) during 1990. On the other hand, both the 
EEC and the International Monetary Fund underlined the urgent need for radical 
changes in pension schemes in order to save resources and to adjust to the existing 
EEC countries’ regulations.
In July 1990, the leaders of the three political parties, the conservative 
ruling party (New Democracy) under the Prime-Minister K. Mitsotakis, the 
socialist party (PASOK) under A. Papandreou and the left alliance party under 
Ch. Florakis, agreed on a minimum consensus in terms of "political tolerance" in 
order to attempt to tackle the vital problems of the social insurance system. As a 
reward, the Prime-Minister promised to introduce a national dialogue with all the 
interested social parties to try to reach agreement (27).
The meeting of the three political leaders on 21 July 1990 was to signify
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the beginning of the national social dialogue for the urgently requested changes in 
pension schemes in particular, and in the social security system in general. 
However, the Prime-Minister did not clarify his intentions concerning the 
direction of the requested solutions and screened the increasing pressures from 
the EEC Council, since one of the main prerequisites for the huge EEC loan to 
Greece earlier that year had been the radical reform of the Greek social insurance 
system. He said that the dialogue should be based on four general principles which 
were commonly accepted in the past and had been guidelines of the former 
socialistic government as well (28): firstly, that the existing relationship between 
the IKA’s employees and employers should be extended to all insurance funds, 
including employees of the public sector and the banks. Social insurance 
contributions should increase. Secondly, that retirement age should increase. 
Thirdly, that the period required to upgrade from one insurance class to a higher 
one should be increased. And fourthly, that conditions for disability pensions 
should become stricter.
The conflict arose from the time schedule planned to implement the 
above principles. The Minister of National Economy - under the burden of heavy 
deficits expected to exceed 900 billion drachmas by the end of 1990 - urged for 
immediate measures, while the Minister of Health and Social Insurance, 
appreciating the expected social upheaval, kept insisting on gradual 
implementation of the new adjustments. Anyhow, they finally agreed that changes 
should have effect not only on new employees but also on those in service for less 
than 10 years. The Minister of National Economy appointed a three member 
Committee to advise the Ministry, in order to submit within one month a 
framework for balancing the social insurance system and the possible 
combinations within the social security system.
The expected restrictions of the system forced many public servants, 
especially women with 15 or more years of service and directors, to apply for early 
retirement in order to catch up with the new adjustments and retain the existing
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privileges. Facing the danger of a paralysis of public administration, the 
Government "froze", by a tricky regulation, the examination of these cases, putting 
them into temporary cold storage.
The national dialogue about the social insurance funds developed in a 
completely fruitless way since the Government, through the Minister of National 
Economy, announced that they were not willing to reveal their suggestions 
concerning the matter. On the contrary, the Minister addressed letters to the 
interested social parties asking them about their positions on the following six 
general areas of the problem (29):
1. More efficient organization of eveiy fund.
2. Measures against insurance contribution leakage and insurance frauds.
3. The insurance contribution level and the distribution of the burdens.
4. The beneficial use of the funds and possible surpluses.
5. The restriction of contributory conditions.
6. The reduction of administrative costs and the improvement of productivity.
Furthermore, the letter expressed some significant views of the 
Government, such as the will to introduce a minimum uniform pension for every 
Greek citizen, supplemented by a pension directly related to insurance 
contributions; and the determination to guarantee supplementary provisions 
based on private insurance principles. Emphasis was given to the fact that, 
although state subsidy to the system was increasing, the financial problems had 
not stopped increasing as well. This letter was considered to be the first decisive 
sign of the Government’s intentions to increase contributions, to tackle 
contribution leakage, to restrict pension conditions, to establish a uniform 
minimum pension, to cut out non-contributory pensions and to open the way for 
private companies’ extra provisions.
These letters were sent out on 26 July 1990 to all the leading trade 
unions, to the employers’ and manufacturers’ associations, the pensioners’ and 
agriculturists’ representatives, trade associations, etc. The Minister asked for a
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written response before 20 August and started negotiations on 31 July, the day 
after a meeting with the Prime-Minister, the Ministers of Finance and of Health 
and Social Insurance in which the Government’s strategy had been planned.
The trade unions representing private employees G.C.G.L. (or in Greek 
GSEE), the employees of the public sector (ADEDY), of the banks (OTOE), of 
the public utilities (electricity, telecommunications), etc - fourteen in total trade 
unions representing all working people - responded by taking into account the 
situation of their independent funds with their respective isolated characteristics. 
The trade unions initially appeared to have a low-profile, claiming in most of the 
cases that their fund was not "problematic" and that the new measures should not 
concern them. Some others claimed that their social insurance scheme was not a 
fund -public servants and employees in telecommunications - so that adjustments 
should not affect them, either. Only the main employees’ representatives, i.e. 
people insured by IKA and NAT, the employees of the merchant navy, seemed to 
participate in the general concern and were willing to make suggestions in the 
desired direction.
The first round of the national dialogue was completed in mid-August 
1990, and the procedure, as well as the outcome, convinced the public that it had 
been "a dialogue of the deaf. Both sides kept their negotiating positions secret 
and released only general indications of their purposes. The Government started 
generating a feeling of insecurity in public opinion, by exaggerating the deficits 
and by threatening some funds with closure. In addition, it partly succeeded in 
provoking the unions "fights" against themselves, by supporting the concept that 
"...the highly paid and the privileged will pay, so that the rest will not lose their 
pensions".
The trade unions, on the other hand, clearly opposed the Government’s 
approach; ADEDY suggested that "...provisions for employees have to increase, 
not contributions", and asked for the management of the funds to be given to 
employees "...in order to stop the deficit ". GSEE proposed solutions far away
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from the Government’s purpose of reducing the deficits but silently accepted 
contribution increases, if employers would contribute more as well, demanding at 
the same time that the State should guarantee that the existing deficits of the 
funds should be covered from the National Budget and that the existing massive 
insurance contribution wastage should be prevented. On the other hand, GSEE 
not only refused to discuss the increase of retirement age, but claimed limited 
decreases for some groups of employees.
The trade unions’ leadership had to a considerable extent differentiated 
aspects concerning the issues discussed and particularly about the future 
orientation of the social insurance system. Some left wing trade unionists were in 
favour of the gradual unification of the system, to assure a minimum level of 
social protection not less than the respective minimum wage. The differences 
among the trade unions were mainly concentrated among the employees of the 
public utilities who enjoyed better protection, and the employees of the private 
sector who had poorer coverage and were aware of the huge financial problems in 
IKA. Moreover, the differences within the Government allowed the trade unions 
to establish informal alliances with some officials in the Government, against the 
solutions being pressed by the Minister of National Economy (30).
At the end of the day, GSEE suggested the redistribution of the
contribution burdens as follows: 2 parts employees, 4 parts employers and 3 parts
the State. GSEE considered it to be a necessary condition that the State should
"settle" IKA’s deficit of 700 billion drachmas, emphasizing that half of this was
generated by low bank interest on its capital. It estimated that IKA had lost
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approximately 3 billion drachmas or the last 30 years from both non payment of 
interest and the absurd social policy of governments, implemented against the 
normal insured persons’ benefit. On two subjects GSEE refused any negotiation: 
the increase o/4.050 working days for a minimum pension and any increase in the 
retirement age. On the other hand, the establishment of stricter regulations for 
disability pensions and the abolishing of some privileges of individual groups were
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negotiable.
The public sector’s employees’ trade union (ADEDY), suspecting that 
the Government might ask them to start -once again (31) - paying insurance 
contributions for their pensions, became more flexible on other issues. Public 
servants had not been contributing for their pension so far, since - as mentioned 
in Chapter VI - the 1958 adjustment provided that the State would fully 
undertake this responsibility (32). ADEDY claimed that the solution to the mass 
early retirement problem was not the increase of retirement age, but the 
establishment of incentives in order to keep public servants working even after 35 
years of work. The electricity employees’ trade union (GENOP-DEI) showed the 
most provocative resistance against any adjustment in their "special" social 
insurance coverage: pensions were granted much earlier than those of IKA and 
employees were entitled to pay an 8 per cent contribution for pension and health 
coverage, and 2.5 per cent for supplementary pension insurance; everything else 
was the employer’s (the electricity company’s) responsibility to provide - the 
special benefits and full coverage. The trade union of GENOP-DEI would not 
accept any loss of vested rights, and only recognized the need for a reorganization 
of their fund.
A decisive blow for the Government came from the side of the 
Association of Greek Industrialists (SEV) which was absolutely against any 
increase in the employees’ and employers’ contribution, as it considered that this 
measure would lead to a rise in inflation and higher production costs (33). SEV 
claimed that solutions should be based on a thorough study and the State should 
mainly finance the deficits caused by social policy measures. According to SEV, 
the State’s subsidy to the system was "until recently minimal and at this time much 
below the respective average of the EEC Countries", excluding of course the 
public servants’ insurance scheme (34). SEV emphasized that the higher cost of 
production and the resultant decrease in the Greek Economy’s competitiveness 
would, in the long run, turn against the alleviation of the social insurance problem.
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by increasing unemployment and with it the consequential well-known social and 
financial costs. Moreover, IKA’s contributions were already at a high level in 
comparison with the respective contribution average of the EEC countries. SEV 
proposed limited immediate measures by reducing the system’s inequities and the 
appointment of an expert working team, with the support of EEC specialists. This 
should appreciate the problems and suggest alternative long run solutions to 
balance the system.
The Greek General Federation of Professional Manufacturers and 
Merchants (GSEVEE) surprised the Ministers of National Economy and of 
Health and Social Insurance with a radical suggestion - the unification of TEVE, 
TAE and TSA, insurance funds of which only the last had a financial deficit. The 
TEVE case had been remarkable, since the fund had had considerable financial 
problems 3 years earlier but, rational financial management had restored it and 
led it back into surplus. However, the Federation’s proposal embarrassed the 
Minister of Social Insurance who said that "not even us could have proposed such 
a radical suggestion" (35).
A decisive meeting for the framework of the "insurance measures 
package" took place on 24 August in the Prime-Minister’s office with the 
participation of both interested Ministers. The Prime-Minister set out two main 
guidelines: the suppression of the huge insurance fund deficits and the 
establishment of a new insurance system which should be fully implemented by the 
beginning of 1993. The general direction was to be the restriction of the funds’ 
costs and of the average pension with no change in the pension level provided, but 
with alterations in the retirement conditions and the reduction in the number of 
people entitled to retire. This was said to be achieved by the establishment of 
incentives for employees to remain in work and by abolishing existing 
disincentives. Furthermore, the financial think-tank of the Government were 
evolving a thorough plan including all major funds and providing alternative 
solutions with calculations of the financial benefit of each of the measures
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examined. Special funds would be included in the measures, since the apparent 
"surplus" of most of them was obviously based on "special" privileged subsidies. 
The funds of the bank employees, for example, relied mainly on the employers' 
contributions, since part of the employees’ contributions were covered by 
employers as well. Notably, banks in Greece enjoy very high benefits.
The social insurance forum
On Thursday 6 September, the Government organised a daily forum in 
order to announce the measures and the strategy aimed "at the rescue of the 
Greek social insurance system" with the participation of the Prime-Minister, most 
of the ministers and representatives of trade unions and insurance funds.
The Prime-Minister Mitsotakis opened the discussions by clarifying his 
thoughts and intentions and giving some general financial information about the 
system, in his effort to describe the existing situation. This was the first time after 
many decades, the problem attracted such publicity. IKA’s annual deficit had 
increased 160 times during the last decade, from 2 billion drachmas in 1980 to 336 
billion drachmas in 1990; the three major insurance funds, IKA, OGA and NAT 
increased in the same period their overall deficit from 7 to 579 billion drachmas; 
in addition, including the public expenses for pensions and hospital care, for the 
public servants’ scheme, the total annual deficit amounted to 981 billion 
drachmas; this was 9.3 per cent of GNP while in 1980 it was only 2.5 per cent of 
GNP. This dramatic evolution had raised the State’s subsidy from 54 billion 
drachmas in 1980 to 390 billion drachmas in 1989.
"The funds’ future is tragic and the issue requires a social and political 
consensus" said the Prime-Minister and continued " we presented the problem to 
the Greek people and to the interested social parties opening an extended 
dialogue ...the reasons for this situation lie in the policy implemented and in 
society’s demographic evolution... Very few responded substantially, it is not 
constructive not to negotiate vested rights... Equalizing provisions to a higher level
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with what money? ... Does the concept of social justice approve of the existing 
huge inequalities of the system? ... Can we respect vested rights having starvation 
pensions on the one side and high pensions without respective contributions on 
the other?... Is it possible to retain the existing enormous inequalities in the 
State’s contribution to the several funds? ... Are there clever and foolish insured 
people? Our government has appreciated the problems and has agreed on specific 
policy lines which will be announced today by the Minister of National Economy, 
so that we will submit to Parliament the draft of law this coming week in order to 
become new legislation. It is necessary for us to rush, since we have to prepare the 
1991 National Budget. We have to save our social insurance system... there is no 
doubt that the country has to establish a national insurance system, ensuring 
minimum limits for everyone and further, social insurance has to be based on the 
principle of balanced budgets... We are not discussing extreme procedures but we 
have to admit that a proper basis for restoration needs to be immediately 
established... Many years will be needed in order to change the situation but the 
basis must be founded now... There will be Parliamentary discussions and I hope 
that this national issue will meet with a rational solution in an economy requiring 
recovery. In a united Europe ... I wish to believe that sense exists in both social 
and political parties... The State is mainly responsible for the wretched state of the 
funds by having taken decisions and having implemented policies which burdened 
the major funds without providing the respective state contribution... But the 
State will contribute as much as possible according to its means which are not 
unlimited... If we do not find solutions we will have an explosion and uncontrolled 
development". Sound arguments and crucial confessions. But it was too late to 
establish a socially acceptable solution.
The instigator of the new adjustments, the Minister of National Economy 
G. Souflias, explained afterwards the dimensions of the crisis: "...the insurance 
system is financially non-viable and socially unacceptable with absurd elements 
and strenuous inequalities in provisions and contributions. It is a system of
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patricians and plebeians... if we leave things to develop in this way, the system will 
fully collapse and pensions will be at risk.. The central goal of our government is 
to guarantee that pensioners will receive their pensions regularly in the future ... 
In this phase we are aiming at the funds’ restoration and at the reversal of the 
prevailing adverse tendencies... All the governments of the past share the 
responsibility for the existing situation but we are here to search for ways to 
overcome the crisis and not to allocate responsibilities... The measures we are 
introducing do not solve problems definitely, we make a step towards substantial 
restoration... The radical reform of the system will follow at a second stage after 
an extended dialogue... Our goal, at the final stage, is to establish a financially 
viable, socially acceptable, just system. We will guarantee a minimum pension 
supplemented by a proportionate contributory pension, based on balanced 
budgets. Extra private insurance provisions will be expected as well... today, first 
of all, we have to restore the system... (all new adjustments) are uniform and 
universal referring to several funds... the new general principles are:
- rationalization of contributory conditions, both time conditions and age limits, 
for pensions.
-objective verification of the degree of disability.
-incentives to work and disincentives for pensioners’ employment.
-uniform participation in the cost of medicines’ expenditure by the insured, 
-objective criteria for inclusion of a profession in the heavy and unhealthy list 
based on European standards.
-making insurance funds property productive by establishing investment 
companies for mutual funds.
-readjustment of insurance contributions in order to be sufficient for the 
provisions.
-gradual harmonization of all funds to the existing ratio of insurance contribution 
(employees-employers) in IKA.
-administrative, organizational and penal measures against the problem of
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contribution leakage".
The Minister closed his speech with his comments on the position and 
suggestions of the interested parties: "I have sent a letter referring to the main 
areas of the problem, to all involved institutions, unions, etc., asking for their 
views... we have received many suggestions, proposals and memorandums. I regret 
to say that in many cases the proposals abstained from the heart of the problem 
and were limited to subjects of secondary importance. While almost everybody 
recognizes the gravity of the problem, the suggestions do not always reflect the 
extent of this recognition. We have received of course very constructive remarks 
and comments as well. I wish to congratulate the builders’ representatives on 
their contribution. Our services have elaborated all the proposals received" 
Finally, the Minister gave to the press the detailed framework of the new 
measures.
The Prime-Minister’s and Minister’s of National Economy statements 
made clear that, by the new adjustments, the public sector would become less 
attractive for future employees. At the same time, the life-plan of thousands of 
families would be capsized by overturning pension conditions retrospectively, the 
buying power of pensions would be considerably decreased and retirement age 
limits would increase. Moreover, special funds would be gradually abolished since 
the bank’s, telecommunications’, electricity’s and transportation’s new employees 
would have to be insured by IKA, and insurance contributions of the above 
mentioned existing special funds would have to be assimilated with those of IKA.
The new adjustments would have an adverse effect on IKA’s minimum 
pensions since their annual uprating increase would start to follow increases in 
public servants’ remuneration; in addition for 1991, the coming year, the 
minimum pensions of the largest insurance organization would increase by half of 
the respective increase in public servants’ remuneration.
The new social insurance measures had been designed to have a high 
cash-flow effectiveness in the first two years (1991-1992) of implementation in
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terms of the reduction in the deficit. Particularly in the case of IKA, the measures 
were expected by the Government to lead to an annual deficit decline of 50 per 
cent: the cuts in the pension uprating were reckoned to save 80 billion drachmas 
in the first year, the insurance contribution increase 55 billion drachmas, the 
retirement age limit increase for employees in heavy and unhealthy occupations 
30 billion drachmas and the disability pensions’ re-examination 20 billion 
drachmas, i.e. a total of 185 billion drachmas, while IKA’s deficit in 1990 would 
reach 366 billion drachmas. Additionally, the implementation of these social 
insurance restoration measures would earn a tribute, according to the 
Government’s expectations, from the EEC as well as from the OECD which had 
emphasized since 1986 the need for radical amendments in the Greek social 
insurance system. This was much of the essence of the whole story, since the 
Government greatly needed to establish political and financial credibility abroad, 
much of which was lost during the socialist administration and the recent political 
instability suffered by the country (36).
Special funds: the impact of the announced restoration
The most impressive side of the announced reform was the attempt of 
the Government to abolish part of the long existing privileged "special funds", 
namely the following: the main social insurance fund and the supplementary one 
of the employees of the Bank of Greece, National Bank, Land Bank, Agricultural 
Bank, Ionian Bank; the supplementary insurance funds of the Trade Bank, Credit 
Bank, General Bank, the social insurance funds of employees in the Public 
Electricity Company, in the Greek Organization of Telecommunications in the 
Athenian Electric Transportation (37). According to the new adjustments, the 
new employees of the above sectors would have to be insured by IKA; in this 
respect special funds would be gradually abolished. Moreover, restrained 
contributory conditions would be enforced in the public servants’ scheme.
At the same time, the new measures would have a significant impact on
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the insurance status of existing employees by reducing pensions, restricting 
pension conditions in terms of years in insurance and retirement age, and would 
increase considerably insurance contributions. The main changes according to the 
announced regulations were the following:
a. The adaptation of the contributory conditions which would abolish the existing
regulation providing bank employees with a pension after 30 years of 
service. Women would have to be 53 and men 58 years old before the end of 
1997, in order to retire; the respective ages from 1998 onwards would be 58 
and 60. The same would be applied to telecommunications’ employees while 
for electricity employees the changes would take effect from 1998 onwards, 
since the existing retirement age was already 55 years.
b. The formula of pension calculation, according to the new regulations method
of 50’s, would decrease the amount of pensions. According to the existing 
legislation the bank employees’ pensions were calculated with the method of 
the 35’s (38). The electricity and communications employees’ pensions were 
based on the salary of the last month before retirement since pension was 
equal to 80 per cent of the last salary. Those employed in heavy and 
unhealthy occupations would have to pay higher contributions, assimilated 
to IKA’s respective ones, while the existing legislation did not provide higher 
contributions for many categories of these employees.
c. The gradual, readjustment of the contribution ratio of employee/employer of
special funds within four years, in order to "come closer" to IKA’s one. New 
employees would be compulsorily covered by IKA’s main and supplementary 
insurance. The question raised, however, was how special funds would be 
financed in order to survive in the short run, having an increasing number of 
pensioners and a decreasing number of contributors.
New employees would immediately pay a 5.25 per cent contribution to 
IKA which would become 5.75 per cent from 1 July 1991 onwards. Contributions 
for existing insured people would be gradually raised to the same percentage.
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According to the prevailing status quo the percentages of employees’ contribution 
in special funds of banks were: Bank of Greece 0 per cent, Agricultural Bank 0 
per cent, National Bank 1 per cent, OTE 2 per cent, DEI 4.5 per cent. Trade Bank 
4.75 per cent. Bank of Industrial Development (ETVA) 5 per cent.
The lack of substantial insurance contributions for most categories of 
bank employees had been the outcome of an agreement between employers and 
employees in the past (39), when bank employees did not receive remuneration 
increases on the condition that the non-given increase would be added to their 
funds as insurance contribution. On top of that, the existing employees’ 
contributions had always been subsidised to a significant extent by the banks as 
employers.
The immediate reactions
The announcement of the new reform proposals caused an immediate 
strenuous reaction from the trade unions. The day after, the bank employees 
reacted with a 24 hour strike. GSEE characterized the measures as "a complete 
overthrow of the existing system" emphasizing that "working people will not accept 
accomplished facts and will react decisively and dynamically in order to defend 
their social insurance rights" (40). GSEE stressed that for the sake of the tax 
collecting short-run needs of the Government, the present and the future of a 
whole generation was being mortgaged and fundamental insurance rights insulted. 
The governmental measures unified working people at a lower level of provision 
and opened the way for the surrender of social insurance to the speculation of 
private insurance companies. Finally, GSEE asked the Government to postpone 
the submission of the draft law to Parliament.
ADEDY characterized the measures as "a new offence to the working 
people’s income... of a collective character... not leading to the restoration of the 
system and the coverage of the insured people’s needs and having a serious impact 
on the operation of public administration". OTOE, the bank employees’ trade
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union, reacted with immediate strikes and declared that "The Government threw 
all the unions’ suggestions into the wastepaper bin, insisting on a logic leading the 
insurance system to deadlock and levelling down provisions since special funds 
would be abolished for new employees" (41). OTOE called on the Government to 
withdraw the measures and to come to open dialogue with new proposals after 
careful deliberation. Otherwise, the Government would be fully responsible for 
the upset which would follow these vital developments for working people.
The opposition parties on the other hand, expressed their total 
disagreement with the new adjustments, urging the Government not to submit the 
Bill to Parliament. The socialist party claimed that the Government presented 
deficits higher than the real ones in order to "justify the new policy" and accused it 
of one-sided decisions, neglecting the real dialogue and of abolishing the welfare 
state. The left wing alliance party emphasized that fundamental insurance rights 
were destroyed: the new measures "disregard the rights of working people and do 
not face the acute social insurance problems of the country, underestimating the 
social character of insurance" (42).
The week commencing Monday 10 September 1991 remained in people’s 
memory as a week of general socio-political upheaval. The strike-storm which hit 
the country provoked national chaos: repeated black-outs due to the electricity 
employees’ strike, paralysis of transportation, 48 hours stoppage of the private 
(GSEE) and the public (ADEDY) sector, indefinite bank closures,... In this 
atmosphere, the Prime-Minister was forced to "go three steps back" (43), 
,announcing on Saturday the 15th that the Government intended to re-examine 
the reconstruction of special funds and to postpone any relevant decision for the 
second phase of the long-run social insurance measures. The Prime-Minister 
claimed that the problem of the people insured in special funds was 
"psychological" and that they had to make the next move. "With national dialogue 
the deepest reform will be studied later on including the disputed issues..." he 
concluded (44).
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The sea change in the Government’s orientations suspended the 
following three vital adjustments of the new draft of law:
a. The new employees of the sectors covered by the special funds (banks,
electricity, etc.) would have to be insured in IKA. The Prime-Minister 
defended the soundness of this measure but accepted its suspension for the 
future.
b. IKA’s minimum pension increases for 1991, which according to the draft would
be equal to half the public servants remuneration increase, would be re­
examined. This actually meant that the Government had been convinced of 
the lack of sensitivity and social justice of this measure and was determined 
to withdraw it.
c. Basic regulations should be amended so that "marginal" categories of employees
would not be treated unjustly. These regulations mainly referred to women’s 
and mothers’ new retirement age limits. According to the announced 
regulations, the retirement time could be delayed for more than 20 years 
for some insured people’s categories.
The prominent reason for the Government’s retreat was firstly, to slow 
down the strike-wave by satisfying the major demand of the most sensitive and 
energetic part of the protesting employees and secondly, to divide the striking 
work force. The Banks’ closure and the lack of power had already halted both the 
money market and industry. Moreover, it was evident, and should have been 
expected, that the working people insured by special funds were determined to 
exhaust all feasible means in order to retain their "vested rights".
On the other hand, this "change of scene in insurance" (45) would have 
significant counter-effects on the initially scheduled collective benefits of the new 
measures. The annual calculated benefits, after subtracting the key measures - 
increases of minimum pensions, increases in IKA’s new insured persons, delays in 
retirement of several categories - would not amount to much more than 110 -120 
billion drachmas for the first year of implementation.
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Furthermore, the tremendous governmental U-tum was induced by an 
intervention by the influential Professor Agelos Agelopoulos, who proposed that 
the special funds insurance restoration issue required a long and extensive 
dialogue with the participation and contribution of the trade unions. A decisive 
role in the U-tum was played also by the trade union organization attached to the 
ruling conservative party, DAKE, which in a meeting with the Prime-Minister 
clarified that they would continue supporting the strikes since they were not 
convinced that their funds could not be saved. DAKE claimed that there was no 
actuarial study on the feasibility of the pension measures and emphasized that 
their disagreement was "a matter of substance and not tactics" (46).
Finally, the opposition parties reverted, demanding from the 
Government not to submit the Bill to Parliament two days after as announced and 
to proceed to substantial dialogue. However, and despite the Governmental 
withdrawal, the trade unions of the special funds’ employees continued their strike 
while, despite the general outcry, the Government submitted the revised Bill to 
Parliament on Tuesday 18 September in order to be discussed a week later.
The battle between trade unions and government became even sharper, 
albeit the "improvement" made to the primary announcements of the social 
insurance fomm, in adjustments characterized as "socially unacceptable", 
overthrowing the personal and family life of thousands of working people or 
nailing down to insupportable level minimum pensions. The initial transitional 
retirement adjustments for working public servants for example, would prolong 
working life by 15 years and force some of them to make more than 38 years of 
insurance contributions.
According to the initial adjustment an 18 year old woman employed in 
the public sector in 1965 would have to remain in service for 41 years if 
unmarried, while a man under the same conditions would need 43 working years 
in order to retire. This scheme traditionally reinforced marriage. Additionally, to 
indicate explicitly the tremendous impact of the initially announced adjustments
266
for public servants, will be mentioned as illustrations examples of three different 
cases, which were not marginal but referred to thousands of public servants.
A case of a married woman employed in the public sector in 1983 at the 
age of 20 and becoming a mother 5 years later: according to the existing 
regulations she could retire in 1998, at the age of 35 after only 15 years of work. 
According to the announced adjustments, she would have to complete 25 working 
years and be 42 years of age in the period from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 
1997 in order to retire. In case she did not fulfil these conditions, she would have 
to have 25 working years and be aged 56 years in order to retire, after 1 January 
1998. However, if she were not 42 years old nor had 25 working years in the period 
1990-7 she should have to complete 25 working years remaining in service up to 
2008. But, she would still not be entitled to a pension in 2008 since then she would 
be 45 years old and not 50 as required by the draft of law. In this respect, this 
woman would expect to receive a pension in 2013 fulfilling all conditions ...but... 
then her child would not be under age anymore and she would have to work up to 
her 58th year of age. In other words, this woman would retire after 38 years of 
work in 2021 and at the age of 58. Consequently the unjustified favourable 
existing status quo would be radically changed by an adjustment prolonging 
working life for 23 years.
A case of a man employed in the public sector in 1971 at the age of 25: he 
could, according to the existing regulations, retire in 1994, incorporating in 
contributions the two years of service in the armed forces, at the age of 49 and 
receiving reduced pension. According to the announced adjustments, he should be 
55 years old with 25 working years in the period 1990-1997, in order to retire. He 
would not however have completed his 55th year of age during this period and, 
though having 25 years of work, he could not retire. After 1 January 1998 he 
would have to complete 25 working years and be 60 years of age in order to retire, 
i.e. in 2005. Consequently, this man instead of retiring in 1994 according to the 
existing status quo, would have to lengthen his working life for 11 years and to
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retire after 36 years of work, losing even the right to retire after 35 working years.
Finally, a case of a woman employed in the public sector before 1983: she 
would not lose the right to retire after 15 years of work even after the announced 
adjustments. This is assuming that she was married with no children and employed 
in 1980 when she was 25 years old. According to the existing regulations she could 
retire in 1995 at the age of 40, after 15 working years. According to the announced 
adjustments this woman could retire if, in the period 1990-1997, she would be 53 
years old with 15 years of work. However, in 1997 she would be just 42 years old 
and she could not retire, though having 17 years of work. Her right to retire would 
be postponed for after 1 January 1998, when she would need 15 working years and 
the age of 58 i.e. in 2013 when she had 33 years of work. Consequently, she would 
have to prolong her working life for 18 years and in practise she would not be 
entitled to retirement after 15 working years, though employed before 1983 as 
required by the draft of law, for retaining the existing status.
The Government, accepting indirectly the initial miscalculation of some 
adjustments proceeded to alterations in the draft, aiming at the alleviation of 
extreme and marginal cases of insured people in the public sector having to 
remain in work for more than 35 years. In this respect, the new retirement age 
limits defined, would not have an effect on public servants remaining in work for 
at least 7 years after completing the existing required minimum working time for 
retirement. By this supplementary balancing regulation a woman with an under 
age child, having completed 15 years of service in 1991, would retire in 1998 
irrespective of the completion of 42 years of age. Furthermore, a man having 
completed in 1990 25 working years, could apply for retirement in 1997 
irrespective of the completion of 55 years of age. Another supplementary 
regulation allowed those having completed 35 years of work before the end of 
1997 to retire irrespective of age.
However, despite the Government’s attempt to improve the new 
adjustments for public servants, those that remained were still considered from an
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irresponsible part of the press as "particularly harming them" (47). Finally, the 
announced obviously unjustified crucial adjustment for double-cut increases in 
IKA’s minimum pensions in 1991 - half of the percentage increase of public 
servants remuneration, had been withdrawn as well.
On Sunday 23 September, two weeks of growing labour movement 
protest against the governmental social insurance reform had been completed. 
The Government’s reaction to improving some and abolishing other of the 
proposed adjustments to counterbalance opposition was in vain. The trade union 
associations advocated not only their sometimes unjustified social insurance 
"vested rights" but also attempted to assert their power.
This kind of battle could provoke only losers since the political cost for 
the chaotic situation was charged to the Government while the social cost touched 
the trade unions leaderships. Most of the public tended to forget the core of the 
problem drifted away by the prevailing political dispute. The repeated black-outs 
- DEI announced that within the following week electricity production would 
certainly stop since fuel reserves would be exhausted - and the paralysis of 
transportation provoked not only anger against the Government but also loss of 
sympathy for or even indignation at the striking trade unions, irrespective of the 
essence of the conflict.
Strikers had initially the social consensus or the social passion but as time 
and every day difficulties went on, responsibilities were shared out to trade union 
leaderships as well. In addition, since DAKE which was the trade union well 
disposed towards the Government and at the beginning was supporting the 
movement, became "convinced" to abandon strikes and to take a position against 
them, the labour force was divided. Although the majority of conservative voters 
and consequently DAKE supporters did not obey the union’s directives, the 
percentage of people returning to work started increasing. This development 
exacerbated the dispute and clearly showed that the trade unions were losing 
control of their work force and fears of "frenzied and wild strikes" were expressed
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by the GSEE leadership which was accused of playing a "political game" (48).
In this turbulent environment the draft of the law "Adjustments for 
pensions and other relevant issues" (49), was to be discussed in Parliament during 
the last week of the rebellious September of 1990.
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ENDNOTES
(1) For more details see Yfantopoulos, J. Health Status and Socio-Economic 
Indicators in Greece and EU, Report on the Organisation and Management 
of Health Services in Greece, Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social 
Security, Athens, April, 1994.
(2) Except of the allowance for large families introduced in 1972 as a 
demographic and income support policy; a housing programme introduced 
in 1963 has actually been implemented. Of course, numerous laws for the 
public servants scheme were introduced, as well as for other minor groups.
(3) Annual growth of 8 per cent in constant prices.
(4) Of course, we should not forget the pioneer Zaimis’ petition of 1951. See 
chapter V for details.
(5) National Health Policy Plan, Patras, L., Athens, 1970.
(6) Minister Doxiadis, a bill concerning "protective measures for health". 
Ministry of Social Services, Athens, 1980.
(7) IKA’s minimum pensions’ increases (according to Law No 825 of 1978 and 
No 1305 of 1982):
18.7 per cent from 1 March 1981 onwards
7.3 per cent from 1 September 1981 onwards 
2.5 per cent from 1 January 1982 onwards 
3.2 per cent from 1 March 1982 onwards
(8) OGA’s pension increases: from 2.000 drachmas to 3.000 drachmas from 1 
August 1981 from 3.000 drachmas to 4.000 drachmas from 1 January 1982 
Introduction of OGA’s pension to female farmers:
1.500 drachmas from 1 August 1981.
4.000 drachmas from 1 January 1982.
Introduction of uninsured old people OGA’s pensions: Law No 1296 of 
1982, improved by Law No 1442 of 1984.
(9) Law No 1397 of 1983.
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(10) In 1989 were roughly spent US $ 60 million on hospital care abroad.
(11) See chapter V for details.
(12) For details see Petmesidou, M., Statism, social policy and the middle classes 
in Greece, Journal of European Social Policy, Longman Group, UK. 1991, 
p. 31-48.
(13) Source: see Graph 1 Ministry of National Eiconomy.
(14) Olympic Airways, Corporations of Public Electricity or of 
Telecommunications, etc.
(15) H‘i- of H e a l t h a n d  o^cio^ l
(16) Souflias, G., Minister of National Economy.
(17) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 13 May, 1990.
(18) op.cit.
(19) As Professor Kyriopoulos.
(20) Minister of Social Insurance, newspaper, TA NEA, 2 June, 1990.
(21) About 380 sterling pounds.
(22) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 3 June, 1990.
(23) The GNP increase of the OECD countries was 5-6 per cent in the 1960s and 
1-3 per cent after 1973.
(24) Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Insurance, Report of Scientific 
Committee for the restructuring of the Social Insurance System in Greece, 
(in Greek), May 1992, p. 11.
(25) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 24 June, 1990.
(26) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 1 July, 1990.
(27) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 22 July, 1990.
(28) op.cit.
(29) Newspaper, TA NEA, 27 July, 1990.
(30) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 29 July, 1990.
(31) See chapters I, III, V for details.
(32) Cabinet Decision No 764 of 1958. See chapter V for details.
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(33) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 19 August, 1990.
(34) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 5 August, 1990.
(35) Newspaper, TA NEA, 1 August, 1990.
(36) Three elections in the 1989-1990 period.
(37) DEI, OTE and ISAP respectively.
(38) Both methods are explained in the next chapter.
(39) Mainly in 1963, by special agreement.
(40) Newspaper, EXPRESS, 7 September, 1990.
(41) Newspaper, ETHNOS, 14 September, 1990.
(42) op.cit.
(43) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 16 September, 1990.
(44) op.cit.
(45) Newspaper, KATHIMERINI, 16 September, 1990.
(46) op.cit.
(47) Newspaper, TO VIMA, 23 September, 1990.
(48) op.cit.
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IX
THE LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION OF 1990
Introductory Report
The draft of the law was discussed in Parliament in the week commencing 
Monday 24 September 1991 under the general title "Adjustments for pensions and 
other relevant issues". The central point of the Introductory Report was that "the 
social security system of the country is in the middle of a deep crisis which by 
mathematical precision will lead to a financial deadlock" (1).
The explanations of the above statement can be summarized as follows: 
The most significant reason for the crisis were the social insurance funds’ deficits. 
The three main insurance funds, IKA - NAT - OGA, in addition to the public 
servants’ pensions scheme required a 981 billion drachmas public loan for 1990 i.e.
9.4 per cent of the GNP. In 1985 the relevant amount was 305 billion drachmas 
i.e. 6.6 per cent of the GNP. This rapidly increasing financial need for covering the 
cash deficits was a huge "wheel brake" to the country’s financial restoration.
The reasons for the cash deficits lie both in the revenues’ decrease and 
the increase of total pension expenses from 12.7 GNP per cent in 1985 (2) to 15.1 
GNP per cent in 1989 (3) according to the OECD. Furthermore, this pension 
GNP percentage is 70 per cent higher than the average of the OECD countries, 
although most of these countries have a percentage of older people higher than 
Greece. The rapid increase in pension expenditure from 1985 onwards was not the 
result of wider social protection. It was mainly the outcome of "structural 
weaknesses" of the social security system, which led to an increase of the relatively 
young pensioners as well as to an increase of expenditure of "low social 
importance". As indications of these structural weaknesses were mentioned (4):
a. The abuse in the disability pensions’ award. These were 30 per cent of all
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pensions, a percentage three times higher than the average of international 
standards.
b. The dissimilarities - among the numerous funds - in pension age limits, as well
as the low age limits which provide eligibility for old age pensions to working 
people in the middle of their productive life.
c. The strong incentives for early retirement, in combination with the pension
level, ignored the principle of financial return. There was also a lack of 
significant restrictions for the employment of pensioners, and the pension 
level could be higher than remuneration at work.
d. In certain monopoly sectors the insurance institution is identical with the
employer. This situation normally leads to the expansion of provision or 
decrease of contributions due to trade union pressures; the extra cost is then 
usually put on the consumer. The loss of ties between provisions and cost 
provokes the most decisive "wound" to the financing system, allowing the 
expansion of irrational expenditure increases.
e. The extension of heavy and unhealthy occupations to 40 per cent of the work
force, consequently entitled to privileged conditions.
Moreover, as we have seen, a prevailing tradition in the system’s 
malfunctions has always been the unequal distribution of state resources, mainly 
for pensions. This legalized social injustice.
The future projections of the Government were extremely discouraging. 
Besides the above mentioned cost-increasing tendencies, the percentage of people 
over 65 years of age was less than 10 per cent of the active population in 1950, 19 
per cent in 1990 and was expected to rise to 34 per cent within the forthcoming 50 
years. In this respect, the current social security scheme would not in any case be 
in a position to respond to these changes and the contract between the 
generations would become invalid.
The conservative government, which was elected five months earlier in 
April 1990, after a year of two of unsuccessful elective attempts when no party
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took the majority, considered that the social security system required urgent 
reform. Given the huge deficits, the implementation of adjustments aiming to 
solve the financial deadlock and to somehow rationalize the system had proved to 
be very difficult. The balanced "Pay-As-You-Go" principle of contribution 
provisions as well as the establishment of uniform insurance regulations was the 
intention. The aim was that, at a later stage, all Greek citizens would be eligible to 
a uniform pension which would be supplemented by a pension dependent on the 
contributions paid by the insured person during working life (5).
As expected, the 1990 social insurance Bill introduced several new 
arrangements. The general objectives of the legislators are summarized as follows 
(6):
a. Rationalization of time conditions and age limits for pension eligibility.
b. Objective verification of the degree of disability.
c. Incentives for work and disincentives for the employment of pensioners.
d. Incentives for remaining in the work force and disincentives for early
retirement.
e. Uniform co-payment for insured persons in drug expenditure.
f. Objective criteria for inclusion in the heavy and unhealthy occupations
according to European standards.
g. Orthodox investment of the insurance funds by the establishment of companies
with mutual capital.
h. Readjustment (increase in simple words), of the insurance premia in order to
be adapted to these provisions.
i. Gradual harmonization of the ratio of the insurance premium of employers and
employees in all insurance funds, to the existing ratio of IKA. 
j. Administrative, organizational and penal measures to tackle the widely 
contribution leakage.
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The Bill of 1990
Pension adjustments for public servants 
Pensions for directly insured persons
Female public servants (7) having at least three children, were eligible for 
a pension after 20 full years of employment or service, irrespective of age or date 
of employment. This regulation included widowers with three children and males 
divorced but having by judicial decision the responsibility for the care of their 
three children.
Pensions for dependants
Male and female children as well as destitute unmarried sisters, drawing 
orphans pensions from the death of their parents, brothers or sisters employed in 
the public sector (8) since 1 January 1983, were entitled to pensions up to their 
18th year of age, or up to their 24th year of age in the case of full time student 
status. Pension eligibility continued in the case of work disability. This regulation 
restricted the privilege of female children and of destitute unmarried sisters - 
comprehensively described in the earlier chapters - to receive these pensions all 
life long and determined the above common limits which already existed for male 
children. It has to be clarified that according to article 116 of the Greek 
Constitution from 1 January 1983 onwards men and women ought to have equal 
treatment by law, following the EEC directive.
New pension conditions
According to the existing legislation there was not a minimum age level 
for old-age pension eligibility. The minimum conditions so far had been either 25 
years of employment for men and unmarried women or 15 years of employment 
for married women, widows and unmarried mothers with children under 18 years 
of age. The pension level depended on the years of employment in any case (9). In 
June 1979 the new system of pension calculation introduced did not provide
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incentives for remaining longer than 25 years in order to obtain respective pension 
increases.
The 1990 Bill defined two categories of insured persons, those employed 
in the public sector until 1 January 1983 - the first category- and those employed 
from 1 January 1983 onwards - the second category. In the first category the law 
anticipated that for insured persons reaching the retirement stage until 31 
December 1997 the minimum age would be 55 for men 42 for women with under 
aged, mentally or physically ill children (more than 50 per cent of disability); and 
53 for all the remaining women. In the second category the law anticipated that, 
for the insured persons reaching the retirement stage from 1 January 1998 
onwards, the minimum age would be respectively 60 for men and 50 or 58 for 
women. From all the above limits military personnel, persons with several 
disabilities (blind etc.), prisons’ employees and those having completed 35 years of 
employment until 31 December 1997 were excluded.
Insured people would have the option to retire according to the existing 
time conditions - men minimum 25 years, women minimum 15 years of 
employment - but they would be entitled to receive their pensions after reaching 
the new age limits or in the meantime when a disability occurred. Additionally, the 
Bill anticipated that the new age limits would not be in force for those remaining 
in service for seven years after completing the so far existing time conditions, in 
order to alleviate extreme marginal cases, i.e. for men 32 (25 + 7) years and for 
women 22 (15 + 7) years of minimum service irrespective of age limits.
Finally, it was clarified that for those employed after the establishment of 
the new legislation, as well as for those employed since 1 January 1983, the 
minimum years of service would be 25 years, the minimum age limits for 
retirement 60 for men and 50 or 58 for women; the 15 years of service condition 
was at last abolished. Furthermore, the Bill anticipated that public servants’ 
maximum age of service would be the 65th year; for those not having completed 
35 years of service, the limit would be the 67th year; those having completed 35
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years of service would have to remain anyway in service up to their 60th year of 
age. Additionally, the maximum year of age for those entering the public sector 
would be 35 and for those with undergraduate studies 37.
The new conditions for pensions were considered to be - and actually 
were - a crucial reform and a brave political decision based on the widely 
recognized fact that Greece had become a "pensioners’ society" and that the 
public servants’ scheme was its extreme illustration. In this respect the target was 
the delay of public servants’ flow towards retirement, which would consequently 
relieve the existing dangerous deficits of the social security system.
It was in addition emphasized, that Greece ought to adapt to the 
relevant EEC legislation which determined the retirement age limits from 60 to 65 
for men and from 55 to 60 for women. The concept behind the established date of 
1 January 1983 basically laid again on the constitutional article 116 concerning 
equality between men and women which was then enforced. Consequently the 
unjustified privilege of married females to obtain pension eligibility within just 15 
years of employment was at last abolished. Another significant consequence of the 
new age limits was that the 35 years period of employment would not be a sole 
condition for entitlement for pension anymore i.e. a man employed at the age of 
20 would have to work up to his 60th year of age to receive a pension, a working 
period of 40 years.
The Minister of National Economy stated explicitly in Parliament that 
the immediate enforcement of the new conditions was indispensable, aiming at a 
decisive decrease in the existing deficits in the short run, although many people’s 
life planning would be heavily disturbed. "... we have to upset some people, there 
is no alternative" he said and emphasized "... the Government’s decision is that 
Greeks have to work more!..." (10).
New pension calculation
According to the existing legislation of 1979, the pension calculation for
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all employees in the public sector was based on the -so called - system of thirty- 
fifth’s (35’s), in which each year of service was equivalent to one unit, i.e. those 
retiring on their 25th year of service were receiving 25/35 of the full pension 
receivable after the completion of 35 years of service.
The new legislation re-established the pre-existing 1979, proportionate 
system of the fifties (50’s), in which the first 25 years of service would be 
calculated 1/50 each year, from the 25th to the 30th year of service each year of 
service would be equivalent to 2/50 and for the last five years of service (30-35) 
each year equivalent to 3/50. This new regulation included all public sector 
employees employed since 1 Januaiy 1983; it excluded doctors of the NHS and 
provided full pension (50/50) eligibility to blind employees after 20 years of 
service. Finally, the maximum monthly pension level for all insured persons was 
determined as equal to 50 days of pay of the 20th insurance class of IKA 
according to Law No 1846 of 1951. Furthermore, the special salary supplements, 
provided as incentives to public servants to remain in service, would not be taken 
into consideration in the pension’s calculation.
The purpose of the revival of the 50’s system was to motivate public 
servants to remain in service as long as possible, to reduce the pace of increase in 
pensioners and especially the "young" pensioners flow. The Minister of National 
Economy recognized that, as practice showed, it had been a mistake of New 
Democracy, his conservative party, to abolish the system of 50’s eleven years ago 
and that, for most public servants, it was to their benefit to retire in the 29th or 
30th year of service. In this respect, the new regulation would give a bonus to 
those remaining in service for 35 years and only half pension (25/50) to those 
retiring at their 25th year of employment.
Contributions
Public servants were not made to pay social insurance contributions; their 
fund was financed in one or another way by the State. The new Bill anticipated
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that all public servants employed from 1 January 1990, would be obliged to pay 
pension contributions equivalent to the respective percentage of the insured by 
IKA persons, i.e. 5.75 per cent of remuneration. In this respect, this regulation 
abolished the long-established public servants’ privilege not to pay pension 
contributions, re-enforcing both equal treatment among the insured people in the 
public and private sector and the inflow of revenues into the scheme.
Pension adjustments for special funds
The new regulations included the schemes of two main groups of working 
people those working in the banks and those in the utilities or enterprises of 
public welfare (11), the well-known "privileged funds". It was a matter of 18 
insurance funds covering more than 120.000 employees and more than 210.000 
dependants, as well as more than 75.000 persons in supplementary insurance 
funds.
New pension regulations
The reformist adjustments aiming at the gradual insurance 
harmonization between the public sector’s and the special funds’ employees 
covered the following areas of adaptation:
a. same pension conditions with public servants in reference to age limits
b. same pension calculation for those employed after 1 January 1983 (12).
c. abolishing the 15 years of service, as a condition providing pension eligibility, for
married women employed after 1 January 1983.
d. pension eligibility for women with 3 children, after 20 years of service.
The Bill reinforced insurance inequalities, as it provided that the 
required years of service for pension eligibility would remain according to each 
fund’s regulations; however, it established a minimum of 25 years of service. 
Additionally, the new conditions were not enforced for those employed in heavy 
and unhealthy occupations insured in special funds. All these people retained
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their vested privileges since they were excluded from the reform.
New insurance contributions
According to the existing situation most of the people insured in special 
funds were entitled to no or minimal contribution due to past arrangements 
between employers and employees and pressures from the latter. The Bill 
introduced a minimum 7.5 per cent contribution for all people insured in special 
funds from 1 January 1996 onwards, which would be achieved gradually (13). 
Especially for the fund of the employees in national telecommunications the 
gradual annual contribution increase would start from 1 January 1993 onwards. 
The employers’ contribution would correspondingly be decreased; employers 
would anyway be responsible for covering potential deficits in the funds. The 7.5. 
per cent contribution would not be applicable to the insurance funds where the 
contribution ratio between employees-employers was 1 to 2.
The proposed adjustments for the special funds provoked, as expected, 
huge reactions from the affected insured working people. The draft of the law 
included several additional radical new regulations which were finally extinguished 
due to the massive pressures exercised.
New pension adjustment
The new legislation provided a crucial new regulation. From 1 January 
1991 (14), the pensions of the special funds would in the future increase according 
to the increases anticipated for public servants’ remuneration. This regulation 
would gradually undervalue pensions which had increased so far according to 
inflation, while the public sectors’ remuneration increases were not related to the 
price-index.
Social insurance committee
The Bill introduced the establishment of a Social Insurance Committee
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aiming at the study of the social insurance problems of the bank employees and 
the relevant existing funds. The members of the Committee would be employees’ 
representatives as well as special scientists in the social insurance field.
Social funds investment revenues adjustment
One of the traditional structural problems of funds has always been the 
existing restrictions in making capital out of their financial reserves. According to 
the existing legislation, funds were bound to heavy state controls and were not 
allowed to invest their money and receive the normal bank interest rates but only 
minimal rates. In other words, social insurance funds, following the easy-going 
practice established by Metaxas during his dictatorship (15), were for almost six 
decades financing other sectors of the economy - especially industry - while the 
insured persons’ property had been scattered to the wind.
The new Bill provided social funds with the opportunity to exploit their 
assets and reserves in the following ways:
a. The establishment of mutual capital investment companies, either by one or
more funds or the entrustment of funds to any relevant operating 
enterprises.
b. Abolishing the interest rate squeezes; in this respect funds were entitled to
enjoy the normal rates.
c. The possibility to invest in bonds or in titles of the Greek state.
d. The possibility to buy and sell shares but with the agreement of the Ministry of
Social Security and the Central Bank’s Administrator.
Until then most of the funds were compulsory shareholders of several 
public enterprises - especially banks - as well as compulsory depositors of the 
central bank (16) with minimal interest as explained above. It was widely 
recognized that one of the most crucial social insurance problems had been the 
totally unfair way the funds’ assets and reserves were manipulated. The new 
regulations liberated insurance funds’ board of directors to exploit their property
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in the above ways, but under continuous government supervision.
Adjustments for successive insurance
The successive insurance regulations include provision for working 
people changing insurance fund (due to change of occupation, amalgamation of 
funds or other reasons) which consequently secures a succession of insurance 
rights. The existing legislation (17) had aggravated the considerable financial 
burden of IKA, since it had led most insured persons to receive an IKA pension 
with minimal or no contribution to this scheme.
Pension condition adjustments
The Bill maintained the regulation according to which the successively 
insured persons were receiving pensions from their last insurance fund, if they had 
five full working years or 1.500 working days of contribution in it, with the 
additional condition that 20 months or 500 days would have been done during the 
last five years before interruption or retirement. If the insured person did not 
fulfil these conditions, pension eligibility would be provided by the insurance fund 
where the most working days had been done, but excluding the last fund, after the 
accomplishment of the following new conditions:
a. retirement age or disability according to the regulations of the last fund.
b. retirement conditions according to the regulations of the fund where the most
working days had been done.
The insured person who would not accomplish the retirement conditions 
of the fund where most working days had been done, would be judged by the 
remaining insurance funds according to the declining order of working days, 
excluding the last fund. In case the retiring conditions were not fulfilled in any 
fund, then the insured person would receive old-age or disability pension from the 
last fund under the condition of 1.000 working days or 40 months of insurance, 
from which 300 working days or 12 months of insurance respectively, should have
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been done in the last five years. In addition, death pension would be awarded 
under the condition of 300 working days whenever done.
Finally, it was clarified that the full total duration of successive insurance 
would be considered as one single period of insurance in the fund which would 
eventually give the pension, and consequently the pension rights would be 
determined according to the regulations of this fund. The Bill gave to this last 
adjustment retrospective effect, so that many neglected pension requirements 
could be re-examined.
Pension calculation
The existing Law No 1539 of 1986 provided that the insured person, 
meeting the requirements for independent pension rights in each insurance fund, 
would receive the minimum pension limits of the fund; in this respect the 
successively insured persons were sometimes receiving 2 or even 3 minimum 
pensions, collecting at the end of the day significantly higher pensions than those 
insured in one fund.
The Bill reinforced some primary regulations (18); specifically it 
anticipated that each fund would estimate the part of the pension respectively to 
the insurance time of the successively insured person in the particular fund. The 
part of the pension would be calculated according to the following formula:
days of contribution x minimum pension 
total days of contribution in all funds
In case the insurance time (days of contribution) in each fund provided 
independent pension eligibility, the part of the pension determined by the above 
formula, could not be less than the pension estimated according to the time 
conditions of the fund. The sum of the pension parts would be the total receivable 
pension provided by the fund responsible for the final pension, not in any case less 
than the minimum pension of the fund.
The new regulations for successive insurance were to reduce the financial
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burden of IKA since it was the last fund in most of the cases, and had to look after 
pensioners with a minimal period of contribution in the scheme. Moreover, the 
Bill abolished some adjustments creating privileged multi-pensioners, considered 
as a simpler and juster, to the anyway complex issue of successive insurance.
Medicine expenses participation
There were significant differences in the numerous social funds 
concerning the insured persons’ co-payment of expenses on medicines. Public 
servants were so far entitled to free medicines while the people insured by IKA 
were paying 25 per cent of the medicine’s value.
The Bill introduced a 25 per cent co-payment in the out-patient medical 
expenses of all insurance funds and for all covered persons and pensioners. 
Medicines for chronic diseases, maternity, work accidents, and Mediterranean 
anaemia complications were excluded from co-payment, while charge for high- 
cost medicines could be reduced to 10 per cent by a decision, taken by the 
Minister of Health Social Assistance and Insurance. This regulation was 
determined by the rapid increase in the cost of medicines as a result of price rises, 
and of the very extensive use of medicines without, in many cases, a necessary 
reason (19).
Restriction of contribution leakage
As noticed in the earlier chapters (20), one of the main reasons for IKA’s 
terrible financial situation has always been the widespread insurance contribution 
leakage; it was estimated that, until 31 December 1989, delayed contributions 
amounted to 90 billion drachmas. "Everybody in Greece owes to IKA, public 
companies, banks, hospitals, football teams, TV-channels,...all the country" as 
admitted in Parliament (21). The need for more severe legislation in order to 
tackle non-compliance, recognized from the mid-1950s, was now imperative. The 
existing maximum percentage of penalty had been 75 per cent of the contribution
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due and penalties were exhausted within a 2 years period; after that delayed 
contributions were IKA loans to employers without interest (22).
The Bill established higher penalties for delaying contributions; IKA’s 
contributions were payable within 30 days - of the respective workdays - and 
within 60 days for the public sector’s companies. Insurance contributions were 
increased 5 per cent for the first 10 days’ period of delay; for any further delay the 
burden would be 1 per cent for each 11th and 21st (i.e. each 10 day period) of the 
first month of delay and for each 1st, 11th and 21st day of the remaining months 
of delay up to a total maximum of 120 per cent increase.
Other regulations of this part of the Bill facilitated the collection of 
insurance contributions in building activities, prohibited travelling abroad to any 
employer owing insurance contributions (23), provided IKA with the public 
sector’s debt collecting privileges and lapsed contribution claims after 10 years. 
Furthermore, another regulation provided that the sewing workers under the 
home-work system would be compulsorily included in IKA’s coverage; this is 
extensively called "façon": a system of subcontracting in the Apparel Industry, not 
working in factories but in other places most usually in groups and paid per 
tailored piece. A considerable group of usually uninsured working people work 
under this "home-work system" and had been always used in this industry, 
especially in Northern Greece. A left wing MP stated in Parliament that from the 
total number of 150.000 home workers only 45 were insured! (24)
Finally, the Bill abolished the regulation according to which IKA had 
been excluding foreign workers from its coverage. In this respect, more than
200.000 working people, mainly from Asia and Africa, had been discriminatorUy 
kept out of social insurance, IKA was losing a considerable amount of 
contributions and employers were, in many cases, preferring low-cost foreign 
workers, contributing to the Greek work force’s rise of unemployment. The Bill 
introduced the compulsory insurance of foreign workers in IKA and anticipated 
strict penalties for employers not paying the relevant contributions. The penalty
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would be equal to the workers remuneration for five months’ full employment 
plus the normal penalties for delaying contributions.
Adjustments in IKA’s legislation
This part of the Bill, providing adjustments to IKA’s fundamental 
principles having effect for forty years since the establishment of Law No 1846 of 
1951, consisted in the most crucial changes in the social insurance legislation, 
considering it was affecting the life of 2.5 million people, 80 per cent of which 
were low-paid insured working persons and pensioners.
New old-age pension conditions
The Bill amended the existing old-age pension minimum period of 
insurance by increasing it from 4.050 to 4.500 working days, or 15 working years, 
fixing pension age as 60 years for women and 65 for men. The minimum period 
would increase gradually -150 working days average per year from 1 January 1992 
onwards - in order to reach the new limit. The new regulation excluded those 
people who had completed before 31 December 1991, their 63rd year of age 
(men) and 58th (women), miners and blind people.
Furthermore, men having completed their 62nd and women their 57th 
year of age would be eligible for old-age pension having completed 10.000 working 
days. For people receiving pension from any other insurance fund, IKA would 
provide an old-age pension after 5.100 working days. For people having 
completed the above mentioned minimum period of insurance, early retirement 
would be allowed, after the year of 60 and 55 for men and women respectively, 
reducing the full old-age pension by 1/200 for each missing month, from 
completing the normal retiring age.
Especially for people working in heavy or unhealthy occupations, the 
retiring age for full pension would be 60 for men and 55 for women; this 
regulation would not have effect on the existing lower retiring age limits for
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special categories of people working in heavy and unhealthy occupation. 
Moreover, for those people having not completed their 58th (men) and 53rd 
(women) year of age before 31 December 1991, the new age limits would have 
effect as well. The long list of occupations classified as heavy or unhealthy had 
been reflecting political criteria to a great extent, as already mentioned.
The Bill introduced a favourable regulation for working mothers insured 
by IKA, anticipating that those having under age or disabled children and at least
5.500 working days would receive an old-age pension after their 50th year of age, 
reduced by 1/200 for each missing month from completing their 55th year of age, 
but not in anyway lower than the minimum established pension. This regulation 
would have effect on all insurance funds; in case other regulations of this law 
would be more favourable, the insured mothers would have freedom of choice 
once, before retirement. Finally, the minimum age for retirement after 35 years of 
work for women employed after 1 January 1983 would increase to 60. This 
regulation excluded persons working in heavy and unhealthy occupations after
10.500 working days.
New disability pension conditions
One of the main problems of the social security system for the last few 
decades had been both the elastic disability conditions and their further distorted 
implementation which provoked the creation of an army of disabled pensioners. It 
was estimated that 30 per cent of the overall pensions awarded were disability 
ones; moreover the disability commissions were providing pensions to people not 
actually eligible and were refusing pensions to entitled disabled persons.
The Bill amended the existing time prerequisites according to the 
relevant regulations of the EEC countries. The disability definition having effect 
since 1934 (25), was reformulated as follows: a person would be considered 
heavily disabled due to sickness or injury, physical or mental, occurred after 
entering social insurance, having, according to medical anticipation, at least a
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duration of one year, and being unable to earn from an occupation relevant to his 
capabilities and education (criterion), 1/5 of the normal remuneration of the 
healthy person with the same education. Respectively a person would be 
considered normally disabled being unable to earn 1/3 of remuneration and 
partially disabled unable to earn 1/2 of remuneration. Normal disability took into 
account the additional criterion of occupational employment and partial disability 
the criteria of education, occupational employment and place of employment, 
requiring medical anticipation for at least a duration of six months. The 
determined disability percentages would be 80 per cent for heavy disability, 66.6 
per cent for normal disability and 50 per cent for partial disability, while the 
existing percentage for heavy disability had been 67 per cent.
In the procedure for defining the disability percentages the non-medical 
criteria, employment, market criterion, could not be more than 15 per cent. 
Disability percentages would be defined by degree after consultation with the 
National Medical Association of Doctors. In case pre-existing health damage 
would increase after the insurance by 50 per cent of the recognized disability per 
degree, the insured person would be considered respectively disabled. 
Furthermore, disability due to intention or fraud proved by court, would not lead 
to eligibility for disability pension but would retain the relative death pension 
rights.
Disability pension
The heavily disabled would be entitled to a disability pension equal to the 
full old-age pension, normally disabled 3/4 of this pension and partially disabled 
1/2 of it. Normally disabled with 6.000 working days would require full pension 
while mentally disabled with 66.6 or 50 per cent disability would respectively 
receive full and 3/4 of an old-age pension.
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Time conditions
The new regulation established a practice of fluctuating time 
prerequisites for the disability risk for young and middle-aged persons aiming at 
the restriction of violations. In this respect disability pension eligibility would be 
obtained by two alternatives:
a. Accomplishment of old-age pension conditions, or for persons under 21 years of
age, a minimum of 300 working days. For persons older than 21 years the 
required working days would increase by 120 working days average per year 
up to a maximum of 4.200.
b. Persons not fulfilling these time prerequisites would receive pension having at
least 1.500 days at work, from which 600 in the last 5 years before disability 
occurred. In the case of a cash benefit period due to sickness or 
unemployment during these 5 years, this period would be respectively 
extended.
It was clarified that the new disability regulations would have effect for 
persons applying for pension for the first time, but would normally be 
implemented for the temporarily disabled when they should be re-examined by 
the disability committee.
Death pension
Death pension would be provided to the spouse, in the case of the 
pensioner’s or the insured person’s death, after at least 1.500 working days of 
which a minimum of 300 were during the last 5 years before the incident or 
completing the relevant fluctuating time conditions of disability pension. Death 
pension would be equal to the respective disability pension and the percentages of 
members of the family would be calculated on this basis.
Pension adjustments for Olympic Airways employees
The special pension conditions for employees of airway companies had
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been provocatively favourable in comparison with IKA’s other insured persons. 
Moreover, Olympic Airways employees were provided with additional privileged 
regulations (26), which established the retirement age of 44 and 42 years for men 
and women flying employees respectively, anticipating higher percentages of 
insurance contributions. However, according to the concept of the new legislation, 
the retirement age of these people was increased to 47 and 45 years, while the 
retirement age for the land staff of the company was increased from 55 to 58 
years. Finally, working days for old-age pension for Olympic Airways employees 
were increased to 9.300 (from 9.000) and for Olympic Air shipping employees to 
7.800 from 7.500.
Voluntary insurance
Insured persons have had the opportunity to continue their social 
insurance coverage if they wished, by paying per month both employers and 
employees’ contributions, according to their insurance class, the time of work 
interruption and not in anyway for an insurance class lower than the sixth one. 
The regulation allowing the classification of the insured person in two lower 
classes than their class, when work interrupted, was abolished.
The Bill allowed the increase of insurance class with a minimum of 3.000 
insurance days and after 3 years in each class for people under 55 years old. 
Additionally, it was anticipated that delay in contribution payment would provoke 
the general penalties but after 3 months; delays longer than 24 months would lead 
to final interruption of voluntary insurance. Voluntarily insured people were not 
entitled to contributions while receiving sickness benefit. Finally, disabled persons 
were not eligible for voluntary social insurance.
Pensioners empUfyment
The Bill attempted to control pensioners’ employment by compelling 
employers to observe IKA’s uniform regulations but introduced a rather low
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penalty of 30 days of pay of the 6th insurance class. Furthermore, the Bill 
suspended pension payment for pensioners having remuneration of more than 35 
days of annual pay for an unskilled worker or having "occupational shelter" as 
independent employees. Persons retired due to heavy and unhealthy occupation 
were not allowed to undertake further employment in the same occupation. 
Employed pensioners would be entitled to insurance contributions with the 
additional burden of 3 per cent for the unemployment fund and would obtain a 
higher pension at the end of the day according to their recent contributions. 
Pensioners’ employment regulations were aiming at the increase of IKA’s 
revenues and at the rationalization of employment and unemployment practices.
Minimum pensions-pensiom readjustment
The crucial issue of minimum pension regulations was described by the 
Introductory Report on the Bill as a technical rather than a protective issue. "The 
existing regulations for minimum pension limits have to a considerable extent 
conduced to the well-known financial deficits of IKA and have functioned as a 
considerable counter-incentive for proper contribution payment, since they have 
enforced contribution leakage by making an even level of pension for the vast 
majority of pensioners. A characteristic example illustrated was that according to 
the existing legislation, an insured person with monthly remuneration of 100.000 
drachmas and with 8.500 working days receives the same pension as an insured 
person with 183.000 drachmas and 4.050 working days respectively" (27).
In this respect the Bill abolished the existing indexing system according to 
which pensions were increasing at the same rate, relative to the inflation rate as 
employees’ remuneration in the private sector. The new regulation introduced the 
relationship between pensions and the remuneration of public servants and 
consequently pensions would increase by the same rate of public servants’ 
remuneration. The new minimum pensions would be defined as at the levels at the 
end of the month preceding the establishment of the new Bill (28). Minimum
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pensions would increase with the normal supplementary allowances for the 
members of the family and decrease in the cases of reduced pensions.
Persons receiving more than one pension from any insurance fund were 
not eligible to IKA’s minimum pensions besides those, receiving pensions of a 
total amount less than the minimum IKA’s pension, increased by 25 per cent; in 
these cases the difference would be receivable.
Pension calculation
According to the 1951 existing legislation, IKA’s pension was determined 
on the basis of the pensioners’ remuneration during the last two years of working 
life. This calculation allowed significant violations against IKA and required time- 
consuming calculations which delayed the pension award. Moreover, this system 
was considered as particularly elastic in comparison with relevant adjustments in 
other countries, where pension was calculated according to remuneration during 
the whole period of insurance (USA, Gr. Britain, Germany, Sweden, Norway, 
Belgium, Switzerland), the remuneration of the last five years (Italy) or the five or 
ten better insurance years (Portugal).
The new adjustment provided that pensions would be based on the last 
five years before retiring according to the following calculation:
total working remuneration of the last five years ^  pension
working days of the five last years
Where the working days in this period were less than 1.000, the pension 
calculation would include pay-days of the preceding period, in order to complete 
the 1.000 required days. Remuneration higher than the highest insurance class 
would not be taken into account. The above total remuneration would take into 
account an increase, in the Consumer’s Price Index, while the existing regulation 
was based on the annual cost of living index differentiation.
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Adjustments for heavy and unhealthy occupations
The regulations from 1951 onwards (29) provided that insured persons 
employed for a long time in heavy and unhealthy occupations would retire earlier 
than normal and would pay additional insurance contributions of 3.6 per cent, of 
which 2.2 per cent would be the employees' and 1.4 per cent the employer’s share. 
In 1963 a by-law regulation was issued (30) defining the occupations in this 
category, the required working time and every relevant subject for the retirement 
of these people. In practice, some occupations were gradually included in the 
heavy and unhealthy category - although lacking the necessary characteristics - 
due to political bribes.
The decision on what qualifications of an occupation needed to be in this 
category belonged to the Committee for heavy and unhealthy occupations with 
the agreement of IKA’s Board of Directors and the signature of the Minister of 
Health,Welfare and Social Insurance. According to the list, in September 1990, 
almost 50 per cent of people insured by IKA were included in heavy and 
unhealthy occupations!
The new Bill anticipated the appointment of a new Committee to judge 
an occupations’ eligibility to be in the category of heavy and unhealthy 
occupations consisting of thirteen specialists, academics and employers’ and 
employees’ specialist representatives. The Committee would re-examine all 
occupations included in this category and should prepare a relevant list as the 
basis of a Ministerial Report within a year of the coming into effect of the law, 
which would be submitted to the Cabinet by the Minister of Health, Welfare and 
Social Insurance. He was the one finally to decide the composition of the list of 
heavy and unhealthy occupations for all insurance funds.
A new regulation provided that those excluded from the new list, but 
included in the old, in case they had less than 10 years to go before retirement and 
at least 2.000 working days in heavy and unhealthy occupation, would be allowed 
to continue in this category. Furthermore, insured people of this category, losing
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for any reason their status of belonging in heavy and unhealthy occupations, would 
receive a bonus increase of 20 per cent in working days for which increased 
insurance contributions had been paid.
Funds of self-employed persons
The majority of self-employed employees (31) had always been provided 
with poor social protection (32) in comparison with employees due to the lack of 
effective protective and administrative measures, the insufficiency of the 
established financial net and the nature of their occupation. The new Bill 
introduced a bunch of regulations to alleviate the revenues of these schemes to 
reduce their financial weakness.
Insurance contribution increase-pensions readjustments
The Bill introduced a contribution increase after the agreement of the 
funds’ Board of Directors and a relevant decision of the Minister of Health, 
Welfare and Social Insurance. Furthermore, under the same procedure a pension 
increase was anticipated "if there is such a financial possibility" and minimum 
pension levels would be re-determined. A ministerial decision established a 
pension increase of 20 per cent in T.E.V.E. from 1 January 1990 onwards and 
increased minimum old-age and disability pensions per month to 36.290 drachmas 
and minimum death pension to 30.300 drachmas. Another Ministerial Decision 
introduced a 25 per cent increase in insurance contributions for T.A.E. from 1 
March 1990 onwards, and 15 per cent for T.A.E. from 1 April 1990 onwards. Old- 
age and disability pensions after 35 working years in T.A.E. would be determined 
according to the seven following insurance categories:
T.A.E.
INSURANCE CATEGORY PENSION (DRACHMAS)
39.100
296
B 52.800
C 66.000
D 79.200
E 92.100
F 104.600
G 117.100
The minimum monthly old-age and disability pension would be 49.400 
drachmas and the minimum death pension 44.600 drachmas from 1.4.90 onwards.
A ministerial decision provided a basic monthly old-age or disability 
pension of T.S.A. of 34.800 drachmas after 15 years of work, minimum old-age 
and disability pensions of 36.000 drachmas and death pension of 30.000 drachmas.
People insured by TEVE-TAE-TSA would be required to pay insurance 
contributions at the end of each working month and within the following month at 
the latest. Delayed contributions would be increased by 1 per cent for each 10 day 
period up to a maximum of 50 per cent.
Contributions collection in TEVE-TAE-TSA
The Bill attempted to improve the effectiveness of the insurance 
contribution system and restrict contribution leakage by introducing practical 
measures and enforcing the use of computerized controls. Contributions would be 
payable in cash to the funds’ service offices or to cooperating banks, and the 
method of insurance stamps was abolished. The fund used to send to the insured 
person the insurance and contribution card between the 20th and 30th of each 
month, determining the amount of contributions payable within the following 
month. This procedure would be replaced by direct payment from the insured 
persons’ bank accounts every month: the insurance card would be sent to the 
bank.
A new regulation provided funds with the possibility of organizing 
computerized services as an obviously faster and simpler method of collecting
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contributions. Furthermore, each fund’s Board of Directors would specifically 
define the procedure for computer application. Finally, delayed debts to these 
funds would be collected according to the procedures of public revenues’ 
collection with the respective penalties.
Self-insurance sector
The introduction of a special self-insurance sector was expected to cover 
a considerable gap in the social insurance legislation. The new Bill provided that 
the self-insurance account would be included in IKA’s administrative scheme but 
kept financially independent. Eligibility for self-insurance coverage would be 
provided for Greek citizens and expatriate Greeks living in Greece, not insured 
compulsorily or voluntarily in any social insurance pension sector and not 
employed in the public sector under pension coverage.
Self-insurance would provide old-age, disability and death pensions for 
persons insured from their 16th to 63rd year of age for men and 58th for women, 
especially for the disability risk for persons insured before their 55th year of age. 
Insurance contributions would be determined on the basis of a person insured at 
the age of 40, paying the IKA’s employers’ and employees’ contributions 
anticipated for the respective insurance class. People insured at younger ages 
would pay lower and older people higher contributions. Self-insurance 
contributions could be paid by parents or guardians of unmarried children and 
would be tax- deductible in this case.
The self-insurance old-age pension conditions would be at least 100 
working days for each of the last five years before the 65th or 60th for men and 
women respectively, and after 6.000 working days overall. Disability and death 
pensions would require at least 3.000 working days.
Working days entitled to recognition by IKA’s regulations would be 
respectively taken into account in addition to those under self-insurance coverage. 
Furthermore, the pension calculation would be made according to normal IKA
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regulations and early retirement would not be a right for a self-insured person. 
Persons failing to fulfil the above mentioned conditions but completing several 
other regulations of Law No 1846 of 1951 would receive pensions lower than the 
minimum IKA pension.
A future special by-law would define the starting date for the self- 
insurance scheme, the insurance classes, the contribution percentage increase or 
decrease for the year of age of insurance around the basis of 40 years, the self- 
insurance sector’s participation in IKA’s administrative costs, etc. In brief, the 
self-insurance institution was considered to be a public substitute for private 
insurance. Moreover, this new institution, by providing an insurance possibility to 
groups such as housewives or unemployed, would enforce the social insurance 
institution and cover considerable insurance gaps.
Adjustments in OGA’s orphanage pensions
According to the existing legislation of 1961 for persons insured by OGA, 
unmarried children under 18 years of age were entitled to orphan’s pension in the 
case of the father’s death. In the case of the mother’s death, pension was given 
only if the father had been already dead. The new Bill abolished the above sex 
discrimination and orphans would be entitled to pension after the death of either 
the father or mother, insured by OGA for the consecutive three years before 
death, except death from accident which would not require this last condition. 
Orphans studying at university or polytechnic would receive this pension up to 
their 24th year of age.
Orphan’s pension would be equal to basic OGA pensions and, according 
to the Introductory Report, would be doubled in the case of the second parent’s 
death. However, this amendment was not finally included in the law and the 25 
per cent increase of the former legislation was maintained. Furthermore, a 
regulation prohibiting orphan’s pension where the surviving mother was receiving 
pension from another insurance fund, was abolished. Finally, orphan pension
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increases due to the existence of wife and children would be 50 per cent for each, 
on the condition that the wife would not receive pension from another insurance 
fund.
A brief conclusion
Criticisms and reflections of the 1990 reform will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Here, in brief, it should be underlined that the new adjustments clearly 
aimed most of all, at immediate savings in the deficit of the social insurance 
organizations. The Ministry of National Economy estimated that the expected 
total savings would be 158 billion drachmas for 1991, 227 for 1992 and 267 for 
1993, in constant 1990 prices. This compares with the anticipated deficit of 980 
billion drachmas for 1990, expected to increase dramatically within the following 
couple of years respectively. However, as it will be seen, these predictions proved 
very optimistic.
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X
CRITICISMS AND REFLECTIONS OF THE 
1990 REFORMS
The way-out of the crisis
There is no need to mention again the huge reactions, the new social 
insurance legislation provoked, due to its considerable effect on the social, 
financial and political life of the country. Such catalytic insurance adjustments had 
not been attempted for four decades and credit for political will should underline 
any criticisms of the ruling conservative government. However, the full evaluation 
of this radical intervention, attempted in this chapter, is vital in order to 
understand the advantages and the weaknesses of the 1990 reforms and to draw 
conclusions on its impact on the Greek Welfare State.
The crucial Bill was discussed in Parliament for five consecutive sessions 
during the last week of September 1990 commencing on Monday the 24th. Valid 
criticisms arose from the fact that it was submitted in a Parliamentary holiday 
period under the "urgent procedure" (1). In other words, the Bill would be 
discussed by 1/3 of Greek MPs (2) and discussions should be completed in five 
sessions. The hundred MPs were 51 for New Democracy, the ruling conservative 
party, 42 for PASOK, the main opposition socialistic party, and 7 for the Alliance 
party, the left wing and communist party. Due to the urgent procedure, 
discussions lasted less than 34 hours overall and the MPs' were allowed a 
maximum speech time of 10 minutes in the best case. ".... social security system is 
collapsed! Social security problems cannot wait even for a minute" (3) claimed the 
Minister of National Economy. The opposition characterized this procedure as 
"...an institutional tragicomedy" (4), supporting the striking trade unions’ demand 
to postpone discussions of the Bill for 15 days, aiming at the withdrawal and
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deeper elaboration of particular harmful adjustments and the alleviation of social 
unrest.
At this point, the depreciating role of Parliament and MPs in the active 
formation of crucial socio-political issues should be stressed, considering that 
Greece is a heavily politicized country. "... this Parliament has become inactive..." 
said an opposition MP complaining about the procedure under which the 
insurance Bill was to be discussed (5).
During the five days when the new insurance adjustments were examined 
in Parliament, almost everybody passed outside Parliament demonstrating and 
protesting - OSEE, ADEDY, GENOP-DEI, OTOE, teachers, postmen or even 
the special police forces. Discussions inside, on the contrary, developed in front of 
empty benches and in a rather low tone atmosphere; the Prime-Minister 
Mitsotakis and the opposition leaders Papandreou and Florakis did not 
participate in the discussions and also did not even turn up in the Chamber (6). 
While the country was in the middle of a long painful strike-storm, most MPs were 
in Parliament’s coffee-shop, visiting the Chamber in order to vote for (the ruling 
party’s), or against (the opposition parties’) the proposed amendments, after their 
blippers signal! In introducing the Bill, the Minister of National Economy was 
almost always absent, either deliberating with his advisors and trade unionists or 
giving television interviews.
MPs who participated actively in the discussions, struggled particularly 
for the public servants’ - their loyal political clientele - insurance adjustments and 
especially for their new contributory conditions. "Battles word by word" resulted 
from some minor alterations accepted by the Minister. On the fourth day of 
discussions, however, the Government proceeded to an impressive retrograde 
movement with reference to the heavy and unhealthy occupations’ regulations, in 
order to pacify the striking electricity employees and to keep off the fear of a 
general black-out. "In other words we fully retreat Mr. Minister" shouted a ruling 
party’s MP, thus provoking the Minister’s anger (7).
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In the meantime trade unionists were time and again visiting the Prime- 
Minister’s office, declaring afterwards in front of the television cameras that "we 
had a friendly and truthful discussion... but ... strikes will go on". In a country 
where governments and politicians had conceded special privileges to some 
groups of people working in the public sector, the so called "confraternities", trade 
unionists were not willing to let their privileges slip away, by trespassing on the 
right to strike. The reason is obvious; these governments and these politicians by 
their familiar political practice of special provisions to particular groups, assigned 
them the power to determine developments for their working and insurance 
status according to their interests. Ironically but not surprisingly, the Prime- 
Minister Mitsotakis, who at this time was appealing against vested rights, Wcis the 
one who, as Minister of Coordination, had in 1966 and 1979 granted some of 
these privileges.
Back in Parliament, the discussions produced some important last minute 
amendments summarized as following:
a. The IKA pension condition for a minimum of 4.050 working days would be
retained for 1991 and gradual increase to 4.500 working days should start 
from 1 January 1992 onwards.
b. The existing minimum retirement age limits for those employed in IKA’s heavy
and unhealthy occupations would not increase.
c. The retirement age limit of 60 for IKA’s insured people in heavy and unhealthy
occupations employed after 1 January 1983 would not have effect to those 
with more than 10.500 working days in this category.
d. Women insured by IKA could be entitled to the respective retirement
conditions of female public servants if they wished.
e. Special funds’ insured people could retire but receive pension after the
completion of the retirement age limit, according to the existing respective 
regulation for public servants.
f. Special funds’ insured people employed in heavy and unhealthy occupations
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would retain the existing beneficial regulations of their fund.
g. Women, widows, widowers or divorced with three children would receive
pension after 20 insurance years in special funds.
h. TEVE’s minimum insurance period for death pension would decrease from 15
to 10 years in order to be adapted to the same conditions as TAE and TSA.
i. Paraplegics insured or retired in the public sector would be entitled to a special
allowance; they would retire after 15 years of insurance (8) and not 20 as the 
existing legislation provided, 
k. Employers verified as exercising insurance violations would have to pay a half 
penalty before the appeal.
1. The new adjustments would not finally include people insured by NAT, nor 
those working on ships, 
m. Finally, a regulation provided that within a month, a special committee should 
be appointed, in order to examine thoroughly the bank employees’ 
insurance funds’ issue.
Furthermore, not a few MPs, mainly of the ruling party, attempted to 
include in the new legislation several adjustments in order to satisfy the individual 
wishes of their voters. In this respect, regulations referring to very limited 
categories of insured people, the so called "photos" (9), were submitted in order to 
be included in the draft although most of them were completely against the 
concept of the new law. It was an opportunity for some MPs to "respond to their 
obligations" to their personal voters, though most of the time, these additional 
regulations did not pass into law either because they were submitted too late or 
met the opposition of the other MPs.
Such an amendment referred for example to the retirement of an army 
officer’s mother. It was suggested that mothers of officers that died on duty, 
having lost their husband within a year and not entitled to any other pension 
receipt, would be eligible for pension if the dead officer had been living with his 
mother up to his death! Many other "photos" were submitted, some important
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others not, based on the unwritten law on "solicitation of votes" but condemned to 
disapproval in most cases, since the particular Parliamentary discussions had met 
with the continuous intense interest of public opinion and media and therefore 
consequent control.
On Friday 28 September, the Parliamentary discussions for the new social 
insurance adjustments were completed. The Bill became Law after not an easy 
passage in Parliament, due to the one MP majority of the ruling party. According 
to the existing procedure the adjustments as a whole, passed in Parliament again 
on 10 October and after a week issued in the "Governmental Paper of Greek 
Democracy", developed into Law No 1902 of 1990.
Strikes played a declining role, though the measures provoked the 
unanimous opposition of the working people. The trade unions failed to foresee 
the limits of the public’s tolerance, as people were subjected to huge trials. In this 
respect, strikes began with society’s full support but came to an end with society’s 
indignation. The trade union leadership, led astray by the high participation in the 
strikes, did not know when to end them.
At the beginning of the week, when the adjustments were discussed in 
Parliament, almost a month after the strikes’ start, some top trade unionists, 
mainly of the left wing, proposed the ending of the strikes meaning the end of the 
conflict’s first round. This proposal met with the support of some leading trade 
unionists especially in GSEE, and the anger of the middle and low level trade 
unionists, who entirely refused the strikes’ suspension before the adjustments’ had 
passed Parliament (10).
Consequently, the labour movement was finally found apologising for the 
repercussions of strikes, having lost the opportunity to enhance public support by 
suspending them as a sign of social sensitivity. At the end of the day, strikers were 
beaten since, after the end of Parliamentary discussions, one trade union after the 
other ceased action, promising there would be a second round. The bank 
employees’ trade union (OTOE) was the one which opened the strike barrage and
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the last to leave the battle field.
The passing of the law and the end of strikes ratified the reconciliation of 
the trade unions to the Government and vice versa. The long and hard dispute led 
only to losers since both sides’ stature was seriously wounded. Trade unions 
especially, were expected to face a significant crisis, since sooner or later they 
would be forced to proclaim new strikes as a result of the Government’s tight 
incomes policy. The question raised would be how long the trade unions could 
convince working people of their real impact ,and most of all, of their credibility.
The Government on the other side, would have to face the tough 
criticisms of the employers’ lobbies on top of the popular discontent, since the 
market had been heavily affected by the strikes. The Industrialist Association (11) 
accused the Government of a delayed and hesitant position and demanded 
legislative alterations in order to repress and restrain the effects of hard long 
strikes.
Criticism of the adjustments
The 1990 social insurance adjustments of Law No 1902 aiming at the 
restoration of the Greek social security system failed from the very first moment 
to satisfy this vital mission for two essential reasons: Firstly, the relatively short 
period of preparatory elaboration and analysis in order to define the required 
guidelines and respectively the lack of indispensable thorough studies. Secondly, 
the failure to alleviate the existing huge inequalities at all levels, and moreover 
the prevalence of a feeling of injustice among insured people, and particularly of 
the low income classes.
The fact that the new social insurance legislation had been drafted and 
produced by the Ministry of National Economy, while the subject belongs to the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Insurance, which kept 
playing a marginal minor role, revealed the accounting philosophy and the 
collective objective of the legislator. The Greek Welfare State, reinforced by the
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socialist governments of PASOK during the 1980s, is certainly poorer after the 
establishment of the law; moreover low income working people and particularly 
pensioners are dramatically poorer after the implementation of the new 
adjustments since especially provisions for the lower classes had been negatively 
influenced.
Furthermore, the unsuccessful - once more - attempt to eradicate the 
privileges of some groups of working people in the public sector deprived the 
measures of any justification in people’s conscience and in most experts’ 
consideration. Moreover, as we have described in detail, the establishment of Law 
No 1902 provoked universal and long labour movements which paralysed the 
economy of the country and cost the economy more billions than those expected 
to be saved by the implementation of the regulations of the law within the next 
couple of years.
As mentioned, the 1990 reform was designed to produce immediate 
savings in the deficit of the social insurance organizations. During the elaboration 
of the new adjustments, the Ministry of National Economy estimated - and 
notified to the European Community - that the savings expected for 1991 would 
be in total 158 billion drachmas, for 1992 and for 1993 the figures would be 227 
and 269 billion drachmas respectively (12) .According to thorough new estimates 
of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Insurance some months later, 
savings for 1991 would be in total only 90 billion drachmas; the difference was 
concentrated on the economies resulting from the restrictions on minimum 
pensions which would be no more than 21 billion drachmas, while the Ministry of 
National Economy had forcast savings of 50 billion drachmas (13). The two 
Ministries agreed on savings from the restriction of contribution leakage (12 
billion drachmas), from the restrictions on disability pensions (6 billion drachmas) 
but they also had a difference of 4 billion drachmas from savings coming from 
increases in the rate of contribution (14). However, it was widely recognized that 
the expected economy would be equal to one per cent of GNP for 1991 (15), or
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almost 10 per cent of the overall annual deficit of the social security sector.
In the light of this unfavourable development, an EEC Specialists’ 
Committee came to Greece in May 1991, to discuss this issue with the 
Government and to attempt to appreciate the actual financial impact of the new 
measures. The Committee was not convinced of the efficiency of the 1990 reform 
and the Government was forced to submit to the EEC within June 1991 the 
directions and guidelines for a new intervention aiming - once again - "at the 
restoration of the social security system " (16).
In a country where politics and policy are used as one single word 
"poUtiki", and perceived as one single concept, that of politics, criticisms arise and 
come to an end under the catalytic veil of political prejudice. In this respect 
public opinion lacks objective and constructive information from the media and 
the new social insurance legislation could not escape this golden rule. Rarely press 
or experts, not to mention politicians, have exceeded in surpassing their political 
colour in order to explain to working people the essence of such measures and to 
spell out the necessary radical rectifications needed to rescue the social security 
system.
Consequently, the minimum consensus and collective spirit, vital for an 
actual reform of the system, was lost in political absurdity and the prevailing 
individualism. IKA members, once again, were to pay the highest price: 
contributory conditions in the leading scheme were restrained and pensions were 
drastically cut. The measures introduced for IKA - sound and reasonable in most 
of the cases - should have followed a vigorous reform in the other schemes, 
favoured with advanced adjustments in the past. The mass of IKA’s insured 
members, most of whom - more than 60 per cent - of the lowest income classes, 
were the victims of the 1990 reform. The others just lost some of their privileges. 
But of course, social justice and political feasibility are two different things. In the 
next pages the new social insurance adjustments which were considered radical 
and towards the long-sought rational direction, will be discussed.
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Public servants
The privileged category of working people most heavily affected by the 
1990 reforms were certainly public servants, since their contributory conditions 
were significantly amended. This was achieved mainly because, since long ago, 
public opinion has been against their special treatment which was matched with 
unacceptionally low level of productivity and poor services provided. However the 
adjustments introduced, provoked great confusion not only due to their compWty 
but also to the obscure way in which they were written in the law. The existence of 
the necessary transitional periods as well as the peculiarities of several 
subcategories of working people provided further complexities and 
misunderstandings. Extended debate concerned the crucial date of 1 January 
1983, which divided insured people into two categories, the second of which was 
losing significant advantages under the new regulations. The opposition and 
especially the socialist party accused the Government of "political and social 
racism" (17) since it was governing the country during this period. According to 
the traditional political practice of political bribes of the party in office, the 
employees entering the public sector at that time were the socialist party’s voters 
and especially active supporters.
In this respect the Government was accused of taking revenge on those 
public servants, discriminating against them and trespassing on the fourth 
constitutional article in reference to the principle of citizens’ equal treatment. The 
Government’s claim was that this date was chosen according to the constitutional 
article 116, covering the equality between men and women enforced then, and 
that anyway a starting date would have to be determined! (18)
The division of public servants’ social insurance rights could lead to a 
division within their trade union, a decrease of the already poor productivity and 
level of public services and, of course, the creation of two classes of employees. 
Alternatively, a single date cutting public servants in two pieces could be avoided 
by transitional regulations with gradual effect, changing for example specific age
311
limits eveiy couple of years and for a period of one or two decades. Most 
importantly, the new regulations, having dramatical and immediate impact on 
public servants personal, family, economic, occupational planning and their 
respective expectations, presented the State as an unreliable employer, changing 
the terms of the "occupational contract" of public sector employees arbitrarily and 
without consent.
Outrageously, the reform excluded the armed forces and some other 
minor special occupational categories without good reason. This exclusion 
generated further inequalities and reinforced favoured working groups, while 
being in contrast with the main principle of that defined as "the concept" of the 
new legislation. The same criticism is applicable to the regulations concerning the 
improvement in the general directors’ retirement rights. Fair regulations for 
dependants’ pensions, restricted unmarried daughters’ life pensions and upgraded 
male children’s’ pension rights to those of female ones. However, and for equality 
reasons, this adjustment should be either abolished or extended to the other main 
insurance funds.
The contributory conditions introduced brought the scheme closer to 
fundamental social insurance principles. The establishment of minimum retiring 
age limits - 60 for men and 58 for women - was an indispensable step towards the 
shrinkage of young pensioners. However, many voices opposed the abolition of 
the 35 years sole retirement condition; it was argued that in a social insurance 
system with such flexibilities and extremes, a man should obtain pension eligibility 
after a 35 years working life, irrespective of age.
According to the logic of the new regulations, two persons employed at 
the same time but with different ages could have 7 years difference in the required 
working period for retirement, since the - even a year - older one could retire 
before 31 December 1996, while the other would have to stay for 7 more years. 
Furthermore, a massive exit would be expected from all those completing 25 years 
of service before 31 December 1996. The transitional 7 years established period
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on top of the existing time conditions for pension eligibility had been the 
minimum sensible price of the new measures. Alternatively, insured people could 
retire according to the existing conditions and receive pension after the 
completion of the new ones.
The overgenerous regulation providing full pension to married women 
after 15 years of service in the public sector had been unanimously condemned 
and abolished (19). But it was too late. This kind of favourable regulations have 
stigmatized the development of the Greek social security system, falsifying its 
character and purposes and generating respective demands from other 
occupational groups. Moreover, "the 15 years pension" established in 1935, is a 
distinctive example of the prevailing political absurdity determined almost always 
by short term election purposes.
Not surprisingly, the same applies to the pension calculation system 
which returned to the form of eleven years earlier. The change was confessed as a 
mistake providing disincentives to those wishing to leave service before 
completing a 35 year working period. However, in the medium run and 
considering the system’s cash difficulties, as well as the fact that the public sector 
was employing at least double the normally required personnel, this policy could 
be disputed. The pension level is 80 per cent of working remuneration and 
respective economies could be achieved under a more flexible policy, leaving the 
pension conditions restriction for a second stage. In other words, especially in the 
public sector, the pension system could be used as a decisive regulative factor, 
diminishing the sector’s overemployment.
The re-establishment of very low contributions was a strategic step 
forward with secondary effect. On the one hand, it alleviated the outrageous 
discrimination against the remaining insured people, some of whom were 
contributing heavily to their funds. On the other hand, basically only those 
employed after the establishment of the law were going to pay these contributions. 
Due to the recession and the dispensably high number of employees, those
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entering the public sector should anyway be a marginal number for a long time.
In conclusion, the new regulations made the public sector less attractive 
for potential employees and reformed some areas of the sector’s insurance. Most 
criticisms concentrated on the retrospective effect of the new adjustments 
considering this process as "unethical" and as "a violent way of overthrowing the 
existing conditions". Many supported the enforcement of the amendments only for 
new employees and an alternative idea was a transitional period of three years 
instead of seven as the law determined. Alternative policies were not examined; 
the "15 years pension" for example has been in a sense, a decisive family planning 
and demographic factor. Early retirement leading to very low pensions was not 
provided for. Moreover, "provocative regulations" (20) privileging some groups 
such as general directors were established, contradicting the principles of the law.
Furthermore, some of the privileges removed - no contributions, 35s, 
etc.- had been gained in the past as a counterbalance to provisions not given to 
public servants. This fact was justifying anyway, part of public servants’ huge 
reactions. On the contrary, extremes such as the MPs pension eligibility after just 
four years in Parliament - the normal period between elections period - or, the 
existence of a trade unionists’ special fund providing pensions under outrageous 
regulations (21), criticized even by the left wing, was retained. Moreover, the new 
regulations would indisputably have a significant impact on the level of pensions 
expected, creating "two-gear pensioners of the same stuff (22) and contributing to 
the poverty threat faced by the low paid pensioners of the country.
Special Funds
The unsuccessful attempt of 1990 aiming at a radical reform of the 
special funds betrayed the greatest part of the expectations derived from the new 
legislation. The powerful trade unions of bank and public welfare employees 
managed once more to postpone, to a great extent, the most "painful" regulations. 
The Government withdrew them, announcing the establishment of a Social
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Insurance Committee with the task of suggesting the required adjustments in 
special funds.
Primarily, the Government announced that new employees of the banks 
and the public welfare sector would have to be insured by IKA, providing the step- 
by-step abolition of special funds. Those employed in heavy and unhealthy 
occupations would start paying higher contributions, according to IKA’s standards, 
since they enjoyed special insurance rights but with no special contribution rates in 
most categories. Both these adjustments were withdrawn. Moreover, the new 
legislation excluded heavy and unhealthy occupations, preserving the unjustifiable 
insurance privileges of almost 40 per cent of public welfare employees.
Furthermore, some of the new regulations, widened the inequalities gap 
in providing additional discrepancies. For example the "employer" would be 
responsible for covering special funds deficits, while other regulations generated 
inequalities within special funds as, for example, providing especially for 
employees in telecommunications a two-year delay for the beginning of the 
progressive increase in the rate of contributions. On top of this, the favourable 
adjustments of public servants have been extended to special funds "for reasons of 
equal treatment", as for example the provision of pension eligibility after 20 years 
of work to mothers with three children. The Government attempted to correct old 
mistakes by making new ones.
The new legislation, however, provided significant changes in this area as 
well, by defining retirement age limits, changing the method of pension 
calculation and pension readjustments. Contrary to the respective adjustment 
introduced for public servants, the 25 working years privileged retirement 
condition has been maintained but as a minimum period for all funds. However, 
for those employed after 1 January 1983, the method of pension calculation after 
25 years of service would lead to only half (25/50) of full pension.
A great debate had taken place in reference to the special funds’ 
financial position. The Minister claimed that most of them have had deficits while
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the opposition and trade-unionists insisted on exactly the opposite. The point, 
however, always was that in most special funds the employer was the State and at 
the end of the day, low or no contributions as well as generous provisions were 
paid by the consumer.
In conclusion, it should be explicitly recognized that special funds, the 
main battle-field of the new legislation, determined the character of this whole 
1990 venture as timid and ineffective. All agreed long ago that for this particular 
area a radical intervention was required. Some disagreed with the process of 
implementation, the lack of real dialogue and the rejection of all alternatives 
proposed by the trade-unions. Some argued that most privileges replaced non­
given provisions and salary increases in the past. Some hot-blooded - the trade 
union of bank employees - threatened MPs by a letter sent crudely stating: "Bank 
employees do not forget. Those voting for this law will account for it". The 
outcome of the story however has been that the strikes of people insured in 
special funds and the massive pressure exercised, achieved to perpetuate most of 
the existing advantaged social insurance framework.
In brief, the 1990 reform failed to fulfil even its short-run accounting 
objectives; the economies achieved never reached expectations, and most of them 
were lost due to the cost of the long strikes. Some privileges were cut but on 
balance, benefits of the lower income groups were further diminished. Most of the 
long existing inequalities, inconsistencies and inefficiencies were perpetuated. 
Most of all, the problem which in fact provoked the "reform", the growing huge 
deficits of the social security system, was not successfully tackled, since radical 
decisions were - once again - postponed.
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EPILOGUE
Throughout this thesis we have endeavoured to scrutinize the factors 
which influenced the development of social security in Modem Greece. As in 
other countries, Greece’s social policy relies almost exclusively upon social 
security measures and financially speaking upon social security expenditures. So, 
as a matter of fact, this thesis traces the development of social policies in Greece 
in most of the twentieth century.
Social policy in Greece, following the pattern of countries such as France, 
Italy, the Netherlands or Belgium, is mainly enforced by the distribution of cash 
benefits, the leading component of the welfare system. The vast majority of social 
security schemes provide contributory benefits and consist of administrative units 
that lack the essential infrastructure to do anything else than simply pay for 
services provided to their members. The State intervention is put across by two 
courses of action: firstly, the establishment of social security legislation copying 
much of respective foreign policies, and secondly, the varying degree of state 
subsidies to the existing social security schemes. As indicated in the preceding 
analysis, the social policies which the State pursued have always had a fragmented 
nature, lacking a fair and efficient distribution of resources, planning and 
coordination.
In the aftermath of the recent unsuccessful 1990 social security reform, 
considerations, arguments, and criticisms bear much of the issues already raised 
in the 1920s and 1930s. In the course of 3/4 of a century, the nature of the social 
security system - though significant improvements have been achieved in terms of 
extent of coverage, labour protection, income maintenance and health insurance - 
is much the same. The main characteristic of the Greek social security fashion is 
the unbelievable anarchy provoked by the existence of almost four hundred main 
and supplementary insurance funds, the "mosaic" as Zarras called it back in 1931.
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The lack of political will made the dream for the harmonization of the system - a 
term used hopelessly in every single legislation since 1932 - become a nightmare 
long ago.
At this particular point, emphasis should be devoted to the poor standard 
of public administration in Greece. The Greek pattern appears as one of extreme 
centralization and politicization. The average Cabinet size is more than 50 
Ministers and Under-Ministers with overlapping responsibilities and contradicting 
policies. The issue of social security belongs to the jurisdiction of five Ministries. 
The role of the Treasury, now called Ministry of National Economy, is 
comparatively weak and the financial implications of the pursued policies - even 
when estimated are based on unreliable or falsified data - are always actually 
unknown.
The institutions of modem democratic states have not operated in 
Greece in the fashion of the Western European countries. The existing political 
system emerged from colonial status or foreign subjugation in the nineteenth 
century but lags behind Western Europe in economic development, ability to cope 
with social change, and the development of strong representative institutions. 
Greek parliamentary politics seem to be concerned with matters either settled or 
ignored in contemporary Western political systems (23). The role of the press is 
identified as not constmctive, reproducing the biased socio-political environment 
of the country.
Greece has obviously insufficient wealth of natural resources that can be 
important for development. Moreover, the location of the country prevents an 
excessive trade with the industries and markets of the Western World. Exports 
have never reached the level of imports and the major Greek exports are luxury 
goods stmggling in a very flexible market and enormous competition. The few 
international advantages of Greece are mainly its ancient antiquities and its 
beautiful climate. Even in periods of economic growth, the State failed to 
establish a sound economic infrastructure while the temporary prosperity has
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caused a huge expansion of political demands, "a vast increase in the magnitude 
and variety of political demands" (24). The huge expansion of the informal 
economy, the "Black Economy", constitutes a major gap in economic 
development, absorbing valuable resources and significant revenues, mainly in 
terms of profit taxation.
In modem Greek society, "patterns of reciprocal favours and mutual 
obligations between patron and client are common" (25). All the mling political 
parties attempted to exert power through machineries of clientelistic networks 
which were accelerated during pre-electional periods. Recmitment practices 
increased in parallel with overwhelming competition for political influence. 
Employment in the wider public sector, for example, has almost always been the 
outcome of passing examinations for political loyalty.
The rapid integration of the majority of the population into the urban 
way of life has been achieved through clientelistic relations and the granting of 
privileges. This has led to the formulation of a fragmented and corporatist society. 
In this framework, the established social policies reinforced the existing social 
disabilities and the social security system redistributes social resources and 
contributions in favour of the political robust socio-professional groups.
The inequalities, inconsistencies and inefficiencies - the three in*s 
syndrome - of the Greek social security system reflects the indecisiveness and the 
irresponsibility of Greek politics. The rapidity of political change - the periods of 
office which are in practice remarkably short - provides considerable incentives for 
constant reinterpretation of political bribes to particular groups. Moreover, the 
response to the need for effective policies tackling the problems of social and 
economic development is diminished by the lack of any consensus among the 
prevailing socio-political groups. Not only are the goals of social and economic 
policies always disputed, but also the distribution of the burden of them among 
society.
This thesis has attempted a critical analysis of the factors which led to the
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landmarks in the evolution of social security in Greece during the turbulent period 
between 1920 and 1990. In a country where social research is underdeveloped - 
the extent of poverty has not even been identified - such a task has often proved 
frustrating and distressing. The overwhelming development of hundreds of social 
insurance schemes and the lack of reliable information makes the synthesis of a 
full history of the system not feasible. The landmarks elaborated are derived, both 
from the extent of population coverage, as well as from their indisputable impact.
Following this framework, the landmarks distilled are the first ever state 
social insurance introduced in 1922; the establishment of IKA, the compulsory 
social insurance scheme in 1934-1937; the massive social assistance efforts to cure 
the casualties of the Second World War and the successive civil war; the attempt 
to reorganize IKA in 1951; the establishment of agricultural social insurance in 
1961; and the repressive social insurance reform of 1990 following the absurd 
social policies of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
The social insurance legislation of 1922 was of strategic importance as it 
constituted the first major step in the introduction of a compulsory scheme in 
Greece as well as in the adoption of this field as an essential part of state policy. 
This law was introduced in a devastating socio-political period and, having no 
immediate effect, was nearly ignored by public opinion and the employers’ 
lobbies. Not surprisingly, the law was in fact not implemented. The law established 
the notion of social insurance in the conscience of the Greek people. It is 
considered as the milestone of social insurance in Greece, but it bears much of the 
responsibility for the dispersion of the field. It founded the State concept for the 
unrestricted introduction of fragmentary larger or smaller insurance funds against 
the orthodox legacy of social insurance principles.
The social insurance Bill of 1932, though radical and comprehensive, 
failed to become a law due to the overwhelming political instability and the 
reactions provoked by influential lobbies. Its successor, the law established in 1934 
introducing IKA, constitutes the landmark of universal social insurance protection
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in Greece. The law implemented from 1937 onwards, in fact established the 
institution in the country since it covered all the white and blue collar workers in 
the urban areas, including more than one third of the working population. The 
new scheme was financed by employers’ and employees’ pay-roll contributions.
The law of 1934, remained the social insurance framework for almost 
twenty years and failed to sort out the existing and recognized anarchy and to 
control the further piecemeal development of the system. It is crucial that at this 
early point, the awareness of the problem did not lead to the necessary correcting 
measures. The law was much milder than its 1932 predecessor in the way it treated 
the existing privileges of certain powerful occupational groups with their own 
special funds. Furthermore, the part concerning the prohibition of the 
introduction of new main insurance fund was not implemented. The number of 
main and subsidiary funds increased from 93 in 1934 to 150 in 1940. The main 
insurance gaps of the 1934 law were the exclusion of the massive agricultural 
population and of unemployment coverage. It was a law reflecting political 
compromises and is bitterly remembered as the "lost golden opportunity" to 
command the system at a not overdue stage. It established the legacy of the 
rational decisions never taken since then, though the problem was identified and 
highlighted. In addition, the long ago established privileges of the public servants’ 
scheme was ratified during this period.
Greece experienced a tragic period, between 1940 and 1949. The bitter 
civil war that followed the end of the World War II, left the nation once again 
deeply divided and wounded. More than ten per cent of the population was forced 
to leave their homes and to overcrowd the urban centres. This was the outcome of 
the preposterous behaviour of the political leaders who failed to prevent the 
massacre and the unorthodox role of the foreign allies. The social assistance 
services which undertook the arduous task for the material recovery of the 
population, relied mainly upon international help. The social insurance system 
was almost ruined.
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The priorities for the social assistance services were identified as the 
improvement of public health, the care of the destitute and the protection of 
children. The voluntary sector claimed a significant role in these heroic efforts. 
The lack of financial resources, of planning and coordination, and of trained 
personnel kept social assistance in Greece always in the comer. However, the 
comparatively massive services provided during the post-war period constitute a 
memorable era in the history of social protection policies.
The reconstruction of the social insurance system attempted in 1951 
came as the result of the existing embarrassing situation and of the international 
trend for unified social insurance schemes, following the influence of the 
Beveridge Report. The law of 1951 not only failed to fulfil its objectives but 
reinforced the legacy of multiple funds and it also introduced over-generous 
regulations not suitable for a contributory insurance scheme.
IKA was to remain the main social policy tool but the need for state 
subsidies, though adopted in the law, was not met for the next thirty years. The 
established contributory conditions for old-age pensions and early retirement, and 
the favoured heavy and unhealthy occupations were to create huge burdens. 
Moreover, the broad definition of disability adopted was to be heavily abused in 
the future. The administrative regulations, proved disastrous.
The intervention of 1951 modified the scheme towards a more solidaristic 
universal social security system, since firstly, it established a uniform minimum 
level of protection; secondly, it fully extended health care provision to 
dependants; thirdly, it introduced unemployment coverage and lastly, it enlarged 
the circle of the insured members by several occupational categories neglected up 
to this point. The harmonization of the social security system, set as one of the 
main objectives of the legislators, remained a dead letter. The existing fragmented 
evolution of insurance funds remained untouched, while a flourishing elite of 
privileged insurance schemes was left undisturbed. The "reform" of 1951 not only 
failed to reorganize the system but also established the basis for IKA’s bankruptcy
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some decades later. Again, rational decisions were postponed due to their 
political cost and illogical adjustments prepared the ground for the forthcoming 
deadlock.
The introduction of agricultural social insurance in 1961 marks the 
establishment of insurance coverage to more than half of the Greek population. 
This scheme, based on the Beveridgean model of health insurance, provided basic 
insurance coverage aiming to improve the living standards of the rural population. 
Financed exclusively by the State and earmarked taxation it provided very low 
pensions, insurance of agricultural produce and primary health care from rural 
centres. Hospital care was actually provided only in the urban centres.
OGA, the long sought organization which provided agricultural 
insurance, was in fact a social security scheme granting benefits of social 
assistance level at very low administrative costs. Not only did it fail to establish 
real social insurance coverage but also it failed to cope with the social disease of 
migration towards the urban areas or the more prosperous Western World. Those 
living in poverty conditions were of course befriended by politicians "struggling for 
the good of the nation", but those seeking the provision of adequate agricultural 
insurance services were disappointed. The nature of the rural population 
prevented the creation of a unified powerful pressure group, able to require 
adequate welfare benefits.
The nature of social policies pursued in Greece in the 1970s and the 
1980s has exacerbated the existing widespread inconsistencies, the embarrassing 
inequalities and the great inefficiencies. The privileged insurance schemes 
retained and in many cases enhanced their eminent position. The expansionary 
social policies of the early 1980s improved the level of cash benefits, but on the 
other hand enlarged dangerously the deficits of the sector. IKA was almost 
bankrupted and the State was at last compelled to subsidize it from 1982. The 
near destruction of the leading insurance scheme had been completed within 
three decades - 1951 to 1981. Step by step, the irrational social policies
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implemented, throughout more than six decades, in accumulation finally led the 
system to the verge of collapse.
The prolonged "crisis of the welfare state" interpreted by huge deficits in 
the late 1980s coerced the State into reacting at last. The social insurance reform 
of 1990, the long sought and always postponed intervention, aiming at the rescue 
of the collapsing system, provoked huge reactions and strong opposition. The 
advantaged socio-professional groups, exploit^ting once again their key role in the 
social and economic arena, went on strike for many weeks, black-mailing and 
provoking the society and the Government. The country was almost paralysed and 
many billion drachmas were lost before the Government finally postponed - once 
again - the most radical and indispensable adjustments.
The social insurance Bill of 1990 suffered critical alterations before it 
became law. It failed to uproot the huge inequalities and inefficiencies at all 
levels; moreover, it is sad that it mainly damaged the interests of the weakest 
groups of the insured population such as pensioners and those receiving the 
minimum wage. In this respect, the law made welfare benefits even more 
inadequate and the system, called unjustifiably in Greece the "welfare state", even 
poorer.
The legislators of the 1990 "reform" had one objective - to control the 
overwhelming deficits of the social security sector which could lead the country 
itself, to bankruptcy. The prevailing accounting philosophy of the law suppressed 
any solidaristic spirit and any redistributionary measure in favour of the lowest 
income groups. The Government - which should be credited to some extent with 
political will - was struggling to appear competent to EC circles since one of the 
main conditions of a vital EEC loan to Greece, was the immediate control of the 
huge deficits of the social security system. At that time, Greece’s EC counterparts 
were already questioning the "far-reaching changes in the social policy agendas" of 
the EC countries, leading towards a European Welfare State "at national and 
supranational level - in a period of major economic restructuring: protecting
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citizens’ living standards, supporting economic efficiency and securing political 
consent" (26). Unfortunately, as actually proved, the legislators miscalculated 
even the expected short and medium run economies and all that was achieved was 
a slowing-down of part of the expenses. The 1990 intervention came too late and 
achieved too little.
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CONCLUSION
In brief, the reasons for the faulty development of social security in 
Greece are clearly identified through two main streams - economics and politics. 
The first includes the deep recession and the difficulties arising in the market, the 
persisting inflation and the flourishing Black Economy. The second, which 
embraces much of the first, includes the pursuit of absurd policies which allowed 
the multiple dispersion of the field and the flourishment of unacceptable 
insurance privileges in favour of influential lobbies. The practice followed 
established mild contributory conditions especially for pensions; the allocation of 
state subsidies according to political criteria; the ineffective use of social insurance 
reserves and the granting of loans to the schemes, when needed, under very 
unfavourable terms; the comparatively high number of disability pensioners due to 
the extended abuses; the illogical expansion of heavy and unhealthy occupations; 
the one-sided pursuit of the insurance contributory principle; the amalgamation of 
small and medium bankrupted insurance funds into the major scheme; the 
implementation of social policies through social insurance without the 
indispensable input of state resources; the special political bribes for electoral 
benefits - enforced by the intolerable political instability - which matched with the 
unfavourable demographic development, created an army either of young 
pensioners or those without any adequate record of contributions. The highly 
politicized decision-making, not only failed to plan for a competent reform, but 
also conveyed the message that welfare benefits are almost exclusively a subject of 
political bargaining. Politics have been charged with the overwhelming share of 
responsibility for the mis-interpretation of the social security model in Greece. In 
fact, social policy is meant and used as social politics.
327
The writer’s premise before this study was that the tough historical 
legacy, the huge national disasters of the 20th century, moderated the social 
policies pursued. Throughout the preceding analysis however, the conclusion 
drawn is that the policies established reflected the irresponsibility and 
opportunism of Greek politics, not met in other European countries. As stated, 
the development of social security in Greece is embarrassingly characterized up to 
a great extent, as an accumulation of political bribes in favour of particular 
groups. But of course, nations enjoy the political leaders they deserve.
Seventy years after the first state attempt to introduce social insurance 
policies, the nature of the social security system remains in the long-run unique 
and illogical. The system needs radical and urgent curative treatment, hopefully 
not over a dead body. After all, it is not remarkable that every single social 
security legislation in the past has emphasized two vital objectives: firstly, that of 
the harmonization of the system and secondly, that the social policies pursued 
should not evolve into a heavy burden on the economy. None of these objectives 
have been even slightly achieved.
The prevalent social security system constitutes an unacceptable atrocity 
against the present and future generations of Greece. Ironically, public dis­
satisfaction with the benefits provided is mainly raised by those most privileged. 
The question is not any more whether to undertake the cost of the decisions 
needed and how to implement them. Neither does the problem seem to be the 
unbearable dilettantism of Greek politicians nor the deep politicization of the 
State. It is probably the individualism of Greek society which prevents any form of 
a minimum consensus emerging, which is needed for radical structural changes. 
Greeks have not to overcome their tough destiny and their political leaders’ 
absurdities. They simply have to overcome themselves.
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APPENDIX A
a. Funds where both employers and employees contributed:
- Pension scheme of employees in the National Bank, the Land Bank and the
Bank of Greece
- Pension scheme of employees in the Bank of Athens
- Pension scheme of employees in the Public Administration Company
- Pension scheme of employees in the Greek Electric Railways
- Pension scheme of employees in the Greek Electric Company
- Pension scheme of employees in the Bank of East
- Pension scheme of employees in the Popular Bank
- Pension scheme of employees in the Lighting-Gas company of Athens
- Fund of employees in the Bank of the National Economy
- Pension scheme of employees in the General Warehouses Company
- Fund of Mutual Help of employees of BIO Company
- Pension scheme of employees of the Electric Transportation
- Pension scheme of employees of the Greek Gunpowder and Cartridge Factory
- Pension scheme of employees of the Commercial and Industrial Chamber of
Commerce
- Pension scheme of employees of the Ionian Bank
- Assistance Fund of employees of the Commercial Bank
b. Funds financed by the contribution of employers, employees and the State
(by indirect taxes):
- Pension scheme of employees of the Piraeus-Athens and Peloponessos
Railways
- Pension scheme of employees of the Thessaly Railways
- Pension scheme of employees of the North West Greece Railways
- Pension scheme of employees of the Greek State Railways
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- Pension scheme of employees of the Athenian Railways Company
- Pension scheme of employees of the Corinthian Ship-Canal
- Pension scheme of employees of the Macedonia Railways
- Insurance Fund of the tobacco workers
- Pension scheme of employees of the Pyrgos Railways
- Pension scheme of employees of the Thessalonica Railways and Electricity
c. Funds financed by employees contributions and by the State (Indirect taxes):
- Pension scheme of employees of Athenian Newspapers
d. Funds financed only by the State - free coverage:
- Pension scheme for actors, musicians, theatre technicians
- Fund for flour millworkers
- Fund for Bakery Workers
e. Funds financed by employees:
- Pension scheme (of employees) of laboratories of destitute women
- Sea-workers ’ fund
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APPENDIX B
Voluntary organizations of social assistance
a. The "Welfare (care) of Northern Regions of Greece" under her Majesty's 
protection, established in 1947, and renamed as "Royal Welfare" in 1955. It was 
administered by a "Collection Commission" consisting of: the Archbishop of 
Greece, the Prime-Minister, several Ministers and judges, the Deans of Greek 
Universities, the General Director of the Bank of Greece, the presidents of the 
unions of doctors, lawyers, workers, etc. "Units" of the organization were 
established in each province of Northern Greece, directed by an agriculturist and 
having as personnel one doctor and several female volunteers. The activities were 
concentrated on rehabilitation (400 schools were built) and unprotected children 
("Children’s homes"). Additionally, a "Volunteers’ Club" was established in 1953, 
offering 3 months training in social welfare to female members, aiming at the 
creation of awareness of social problems’ awareness.
b. The "Royal National Institution" established in 1947, aimed to upgrade the 
living, social and cultural standards of the population. President of the Board of 
Directors of the Institution was the King and the members were the Archbishop 
of Greece, Professors and Academics, etc. The guidelines of the institution were 
no interference in politics, cooperation with the public services, whenever 
necessary, with income coming from sources other than the national budget but 
from voluntary contributions, donations, inheritances and subsidies from "Royal 
Welfare", with emphasis put on "Greek village", limited and effective projects.
The regional branches of the institution provided consultation and 
activities with reference to the agricultural and technical sector schools and 
training, cultural sector etc. Additionally, it established "Emergency Centres"
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providing temporary care to unprotected persons as well as programmes for 
mental health. The National Organization of Greek Handicrafts, established by 
the institution in 1958, aimed to rescue and expand any form of "popular art" and 
the organization of its further production, financed mainly by the State, Chambers 
of Commerce, donations, etc.
c. "Greek Light" established in 1948, under the protection of the King, aimed to 
raise the morale of the nation, especially of young people, to bring them closer to 
Orthodoxism. It was an association run by volunteer ladies who visited people in 
their houses.
d. "Greek Care" established in 1946, under Her Majesty’s protection, aimed to 
provide care to people in need by 35 branches all over the country and homes 
especially for children, financed by the State and its own resources.
e. "Friends of the Army" aimed to help the families of those in the war.
f. "Organization for the Girls’ Dowry" aimed to give dowries to destitute female 
children in order to marry.
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APPENDIX C
Social assistance service for disabled
A.Services for the physically handicapped 
Motor disabilities.
a. The Greek Association for the protection of disabled children was established
in 1948, enhanced by UNICEF and the American Middle East Institution. 
The hospital operated by this Association received annually 800 children 
providing mainly orthopaedic and physiotherapy rehabilitation with modem 
facilities.
b. PIKPA’s Centre for Handicapped Children introduced in 1954 a special section
providing all the range of services for disabled children.
c. The Centre for Disabled People in Athens (1945) provided full services for
handicapped people.
d. Saint Paul Hospital (1949) provided medical care for accidents and war
casualties.
The B U n d y  Deaf & Dumb
a. Blind
For children were established: The Blind House of Athens (Kallitheas), 
the Blind School of Northern Greece and "The Sun", established in 1950, 
financed by the Ministry of Social Assistance receiving children 7-19 years 
of age. For adults were founded the Boarding House (1958), the School of 
Female Blinds Association of Peloponessos (1943), and the School of 
Blinds’ Resettlement (1959).
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b. Deaf-and-Dumb
For Children, there were the National Institution for Deaf-and-Dumb 
protection, the Special School for Deaf-and-Dumb of Athens (Glyfada), the 
Deaf-and-Dumb protection institution of Thessaloniki.
Disabled children suffering from chronic diseases
Not specialized limited protection was provided for children suffering from 
TB and for Hansen’s disease.
B. For the mentally handicapped
The general provision of services for mentally ill people was unorganized 
and poor. In the late 1950s an attempt was made by the State to establish an 
institution for mentally ill children ("Theotokos") which provided limited care. 
Additionally, the open School of Athens (1937) was providing education to 
mentally ill children from 7-14 years old.
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TABLE 1
WAGE CLASSES ACTUAL WAGES ♦ NOTIONAL WAGES*
I 0.05-19.95 10
II 20-39.95 30
III 40-59.95 50
IV 60-79.95 70
V 80-99.95 90
VI 100-119.95 110
VII 120-139.95 130
VIII 140-179.95 160
IX 180 and over 200
* drachmas per day 
Source -. MW Mo 5755 of 4952
TABLE 2
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WAGE CLASS ACTUAL WAGE* NOTIONAL WAGE*
I up to 29.95 15
II 30-59.95 45
III 60-89.95 75
IV 90-129.95 110
V 130-169.95 150
VI 170-209.95 190
VII 210-249.95 230
VIII 250 and over 270
In case of considerable differentiations in the price index, in comparison with that 
of 1933 a Ministerial Decree, following a Cabinet decision could increase or 
decrease the above minimum and maximum stated limits.
* in drachmas per day 
source-LA^ No Gzi? OF 4154.
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TABLE 3
WAGE
CLASS
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR SICKNESS SECTOR *
TOTAL
AMOUNT
EMPLOYEES
PART
EMPLOYERS
PART
I 0.60 0.25 0.35
II 1.80 0.70 1.10
III 3.05 1.25 1.80
IV 4.45 1.80 2.65
V 6.05 2.40 3.65
VI 7.65 3.05 4.60
VII 9.25 3.70 5.55
VIII 10.90 4.40 6.50
* in drachmas
SOORa - LAW No 6z?8 oF \154
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TABLE 4
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PENSIONS SECTOR *
WAGE TOTAL EMPLOYEES EMPLOYERS
CLASS AMOUNT PART PART
I 0.55 0.20 0.35
II 1.60 0.65 0.95
III 2.70 1.10 1.60
IV 4.00 1.60 2.40
V 5.40 2.15 3.25
VI 6.85 2.75 4.10
VII 8.30 3.30 5.00
VIII 9.70 3.90 5.80
*in drachmas
6172 oF
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TABLES
NATIONAL BUDGET FOR THE CHILDREN 
YEAR DRACHMAS
1950 (2 months) 8.135,326
1951 66.672,254
1952 73.944,728
1953 58.559,664
1954 41.488,455
1955 36.928,120
1956 32.217,640
1957 28.494,705
1958 27.500,000
TOTAL: 400.440,892
SOURCE: Ministry of Social Assistance, 1948-1958
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TABLE 6
ANNUAL ESTIMATED REVENUES OF OGA FOR 1962 
(in drachmas)
A.. Insurance contributions
a) Direct contributions of land owners 
and land workers 230.000.000
b) Contributions of agricultural machine owners 20.000.000
B. Social contribution
a) 10 or 15 per cent of income-tax* 120.000.000
b) 15 per cent of companies tax 40.000.000
c) 10 per cent on stamps 130.000.000
d) Tax on cigarettes 225.000.000
e) Tax on luxury imported products 140.000.000
f) Tax on some local products 5.000.000
g) Tax on beers’ consumption 40.000.000
C. Social contribution on prices of agricultural prices 240.000.000
D. Several revenues 40.000.000
TOTAL: 1.230.000.000
£. Revenues from national budget for hospital care 300.000.000
GENERAL TOTAL: 1.530.000.000
* 10 per cent for annual income of more than 40.000 drachmas and 15 per cent for 
annual income of more than 240.000 drachmas
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TABLE?
ANNUAL ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE OF OGA FOR 1962
(In drachmas)
1. Old-age pensions 800.000.000
2. Health care 225.000.000
3. Crop-insurance compensation 150.000.000
4. Administrative cost 3 per cent 35.000.000 
on annual expenditure
TOTAL 1.210.000.000
5. Annual expenditure of national 
budget for hospital care &X).OÙO.OOO
GENERAL TOTAL 1.510.000.000
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TABLE 8
GENERAL INDICATOR OF WHOTÆSAÏ.E PRICES IN GREECE 
YEAR MONTH INDICATOR
1952 Dec. 100.0
1960 Oct. 154.9
1960 Nov. 157.9
1960 Dec. 158.0
1961 Jan. 157.9
1961 Febr. 158.5
1961 March 158.8
1961 April 158.5
1961 May 157.9
1961 June 154.9
1961 July 154.5
1961 Aug. 153.7
1961 Sept. 153.2
1961 Oct. 153.7
1961 Nov. 153.1
National Statistical Service of Greeee, February 1962
343
TABLE 9
OGA’s ACTUAL 1963 BUDGET
(in drachmas)
REVENUES
1. Social resources
2. The 2 per cent on agricultural products 
and tobacco sold
765.000.000
260.000.000
3. Direct contributions 250.000.000
4. Other revenues
TOTAL:
EXPENDITURE
1. Old-age pensions
2. Crop insurance
3. Health care provisions
4. Compensation for OGA’s representatives
5. Compensation for ATE’s activities
6. Central Administration expenditure
a) Personnel cost, etc. 10.985.000
b) Rent, electricity, etc. 3.771.000
c) Computers 2.500.000
30.000.000
1J05.000.000
900.000.000
150.000.000
180.000.000 
16.342.000
5.000.000
17.256.000
7. Investments and deposits 36.402.000
TOTAL: 1.305.000.000
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TABLE 10
SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE AND GNP *
GNP SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE
YEAR DR ANNUALINCREASE DR ANNUAL
INCREASE
SOCIAL
SECURITY
CONTRI­
BUTIONS
NATIONAL
BUDGET
SUBSIDIES
SOCIAL
SECURITY
EXP/TURE
A S % O F
GNP
1957 70.690 5.719 3.647 2.072 8.09%
3.3% 11.8%
1958 73.143 6.392 4.066 2.326 8.74%
3.5% 8.7%
1959 75.694 6.950 4.503 2.447 9.18%
6.4% 8.8%
1960 80.510 7.561 5.057 2.504 9.39%
* in thousand drachmas
GRAPH 1
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GRAPH 2
INSURED POPULATION OF GREECE IN 1990 - SEGMENTS
38%
□ IKA OGA TEVE PUBUCSERVANTSIBAISKS ■ o m e ^
SOURCE : MINISTRY OF HEALTH. WELFARE. AND SOCIAL SECURITY. 1994 4^
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SOURCE : MINISTRY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY, 1989
GRAPH 4
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SOURCE: OECD, 1988 00
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